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American Constitutional Conventions: The
Judicially Unenforceable Rules That
Combine With Judicial Doctrine and
Public Opinion to Regulate Political
Behavior
JAMES G. WILSON*
"In short, by the side of our written Law, there has grown up an
unwritten or conventional constitution."'
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTIONS
rT he concept of nonjusticiability, reflected primarily through the
X "political question" and the "standing" doctrines, fails to give the
Supreme Court (and the rest of us) adequate guidance on how to resolve
many constitutional disputes, such as impeachment procedures and stan-
dards, congressional expulsions, the scope of federal court jurisdiction,
and the use of force abroad. These two doctrines put the Supreme Court
on the horns of a false dichotomy. The Court tends to withdraw com-
pletely from an issue and from enforcing a textual passage, such as the
Republican Guarantee Clause, whenever it makes a determination of
* Professor of Law, Cleveland State University. B.A., Princeton University. J.D., University of
Chicago. I asked for and received a tremendous amount of assistance on this article. I would like to
thank Hans Linde, the late George Haskins, Geoffrey Marshall, Rodney Brazier, Sheldon Gelman,
Maijorie Kornhauser, Lynne Henderson, Steve Steinglass, Susan Becker, Debbie Geier, Steve Laza-
rus, Dean Steve Smith, and Mimi Lord for their help. The Cleveland-Marshall Fund once again
provided needed assistance.
1. EDWARD A. FREEMAN, GROWTH OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 109 (1872), quoted in
A.V. DICEY, AN INTRODUCroN To THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONsTrrION 420 (10th
ed. 1959).
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nonjusticiability.2 Conversely, once the Court has determined that it can
competently handle an issue, as it did in a recent Origination case,3 it
tends to intervene aggressively.
The Court, for example, decided in early 1992 to hear District Judge
Walter Nixon's claim that he should not have been impeached for brib-
ery because the Senate did not provide sufficient procedural safeguards.
4
Judge Nixon asserted that his case should have been heard by all the
Senators, not by a committee of twelve Senators that reported back to
their colleagues. If the Court feels obligated to eliminate all unfair proce-
dures, it might resolve Nixon's case on the merits.5 It could extend its
existing procedural due process doctrine to impeachment proceedings.
But once the Court starts reviewing impeachment proceedings, where
can it stop? Could the Court review the impeachment of one of its own
members?
Later in this article, I will propose that the Court should not provide
any meaningful review of either the process or substance of impeachment
proceedings. But such judicial abstinence can excessively legitimate
political behavior that violates constitutional norms. What if Judge
Nixon had only been allowed to appear before a single, biased Senator?
If the Court refused to correct that procedural abuse because it was
"nonjusticiable," the citizenry might interpret the Court's decision as a
complete validation of such an impeachment. A finding of nonjusticiabil-
ity in the pending Walter Nixon ease may convince the Senate that it can
do whatever it wants, because there is no constitutional recourse or re-
straint. Another perspective is needed.6
2. In a recent case, the Court stated that it might delve into textual passages that have previ-
ously been considered nonjusticiable. New York v. United States, 112 S.Ct 2408, 2433 (1992). If the
Court does make such a move, the law/convention distinction can help it decide how far to go.
3. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990).
4. Nixon v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 1158 (1992).
5. Nixon v. United States, 744 F.Supp 9 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd, 938 F.2d 239 (D.C.Cir. 1991),
cert. granted, 112 S.Ct. 1158 (1992). The lower courts held that the claim was nonjusticiable.
6. As we shall see, the concept of conventions improves our understanding of how the Constitu-
tion functions and of how it should function. For example, the Senate created a new convention in
1992, when the Democratic and Republican leadership agreed not to force journalists Nina
Totenberg and Timothy Phelps to testify as to their sources. The Judiciary Committee was trying to
ascertain how Anita Hill's evidence against Clarence Thomas was leaked to the press. The Senate
decided that using their contempt power to require such testimony would put a "chilling effect" on
the media. William Eaton, Senate Will Not Try To Force Reporters To Testify On Leaky, L.A.
TIMES-MIRROR, Mar. 26, 1992, at 23. Thus Congress, not the Supreme Court, established a new
constitutional doctrine, a new constitutional convention, that influences both structural and individ-
ual rights. See also TIMOTHY PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNITZ, CAPITOL GAMES 430-33 (1992).
[Vol. 40
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American lawyers, judges, political scientists, and politicians7 can
improve their constitutional analysis of issues like the Walter Nixon im-
peachment by importing a concept that British lawyers have refined over
the past century: "constitutional conventions."' The British give the
phrase two meanings: "constitutional conventions" are judicially unen-
forceable allocations of constitutional power and judicially unenforceable
regulations of constitutional power.9 "Conventions" have been called
"unwritten" because they are neither codified by statute nor part of the
English common law. Yet the British legal community frequently writes
about "conventions"; they are staples in any English constitutional law
7. For discussions about the role those outside the judiciary play in interpreting the American
Constitution, see Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALoGuEs: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL
PROCESS (1988); JOHN AGRESTO, THE SUPREME CoURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
(1984); SOTIRiOS BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTrUTION MEANS (1984); and Walter F. Murphy,
Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 REV. POL. 401 (1986).
8. English conventions should not be mistaken for American constitutional conventions, the
formal meetings that can create or transform America's written Constitution. This article's use of
the word "conventions" also should be distinguished from Professor Dworkin's "conventionalism,"
a close relative of H.L.A. Hart's "rule of recognition":
In America it is settled by convention that law is made by statutes enacted by Congress
or the state legislatures in the manner prescribed by the Constitution, and in England
that decisions by the House of Lords are binding on the lower courts. Conventionalism
holds that legal practice, properly understood, is a matter of respecting and enforcing
these conventions, of treating their upshot, and nothing else, as law.
RONALD DWORKiN, LAW'S EMPIRE 114-15 (1986). Such "meta-conventions" are largely outside
this article's jurisdiction. We are trying to determine when the Court should intervene, and few
would argue that the Supreme Court should completely abstain from determining what is or is not
law.
The word "convention" has a complex intellectual history; its meaning has not been fixed by any
linguistic convention. For example, the philosopher David Lewis maintained that conventions arise
only when parties arbitrarily choose one valid solution over another to achieve regularity. DAVID
K. Luwis, CONVENTION 96 (1969). Lewis' conventions only facilitate co-ordination. We can drive
on either the left or right side of the road, but we must make a choice. Constitutional conventions,
on the other hand, are followed for a variety of reasons. Sometimes the alternative is less desirable.
Id. at 95. Lewis would probably call constitutional conventions "rules." See id. at 103. David
Hume placed the notion of "convention" at the center of his jurisprudence. He argued that people
need to form "conventions" about property, which in turn lead to a broader definition ofjustice. See
DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 489-90 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford University
Press 1888) (1740).
9. Unlike the British Constitution, which is permeated with both types of conventions, the text
of the American Constitution explicitly delegates most important constitutional powers. Further-
more, the Supreme Court determines which additional powers, such as the President's power to issue
Executive Orders, can be "implied" from the text since the federal government is, in theory, a gov-
ernment of limited powers. Consequently, this article shall emphasize the judicially unenforceable,
"unwritten" regulations of existing constitutional powers that arise under the American Constitu-
tion. I hope to develop a more complete inventory of all American conventions in the future, includ-
ing those that distribute constitutional power. Allocation of power is, after all, a regulation of
power.
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course.1" For example, "convention" requires the British Prime Minister
to resign or to dissolve Parliament, thereby forcing a general election,
whenever he or she loses the confidence of the House of Commons."
The English courts would not compel a recalcitrant Prime Minister to
comply with that rule. Only some combination of politicians, the people,
the Monarchy, or even the military could resolve such a severe constitu-
tional crisis. Other "conventions" include the Queen's virtually
mandatory obligation to assent to all legislation put before her,12 and the
Prime Minister's legally unconstrained powers to hire and to dismiss any
Cabinet members." These examples demonstrate that "conventions"
vary radically in the amount of discretion they provide to politicians.
Professor Geoffrey Marshall's description of the methodology for
10. Because of conventions, standard English constitutional law books cover more ground than
their American counterparts, including such subjects as parliamentary structure and process, the
Cabinet, the discretionary powers of the Executive, the Civil Service, and the police. See S. DE
SMITH & RODNEY BRAZIER, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (6th ed. 1989); COLIN
TURPIN, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTrTioN: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS (1985);
GEOFFREY WILSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(2d ed. 1976). England's simultaneous presentation of the political and the legal constitutions is
preferable to America's focus on Supreme Court cases and on a few sections of the Constitution.
English law students do not have such a legalistic conception of their constitution. For a similar
criticism, see W. Michael Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study
of International Law, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 8 n.13 (1984).
11. This convention did not directly force Margaret Thatcher to resign as Prime Minister in
1990. She stepped down because she lost control of her party MPs during the Conservative Party's
annual election of their leader. Walter Bagehot, The Succession, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 24, 1991, at
64. The winner of that election, John Major, satisfied the basic constitutional convention because all
the Conservative MPs, who make up a large majority in the House of Commons, would support him
against any rival party challenges. Many Conservative backbenchers and Cabinet Ministers wanted
a different leader, but not at the expense of a forced general election that might cost them their
power and even their jobs. See Rodney Brazier, The Downfall of Margaret Thatcher, 54 MOD. L.
REv. 471 (1991).
12. GEOFFREY MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THE RULES AND FORMS OF
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILrrY 21-22 (1984). As the title of Marshall's book indicates, most British
conventions facilitate political accountability. Chief Justice Marshall noted the link between ac-
countability and political questions in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803): "By the
constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain important political powers,
... and is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience." Id.
at 165-66. Chief Justice Marshall's distinction between law and politics demonstrates that the con-
cept of conventions is consistent with Marbury. Indeed, this article attempts to make Marshall's
distinction more compelling. The principle of conventions also coexists with the technical meaning
of Marbury because Marbury only requires that the Supreme Court initially consider all constitu-
tional claims. Marbury does not require the Court always to have the last word. See Terrance
Sandalow, Comments on Powell v. McCormack, 17 UCLA L. REv. 164, 172-74 (1969). '
13. Although the Queen has the legal power to hire and fire all government officials, convention
requires her to defer to the Prime Minister. RODNEY BRAZIER, CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 57-60
(1988).
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determining British constitutional conventions is so succinct that a
reader can miss its breadth: "the essential quality that should mark a
constitutional convention [is] the combination of consistent historical
precedents, and a convincing raison d'etre."'14 Determining which prece-
dents are relevant and what weight should be given to such episodes ri-
vals, in terms of difficulty, analysis of legal precedent. Yet the concept of
conventions is not simply historical. The British Constitution sometimes
changes rapidly'5 because a single event creates or alters a convention:
"There may be an agreement among the people concerned to work in a
particular way and to adopt a particular rule of conduct. This rule has
not arisen from custom; it has no previous history as a usage."16
There will be even less agreement over what is a "convincing raison
d'tre." The ambiguity of raison d'etre implies that one can legitimately
rely upon virtually any form of constitutional argument- text, historical
intentions, precedent, policy, and/or political morality- when defining
or modifying particular constitutional conventions. Furthermore, the
formulation of precise conventions becomes very contextual because the
non-legal sanctions for breaches of convention range from indifference, a
drop in opinion polls, and forced resignation from office, to armed rebel-
lion. But such problems should not deter us from studying conventions,
which distinguish between a constitution's legal and non-legal compo-
nents. As Professor Marshall noted: "There seems little to be gained by
insisting that the rules of political behavior that are observed in these
matters are fundamentally of the same nature as rules of law."'
7
Several reasons exist for developing a similar conception for Ameri-
14. MARSHALL, supra note 12, at 45. Marshall's invocation of a "convincing raison d'etre is not
as conclusory or simplistic as it might first appear. Karl Llewellyn wrote that the preferred tech-
nique of judicial rulemaking sought "the rule with a singing reason." KARL LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION 210-15, 493-96 (1960).
15. Some changes in conventions are gradual. Prior to the 1960s, it was thought that the gov-
ernment must resign whenever it lost a major vote. The current rule is that the Prime Minister must
resign whenever he or she loses a vote of "no confidence." MARSHALL, supra note 12, at 55. This
new rule makes governments more stable and partially liberates backbenchers (members of the ma-
jority party who are not in the government) by allowing them to vote against some of their own
government's initiative without inevitably risking their careers by triggering an election. Thus a
fundamental convention-determining when a government must seek to dissolve Parliament--can
change over time.
16. SIR KENNETH WHEARE, MODERN CONSTrrUTIONS 180 (1951), quoted in MARSHALL,
supra note 12, at 9. Professor Marshall cited two examples of the instantaneous formation of con-
ventions: "that the United Kingdom would not legislate for Commonwealth countries except upon
their request and consent, and that any change in the Royal style and titles should require the
consent of all the member countries .... " MARSHALL, supra note 12, at 9.
17. GEOFFREY MARSHALL, CONSTrruTiONAL THEORY 12 (1971).
1992]
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can constitutional conventions, much of the American Constitution is
created and controlled outside the courthouse.18 American constitu-
tional conventions are widespread; they implement and control much of
the text of the Constitution. To support that positive-normative claim,
this article will discuss a variety of existing American constitutional
conventions.
Consider the presidential electoral college. The constitutional text
does not dictate how its members must vote, but convention requires all
members of a state delegation to support the presidential candidate who
received the most votes in their state. If a lawsuit were ever fied in the
federal courts to obtain compliance with that convention, the Supreme
Court should not enforce the convention. For example, the Supreme
Court ought not order a West Virginia elector, who voted in 1988 for
Lloyd Bentsen as President and for Michael Dukakis as Vice-President,
to change that vote.19 Henry Jones Ford described how this convention
was created, well over a century ago, in direct conflict with the Framers'
original intentions:
A fact of the highest importance, which has been made manifest by
this process, is the plastic nature of constitutional arrangements, however
rigid their formal character. The electoral college has been entirely
divested of its original functions, without a change in the letter of the law.
Instead of possessing discretionary powers, it has become as mechanical as
a typewriter. The case is conclusive evidence of the ability ... of public
opinion to modify the actual constitution to any extent required. It has also
revealed wherein the true strength of a constitution resides. There is not a
syllable in the organic or in the statute law to safeguard the present consti-
18. The concept of conventions can be reconciled with many of the legal academy's ever-grow-
ing number of"schools"-- pragmatism, republicanism, feminism, humanism, liberalism, critical
legal studies, environmentalism, and conservatism. All these movements should be as aware of polit-
ical conventions as they are of constitutional legal doctrine; specific conventions can be more impor-
tant than many legal decisions. Since conventions will be more overtly political in nature, they
provide another battle-ground for contesting ideologies. The English system is actually easier to
evaluate than the American one because British conventions are primarily designed to improve ac-
countability. Accountability (and its cousin, majoritarianism) cannot explain the American Consti-
tution, which contains a more complex political morality.
American conventions tend to be anti-theoretical because they serve the diverse number of values
contained within the Constitution. They also reveal how the Constitution changes over time in
response to the people's will; the American public has never been committed to any single ideology.
Thus conventions help us better understand America's unique, perpetually changing constitutional
morality.
19. The elector cast that vote to protest the entire structure of the electoral college. Bush,
Quayle - Winners Again, Cm. TRia., Dec. 20, 1988, § 1, at 4. That convention has been criticized.
Skip Roberts has proposed that States should pass laws changing the winner-take-all "custom" that
currently determines how electors cast their votes. George F. Will, Electoral College's Campus Radi-
cal, WASH. PoST, June 3, 1990, at D7.
[Vol. 40
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tutional function of the electors, and yet such is the force of public senti-
ment that there is practically no danger that any elector will ever violate his
party obligations, although it cannot be doubted that those obligations have
been established in opposition to the expectation of the constitution.20
Thus a crucial part of the American Constitution, the method of electing
Presidents, is partially "unwritten" in the same sense that much of the
English Constitution is "unwritten."21
The example of the electoral college reveals how conventions adapt
to changed circumstances. This fluid, evolutionary nature of conventions
adds another perspective to the debate over how to interpret the Consti-
tution. For example, "originalists"22 like ex-Judge Bork need to explain
why originalism is the only "legitimate" form of constitutional interpre-
tation when conventions have changed so much of the Constitution. All
American lawyers and judges should explain how their constitutional
legal doctrine and legal theory co-exists with the political doctrine of
constitutional conventions.
Most of us know that it is difficult, if not impossible, to infer an
"ought" from an "is." Arguably, the widespread existence of conven-
tions only shows that conventions ought to be studied, not that they
ought to exist. But there are also strong normative arguments for devel-
oping a doctrine of American constitutional conventions. Conventions
can and do serve many of the same valuable purposes that constitutional
legal doctrine should fulfil. Conventions prevent tyranny, constrain dis-
20. HENRY J. FORD, THE RISE AND GROWTH OF AMERICAN POLITICS 161 (1898).
21. While this article was being completed, Ross Perot was dominating the 1992 presidential
election in the summer of 1992. His candidacy raised a strong possibility that the country might end
up with a "hung Electoral College," which would refer the final decisions to the House and Senate.
Guy Guliotaa, 3-Way White House Race Could Greatly Complicate Electoral Process, WAsH. POST,
May 28, 1992, at A19. Indeed, Perot cited the "gridlock" that would result if the election was sent
to the House as a key reason for withdrawing from the race. I Just Wanted to Do the Right Thing',
NEWSWEEK, July 27, 1992, at 26.
If a presidential election did end up being decided by Congress, that process should be regulated
completely by convention, even though the Bush campaign had considered legal action during Pe-
rot's candidacy. S.A. Paolantonio & David Hess, Bush Team Plots Course If There is No Winner,
CHI. TRIB., May 30, 1992, at 1. Under such circumstances, I believe the House should adopt, as a
convention, the rules that it would select the candidate who received the most votes throughout the
country. The Senate should pick that candidate's vice presidential nominee. Otherwise we would
have a President without any mandate and with little legitimacy. Such a convention also has the
virtue of applying a neutral standard to a crucial constitutional controversy.
22. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 143 (1990). Raoul Berger may be the
most consistent advocate. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977). Paul Brest,
on the other hand, rebuts originalism. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Under-
standing, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980). For a useful summary of the debate over constitutional inter-
pretation, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 4 Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1889 (1987).
19921
HeinOnline  -- 40 Buff. L. Rev.  651 1992
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
cretion, distribute power, enhance efficiency and accountability,
strengthen separation of powers, and generate an internal political moral-
ity. The written text initially allocates many broad constitutional powers
to different groups of political leaders, but the exercise of such powers is
often not amenable to effective judicial review. Only conventions can
control the politicians' implementation of many constitutional powers.
Furthermore, if the Rehnquist Court becomes increasingly majoritarian,
generally deferring to elected branches' resolution of constitutional
claims, then it is vital that the country develop an additional set of con-
stitutional constraints to regulate the politicians. The politicians should
not assume that they have unlimited discretion because the Court has
refused to intervene.
The relationship between law and convention should be symbiotic,
not adversarial. Conventions and legal doctrine can arise under the same
constitutional text, enabling the American Constitution to fulfill its mul-
tiple functions. For instance, the President's power to wage war can ar-
guably best be controlled by a mixture of convention, Supreme Court
doctrine, and even congressional statutory law. Because each clause of
the Constitution serves different purposes, we need different combina-
tions of judicial decisions, conventions, and statutes to enable each con-
stitutional clause to best fulfill its functions. Furthermore, the choice
between law and convention cannot be made by relying on any single
mode of interpretation, be it text, history, or policy. 23 Nor can the choice
be reduced to the frequently articulated distinction between structure
and rights.24 One needs to assess the particular factors of each case and
the overall desirability of either alternative.25
23. By being so political and so fluid, the concept of conventions undermines any attempt to
reduce all constitutional interpretation to a single interpretive technique.
24. See JEssE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REviEw AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 127-
28, 169-70 (1980); J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L.
REv. 97, 164-69 (1988). Structure and rights cannot and should not be completely separated; some
conventions affect individual rights. For example, convention could help regulate the use of the
special prosecutor, whose powers affect both the Constitution's basic structure and the individual
rights of executive officers who are being investigated. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
25. Broad as the scope of this article is, it will not discuss what "fundamental" individual rights
may exist under America's "unwritten constitution." See Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwrit-
ten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975). Thus it will not consider such nontextual, funda-
mental rights as the right to travel. See, eg., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right of
new resident in state to receive welfare); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250
(1974) (striking down one year residency requirement before an indigent could receive emergency
medical care). All such rights are, by definition, judicially enforceable, and thus are not conventions.
In this article, I shall use the British concept of conventions primarily to assist in determining the
American Constitution's governmental structure: its formal and informal distributions of power.
[Vol. 40
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The notion of conventions also creates a bridge between law and
political science by allowing American constitutional lawyers to share
with the political community their technical skills and experience, their
tools of "legal reasoning," to develop precise conventional rules that will
make the Constitution stronger and politicians more accountable. Many
legal skills are required because some conventions are so broad that they
approach the status of truisms (such as the convention against tyranny or
the convention against self-aggrandizement by any branch of govern-
ment26), while other conventions coexist with some of the American
Constitution's most subtle legal problems (such as the scope of congres-
sional power to alter federal court jurisdiction under Article I and Arti-
cle III). American constitutional lawyers and judges have spent two
centuries deriving specific, complicated rules from general constitutional
standards, as well as from the more technical parts of the document. In
addition, conventions cannot be precisely formed without considering
Supreme Court case law because legal doctrine and "conventional doc-
trine" frequently coexist under the same constitutional text. Constitu-
tional lawyers are also needed because conventions can be created,
defended, and altered by conscious application of the constitutional text,
the Framers' intentions, relevant precedent, policy considerations, and
morality - the same sources that animate constitutional legal analysis
and debate." The process also works in reverse. Careful contemplation
of the political components of the Constitution enhances legal constitu-
tional theory and adjudication.
On a purely legal level, the concept of conventions is important be-
cause it assists the Supreme Court in determining which constitutional
issues should be ultimately resolved by the political branches. Congress,
the President, and/or the public will determine the existence of conven-
tions, their precise contours, any violations, and any sanctions. By si-
multaneously revealing and refining the existence of nonlegal
constitutional constraints on political behavior which violate constitu-
tional norms, constitutional conventions prevent the Supreme Court
from deciding constitutional controversies which are so disturbing that
26. Note that the "convention" prescribing one branch of the government from dominating
another has a legal equivalent. Sometimes the Supreme Court can and should form legal doctrine
under the separation of powers doctrine to prevent one branch from overwhelming another.
27. The debate over which forms of constitutional argument can be "legitimately" used by the
Court is at the heart of contemporary constitutional jurisprudence. See, eg., BORK, supra note 22
(only heretics look at anything aside from text, history, and precedent). For a critique of Bork,
including exhaustive documentation of internal inconsistencies, see Richard A. Posner, Bork and
Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1365 (1990).
19921
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they cry for a remedy, but for a remedy that should be political, not
legal.2" Just as the Court is more willing to intervene when it can per-
ceive a judicial remedy, it is less likely to produce final judicial resolu-
tions if it is aware of alternative, political solutions. The elected branches
can sanction those who breach conventions, with the voters retaining the
last word. In other words, certain constitutional wrongs can only be ef-
fectively prevented or corrected by the politicians and/or the voters.
Many constitutional debates should focus on the precise form of conven-
tions, not solely on legal doctrine. Many law review articles appear una-
ware of how the distinction between law and convention can improve
their inquiries, even though they are primarily concerned with formulat-
ing appropriate constitutional conventions, not with developing constitu-
tional law.29
One sticky, legal doctrinal issue remains: Should the Supreme Court
hold that all conventions are nonjusticiable "political questions," or
should the Court simply decide that the plaintiff loses on the merits be-
cause final resolution of the issue is committed to another branch? The
doctrinal semantics become even more intricate because the Court some-
times relies upon "standing"3 to dismiss suits which have heavy political
28. Only some separation of powers issues are outside the scope of effective judicial review. I
reject Professor Choper's proposal that the Court should abstain from all separation of powers dis-
putes. CHOPER, supra note 24, at 295-96. For example, I argued in a recent companion piece that
contemplation of the British system supports a fairly rigid, formalistic interpretation of the Appoint-
ments Clause, particularly in criminal cases. James G. Wilson, Altered States: A Comparison of
Separation of Powers in the United States and in the United Kingdom, 18 HASTrNGS CONST. L. Q.
125 (1990). Conventions help us determine when the judiciary should intervene in separation of
powers cases. These two articles suggest one partial solution: The Court should insure that the
personnel within each of the three branches are fairly immune from each other, but should tolerate
much fluidity in how those three branches share many constitutional powers.
29. Virtually every article cited in this article addresses issues that might be best solved, at least
in part, by creating constitutional conventions.
30. During the 1970s and 1980s the Supreme Court added a substantive component to its stand-
ing requirements, using the doctrine to exclude claims that it believed would corrode separation of
powers. For examples of this usage, see Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208 (1974), Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464
(1982), and Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). Such holdings are a hybrid of the "political
question doctrine." This article will not attempt to determine which doctrine should be used when,
if only because the author believes that the Court should never have added any substantive compo-
nent to standing beyond "injury in fact." See Wayne McCormack, The Justiciability Myth and the
Concept of Law, 14 HASINGS CONST. L. Q. 595, 599-611, 627-630 (1987). See also William A.
Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L. J. 221 (1988); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Stand.
ing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1985).
On the other hand, Professor Brilmayer maintains that standing advances non-constitutional val-
ues. Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article IP Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Re-
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overtones. Legal scholars have intensified the debate by praising the
political question doctrine,31 or by claiming it is nonexistent, 32 unneces-
sary,33 mythical,34 prone to unpredictable applications,35 and danger-
ous.36  Because I am primarily interested in demonstrating the value of
conventions as a tool of constitutional analysis, I shall not dwell upon the
difficult doctrinal/semantic problem of determining what precise doc-
trine the Court should apply when it dismisses a case involving constitu-
tional conventions. I do not want the concept of conventions, this
article's contribution, to become entangled with the murky, controversial
judicial concept of nonjusticiability.37 This article's crucial points are
that cases involving conventions should almost always be dismissed, and
that the debate over the constitutionality of the challenged action should
then continue within the body politic.
We shall return to these doctrinal issues at the end of the article.
The concept of conventions helps determine the appropriate scope of ju-
dicial review, whatever doctrinal phraseology the Court adopts. The
concept supports the notion that the Court should be extraordinarily re-
luctant to enter into many constitutional controversies; the plaintiff
should almost always lose. This maneuver does not immunize the con-
cept of conventions from criticism. By supporting the conclusion that
the Court should not regulate some political behavior that arises under
the Constitution, the concept of conventions creates pockets of "lawless-
ness," similar to those Professor Redish condemned as vile products of
the political question doctrine.38
The idea of conventions enables us to evaluate the Supreme Court's
actual decisions more carefully, whatever doctrinal vehicle is chosen.
The Court's instincts have generally been sound in determining when it
should defer to another branch on such questions. However, the Court
quirement, 93 HARv. L. REv. 297 (1979). Justice Scalia has explicitly defended the use of
"standing" to guarantee separation of powers. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Es-
sential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881 (1983).
31. Mulhern, supra note 24.
32. See Michael E. Tigar, Judicial Power, The "Political Question Doctrine, "And Foreign Rela-
tions, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1135 (1970); McCormack, supra note 30, at 595.
33. See Tigar, supra note 32; Louis Henkin, Is There A "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE
L. J. 597 (1976).
34. McCormack, supra note 30, at 595.
35. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question", 79 Nw. U. L. RPv. 1031
(1985).
36. See id. at 1060.
37. I want to thank Hans Linde for making this point.
38. Redish, supra note 35.
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may err if it continues to rely upon its existing political question doc-
trine, which is expressed in reluctant, ambiguous, and conclusory terms,
or on its standing doctrine, which is equally malleable. For example, the
Court misjudged when it attempted to remedy gerrymandering in Davis
v. Bandemer.9 Two 1990 Supreme Court decisions, Rutan v. Republican
Party of Illinois' and United States v. Munoz-Flores,'" also heighten
one's anxiety that the Court may not apply the political question doctrine
as well in the future as it has in the past.
This article shall briefly describe the British theories of constitu-
tional conventions in Part II so American readers can become more fa-
miliar with the concept. Because the United States, unlike England, has
a written constitution that cannot be changed by legislative majorities,
Part III will slightly alter the English concept of conventions to fit the
American scheme. Part IV will focus on several recent American consti-
tutional conflicts - ranging from the military attack on Iraq to the
proper scope of questions and answers during Supreme Court confirma-
tion hearings, a constitutional problem that reappeared when Judge Sou-
ter and Judge Thomas refused to tell the Senate Judiciary Committee
how they would decide the abortion issue.42 Part V considers how the
concept of conventions relates to such legal constructs as the "political
question doctrine," particularly as expressed in Rutan, Munoz-Flores,
and Davis. Part VI will consider objections to the claim that conventions
should become part of American constitutional rhetoric and analysis.
II. THE ROLE OF CONVENTIONS IN THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION
A. The Law-Convention Distinction in Theory
Because American lawyers work with a written constitution that is
continually reinterpreted by judges, they may neglect a major threshold
question that British constitutional lawyers must address: What is a na-
tion's "constitution"?43 Professor Colin Munro inaugurated his series of
39. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). See infra text accompanying notes 252-257.
40. 496 U.S. 62 (1990). See infra text accompanying notes 248-251.
41. 495 U.S. 385 (1990). See infra text accompanying notes 234-247.
42. Nine Senators voted against Souter. Senator Cranston explained: "He has demanded (that)
we take him on faith in this critical area of constitutional rights. That I cannot do." David G.
Savage, Souter Confirmed For High Court in 90-9 Vote, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1990, at 1.
43. CorIN R. MUNRO, STUDIES IN CONSrrrUTIONAL LAW 1 (1987) [hereinafter MUNRO,
STUDIES]. See also COLIN R. MUNRO, WHAT IS A CONSTITUTION? 563 (1983) [hereinafter MUNRO,
CONSTITUTION].
Professor Koh observed that America has created a "national security constitution" that extends
far beyond the generalities contained in the constitutional text. HAROLD KOH, THE NATIONAL
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essays on the British Constitution by answering: "Every state in the
world has a constitution in the original sense of the word, by which is
meant the body of rules and arrangements concerning the government of
the country."' British lawyers must consider this question (and provide
an answer similar to Munro's conclusion) because they have no docu-
ment or documents which are supreme and/or which set forth their con-
stitution's basic organizational format. 5 With one exception,' no
modern47 English constitutional scholar accepts the view that the British
Constitution is completely "unwritten" or even nonexistent. 8 Munro
observed "generalisations about 'written constitutions' or 'unwritten con-
stitutions' are unfounded, because they depend upon a distinction which
SECURITY CONSTrTION: SHARING POWER AFteR THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 67-72 (1990).
Koh noted that several other constitutional powers are primarily regulated by congressional "frame-
work statutes." Id. at 69. Examples of "framework statutes" include the National Security Act, the
Administrative Procedure Act the War Powers Act, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Act, and Gramm-Rudman. See Gerhard Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of For-
eign and Defense Policy:. A Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. CI. L. REV. 463 (1976); Gerhard Caspar, The
Constitutional Organization of the Government, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 177, 187-93 (1985); E.
Donald Elliott, I.N.S. v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legisla-
tive Veto, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 125, 169-73; Kenneth W. Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44
U. CH. L. REV. 271, 279-90 (1977); Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CAL. L. REV. 593 (1988). Such statutes must be part of any descrip-
tion of constitutional law and convention.
Koh also linked his broad definition of the American Constitution with Professor Black's struc-
tural constitution: "But as Charles Black has recognized, a constitution 'constitutes' not by merely
enumerating individual rights and institutional powers, but more broadly by declaring how an entire
government is to be structured." KOH, supra, at 68. See also Charles L. Black, Jr., The Working
Balance of the American Political Departments, I HAST. CONST. L.Q. 13 (1974); Steven L. Carter,
ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Indeterminate Tex" A Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Mud-
dle, 94 YALE L.J. 821, 853-55 (1985); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE
L.J. 1425, 1426-29 (1987).
44. MUNRO, STUDIES, supra note 43, at 1. See also MUNRO, CONSTITUTION, supra note 43, at
563.
45. Some important elements of the British Constitution are contained in The Bill of Rights of
1688, (1688) 1 W. & M. 2, ch.2. Such statutes indicate that much of the British Constitution is
"written." See, eg., BLAcmesTONE's STATUTES ON PUBLIC LAW (Peter Wallington & Robert G.
Lee eds., 1988). Admittedly, the English Bill of Rights is not as comprehensive as the American
Constitution, but the most important distinction between the two legal documents is that the English
Bill of Rights is not "entrenched." Parliament can repeal or alter it at any time with a simple
majority vote. MUNRO, STUDIES, supra note 43, at 4.
46. F.F. Ridley, There is No British Constitution: A Dangerous Case of The Emperor's Clothes,
41 PARL. AF. 340 (1988).
47. Munro dismissed Horwill's graceful description of the British Constitution as being "trans-
mitted orally from generation to generation, like the earliest poetry of ancient Greece." H.W.
HORWILL, THE USAGES OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1 (1925), quoted and dismissed in
MUNRO, STUDIES, supra note 43, at 2.
48. MUNRO, STUDIES, supra note 43, at 5.
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is misleading and inexact."'49 Instead, British legal scholars grapple with
the potpourri of written statutes, practices, judicial opinions, and theoret-
ical writings"0 that constitute the British Constitution.
Such a wide-ranging inquiry is nothing new. One of the curiosities
of the British Constitution is that it has developed spontaneously, yet
became relatively fixed after one man, Professor Dicey, described several
of its central features in the late nineteenth century. In a culture wary of
theorizing, one mind organized and rationalized a complex historical-
legal phenomenon.51 Dicey expanded and integrated three pre-existing
concepts52 to explain (and to defend) his country's constitution: parlia-
mentary sovereignty,53 the rule of law, and the distinction between law
and convention. This article, of course, focuses on conventions.
5 4
Dicey explained that laws are enforced by courts, but conventions
consist of "customs, practices, maxims, or precepts which are not en-
forced or recognized by the courts, [conventions] make up a body not of
laws, but of constitutional or political ethics ... ."' Dicey's distinction
explains how an "unwritten constitution" coexists with the law. Accord-
49. Id at 7.
50. Munro seemed to limit the British Constitution to customary practices, statutes, and judicial
opinions. Id at 2-3. One should also include theoretical writings; British courts frequently cite the
works of theoretical writings of constitutional lawyers, particularly A. V. Dicey. See DICEY, supra
note 1.
51. The English bias against theory is a fundamental cultural trait, even among English legal
theorists. "[No person ever thinks out public policies from first principles. He does not collect all
the literature from Plato and Aristotle onwards in order to find out whether there should be a
limitation of the hours of work in a factory." SIR IVOR JENNINGS, THE BRmsH CONSTITUTION 4
(5th ed. 1971). The modem English Constitution is thus partially based upon an anomaly (another
English trait). It is antitheoretical, yet it was largely conceptualized by one thinker, Dicey.
52. 'The concept of sovereignty he owed to Austin, the term 'rule of law' to W.E. Heam and his
understanding of conventions to the work of the historian Edward A. Freeman." John F. McEldow.
ney, Dicey in Historical Perspective-A Review Essay, in PATRICK MCAUSLAN & JOHN F. McEL-
DOWNEY, LAW, LEGITIMACY, AND THE CONSTITUTION 40 (1985).
53. Parliamentary sovereignty can be an additional source of confusion. Dicey stated that the
courts cannot overrule any statute passed by the House of Commons, the House of Lords, and the
monarchy. This cornerstone of British constitutional law is not a convention. This "rule of recogni.
tion" is a unique common law doctrine, created and applied by the courts, but untouchable by
Parliament. Id. at 83. For example, the court in Pickin v. British Railway Board, 1974 App. Cas.
765, held that a citizen could not bring before the court his claim that fraud had occurred in the
passage of a bill. The court held that it must enforce the laws once it receives a document certified
by the Speaker of the House as having been passed by the Queen in Parliament (Commons, Lords,
and Crown). Id at 771-72. Otherwise, the court would have to second-guess Parliament. The
Pickin Court noted the problems that might arise if the court were to determine that fraud had
occurred, id. at 776, but Parliament conducted its own inquiry and determined otherwise.
54. This section relies heavily on Professor Marshall's work. See MARSHALL, supra note 17, at
3-12.
55. DIcEy, supra note 1, at 417. Dicey's distinction between law and convention was not origi-
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ing to Dicey, the "true opposition" is not between the "unwritten consti-
tution" and the law, but "between laws properly so called, whether
written or unwritten, and understandings, or practices, which, though
commonly observed, are not laws in any true sense of that word of all."56
Dicey observed that every country's constitution has conventions. He
referred to the American electoral college as an example: "The under-
standing that an elector is not really to elect, has now become so firmly
established, that for him to exercise his legal power of choice is consid-
ered a breach of political honour too gross to be committed by the most
unscrupulous of politicians.""7 This example demonstrates how consti-
tutional conventions exist under written constitutional text. Most Amer-
ican conventions are "unwritten rules" that determine how politicians
should actually apply the initial allocation of power granted them by the
written Constitution.5"
Dicey's distinction between law and conventions also explains how
the British can accuse a politician of acting "unconstitutionally," 59 even
though there is no legal recourse. Such allegations signify that a British
politician is violating a judicially unenforceable constitutional standard
that protects an important constitutional value (usually accountability).6°
nal; he frequently cited Edward A. Freeman's Growth Of The English Constitution. See DICEY,
supra note 1, at 418-22.
56. DIcEY, supra note 1, at 420.
57. Id. at 29-30. This convention conflicts with the Framers' specific intentions:
Washington and his fellow-politicians contrived an electoral college, to be composed (as
was hoped) of the wisest people in the nation, which, after due deliberation, was to
choose for president the wisest man in the nation. But that college is a sham; it has no
independence and no life. No one knows, or cares to know, who its members are. They
never discuss, and never deliberate.
WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 150 (Cornell Paperbacks, 1966)(1867). Consti-
tutional conventions should and will change dramatically over time, undercutting many of the
Framers' specific intentions concerning how the Constitution would operate. The Framers' inten-
tions thus remain relevant, but even less weighty than in constitutional adjudication. If Americans
do not become aware of their conventional constitution, the body politic, the legal community, and
the Supreme Court will be acting in twilight, insufficiently aware of the continual political transfor-
mations currently taking place within the Constitution.
58. A few controversial political powers are purely conventional, both in their formation and
their application. The elected branches' "power" to ignore the law and the President's "power" to
suspend the Constitution during times of emergency are not implied powers that the Court can
legally regulate. The relationship of these metalegal issues to the theory of conventions shall be
analyzed in a later work.
59. Professor Geoffrey Marshall presented several hypothetical situations in which the Queen
might be allowed to breach the basic convention of royal deference to the Prime Minister in order to
prevent more egregious "unconstitutional" violations of the constitution by the Prime Minister.
MARSHALL, supra note 12, at 23-25.
60. Of course, American politicians can act unconstitutionally and illegally; they can violate the
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The politician may be acting within the constitutional framework, under
the color of constitutional law, and may be immune from any judicial
sanction, but still be violating constitutional values. Concluding that
some political acts are both "unconstitutional and legal" may grate many
Americans' sensibilities, but that proposition helps explain how the
American Constitution should sometimes be interpreted. American poli-
ticians can sometimes violate the Constitution, yet the Supreme Court
will be unable to respond effectively.
Dicey defined the scope of constitutional law more precisely than
Austin by separating the distinction between law and convention from
the issue of sovereignty, Austin's primary focus.61 Dicey maintained that
the "law of the constitution" consisted only of those parts of the constitu-
tion that courts could protect. He spoke less clearly about the constitu-
tional lawyer's need to study the rest of the constitution. Dicey's work
consistently "demonstrate[d] the connection between the habits and the
conventions of political life and the rules of constitutional law,"'62 but he
also stated that political conventions "need trouble no lawyer or the class
of any professor of law."6 Yet English constitutional law classes have
Constitution in a way that requires judicial intervention. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803).
61. Dicey's distinction between law and conventions can be traced back to Austin's murky de-
scription of the British Constitution as a mix of "positive law" and "positive morality." JOHN Aus-
TIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 258-59 (1954). Dicey's distinction
incorporated Austin's positivistic jurisprudential definition that "law" consists of those rules which
are enforced by courts. Conventions are the leftovers. But Dicey did not adopt the rest of Austin's
constitutional theory, which remained inadequate and incomplete because Austin linked his defini-
tion of the constitution to his more questionable definition of sovereignty. Austin asserted that the
sovereign was the body which was not subject to the positive law. Id.
Maitland, a contemporary of Dicey, pointed out that Austin's definition effectively excluded the
House of Commons, whose membership is partially regulated by law. "[Miost certainly any student
set to study constitutional law would be ill-advised if he were to trust that his examiners would not
go beyond Austin's definition." F.W. MArTLAND, THE CONSrrruTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND
531 (1908). Maitland's point also confirms that constitutional branches are regulated and defined by
a blend of law and conventions. Professor Marshall added that Austin also improperly limited con-
stitutional law to questions of sovereignty: "All the laws which relate to the liberties of the subject,
to Ministers' powers, and to the duties of the police are usually thought of as having constitutional
importance, but they are not directly connected with the definition of the Sovereign." MARSHALL,
supra note 17, at 6.
Marshall's curative definition of constitutional law is broad: "Any branch of the law, whether it
deals prima facie with finance or crime or local government, may throw up constitutional questions."
Id. Marshall did not convert all legal questions into constitutional questions; he was asserting that
constitutional questions can arise within any legal area.
62. MARSHALL, supra note 17, at 9.
63. DIcEy, supra note 1, at 31. Such ambivalence is even less warranted for American constitu-
tional lawyers because the Supreme Court must invariably decide which constitutional issues are
justiciable and which are not. American laws and conventions are entangled, thereby increasing the
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considered conventions ever since.
The distinction between law and convention, like all major legal/
political distinctions, has been subject to criticism and revision. Profes-
sor Ivor Jennings concluded that conventions "are rules whose nature
does not differ fundamentally from that of the positive law of Eng-
land."" Dr. A.L. Goodhart complained that Dicey implies "that the
most interesting and the most important parts of the British system of
government fall outside the field of Constitutional Law."65 Professor
Geoffrey Wilson went further, arguing that the convention should be
eliminated because it is dogmatic and the product of an outmoded juris-
prudence.6 6 Sir Kenneth Wheare suggested that constitutional conven-
tions consist of "those rules of conduct governing the exercise of official
(or State) power which are recognized as obligatory by the legislative,
executive or judicial offices of the State." 67
Professor Marshall powerfully defended Dicey. According to Mar-
shall, Jennings' accurate observation that law cannot be understood with-
out also considering conventions does not support the conclusion that
law and conventions are indistinguishable. Marshall noted that conven-
tions differ from law. They vary widely in their character, significance,
and prescriptive force: "No one really knows where the boundaries of
convention lie and though there are some few conventions that are as
firm, clear, and compulsive as laws, there are not very many of them."6
Marshall added that the process of determining the precise definition of
conventions and the precise sanctions for violations "are not in the least
like litigation., 69 Jennings' complaint that the theory of conventions
leads to a constitution that "is not a system at all but a mass of discon-
nected rules depending upon historical accidents," generated Marshall's
reply that Jennings might have indicted the British constitution but failed
to undermine Dicey's basically accurate description of that constitution.
Marshall then shifted to the offensive. Dicey's observation helps us
understand all constitutions: "On any account the constitution or system
lawyer's need to define and separate them. On a practical level, American lawyers need to under-
stand which issues are regulated by convention so they will not engage in futile litigation.
64. IVOR JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 74 (5th ed. 1959). Marshall was not
convinced by any of Jennings' criticisms of Dicey. MARSHALL, supra note 12, app. C at 254-46.
65. A.L. Goodhart, 0. Hood Phillips' The Constitutional Law of Great Britain and the Common-
wealth, 75 L. Q. REv. 112, 113 (1959).
66. GEOFFREY WILSON, CASES Am MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW v (1966).
67. Goodhart, supra note 65, at 114.
68. MARSHALL, supra note 17, at 14.
69. Id. at 11.
1992]
HeinOnline  -- 40 Buff. L. Rev.  661 1992
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
of government of a country is a wider concept than the law of the consti-
tution. That was precisely Dicey's starting point."7 Nor did Marshall
see any reason to accept Goodhart's concerns that Dicey excluded many
of the interesting parts of the constitution from formal constitutional
law.71 Large segments of any constitution should be kept out of the
hands of judges and lawyers. Marshall's overall conclusion follows from
his consistent defense of Dicey, but it may trouble many American con-
stitutional lawyers: "Naturally enough, a simple diet of judicial decisions,
statutes, and delegated legislation is inadequate nourishment for a consti-
tutional lawyer. Like the historian and the political theorist he needs
often to straddle but not, for that reason, to blur, the boundary between
law and politics."'72
Academics have criticized Dicey for not fully understanding his
own concept of conventions. He has been justly reproached for stating:
"the breach of these.., conventions will almost immediately bring the
offender into conflict with the courts and the law of the land."' 73 That
argument more than implies that conventions are ultimately judicially
enforceable, even though it is inconceivable under existing British legal
doctrine that a court would review the Crown's refusal to grant a royal
assent to pending legislation already passed by the House of Commons
and the House of Lords. Marshall defended Dicey by limiting the sweep-
ing statement to the example Dicey provided. Dicey had argued that a
government which refused to regign after dissolution would soon run out
of legal funds because it could not raise money with approval from the
House of Commons, as required by The Bill of Rights of 1688. Mar-
shall noted that Dicey also offered his own counterexamples, thereby in-
dicating that the statement was not meant to be universal; a court could
not reject a piece of legislation because it only received one reading in-
stead of three.75 But even if Dicey did err or exaggerate (he did refer to
"conventions," not to a single convention), Marshall concluded that Di-
cey's basic distinction between law and convention "is clear enough and
worth maintaining."
716
Sir Kenneth Wheare tried to modify Dicey in the opposite direction
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 12.
73. DIcEY, supra note 1, at 446.
74. MARSHALL, supra note 12, at 5-6.
75. See MARsHALL, supra note 17, at 7-12.
76. MARsHALL, supra note 12, at 17.
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by giving conventions even more potency.77 Wheare described a conven-
tion as "a binding rule, a rule of behavior accepted as obligatory by those
concerned in the working of the Constitution."" Many conventions are
not "binding"; they can be ignored or modified at any time. Once again,
Marshall helped solve the problem by expanding the power of conven-
tions beyond the idea of obligation:
So although we can sensibly ask what the uses or purposes of conventions
are, it may be unnecessary to ask why they are obeyed when they are
obeyed, since we pick out and identify as conventions precisely those rules
that are generally obeyed and generally thought to be obligatory. Those
who obey moral or other non-legal rules they believe to be obligatory, char-
acteristically do it because of their belief that they are obligatory, or else
from some motive of prudence or expected advantage.
7 9
Marshall then noted that the word "obligatory" obscures crucial
distinctions among conventions, which "as a body of constitutional mo-
rality, deal not just with obligations but also with rights, powers, and
duties."80 Although I may be the last person in the world who can define
and separate the concepts of governmental "obligation," "right,"
"power," and "duty," I believe Marshall correctly pointed out that all
British constitutional conventions cannot be reduced to "duty." Conven-
tions give parts of the government "rights" and "powers" as well as sad-
dle politicians with "obligations." Marshall thus offered an additional
distinction: "It [is] often useful to distinguish duty-imposing from right-
conferring conventions."'" In other words, British conventions both al-
locate and regulate governmental power.
Marshall provided a useful summary of the character of British
conventions:
1. Conventions are rules that define non-legal rights, powers and obliga-
tions of office-holders in the three branches of government, or the relations
between governments or organs of government.
77. K.C. WHEARE, MODERN CONSTrrUTIONS 179 (1951). Dicey also has been accused of ap-
plying his definition of conventions too narrowly. He concluded that most conventions regulate
prerogative powers, even though many conventions help determine parliamentary structure and pro-
cess. See MARHALL, supra note 12, at 5-6. Of course, erroneous application of a distinction does
not necessarily undercut the distinction's validity. Some academics have tried to distinguish between
"conventions" and "practices," an exercise that Marshall found futile and misleading. Id. at 212
n.2. See also MARSHALL, supra note 17, at 12.
78. WHEARE, supra note 77, at 179.
79. MARSHALL, supra note 12, at 6.
80. Id. at 7.
81. Id. at 210.
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2. Conventions have as their main goal the effective working of the ma-
chinery of political accountability.
3. Conventions can in most cases be stated only in general terms, their
applicability in some circumstances being clear, but in other circumstances
uncertain and debatable.
4. No general reason needs to be advanced to account for compliance with
duty-imposing conventions beyond the fact that when they are obeyed
(rather than disobeyed, rejected or changed), they are believed to formulate
valid rules of obligation.
5. Conventions are distinguishable from rules of law, though they may be
equally, or even more important than rules of law.
6. Conventions may, in practice, modify the application or enforcement of
rules of law.
7. Conventions are not direct sources of legal rights and duties, but they
may be used or invoked by courts in the application or interpretation of
existing rules of law.
8 2
8. Conventions may be incorporated by reference or specification into
newly-enacted constitutional instruments or rules of law.
9. In some cases law may provide for the existence of conventions to be
certified or declared by judicial declaration.
8 3
B. The English Law-Convention Distinction in Practice
The relationship between English law and convention is never static;
it is more a function of history than of principle. Because the British
Parliament is supreme under the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty,
it can "convert" any existing convention into law by passing a statute. A
conflict between the elected House of Commons and the unelected House
of Lords provides a compelling example. Late in the nineteenth century
82. The British Constitution would not be British if it did not have anomalies. When the Attor-
ney General sought in Attorney-General v. Jonathan Cape Ltd., [1976] Q.B. 752, to enjoin ex-Cabi-
net member Richard Crossman from publishing his Cabinet diaries fifteen years after he left office,
the court hedged its conclusion by allowing Crossman to publish his diaries, stating in dicta that the
Attorney General might be able to enjoin the publication of similar documents if there were a breach
of confidence. The court derived a breach of the common law doctrine of confidentiality from the
convention of collective responsibility, which requires Cabinet confidentiality. This judicial excep-
tion to non-judicial enforcement of conventions could be the beginning of an onslaught; if the court
can legalize this convention, why can't it enforce others? Professor Marshall attempted to limit
Jonathan Cape on the ground that the court only found that the breach of convention fell "within
the ambit of the existing law restraining breaches of confidence in general." MARSHALL, supra note
12, at 15. This chicken-egg argument is not completely convincing; without the convention, there
would be no legal intervention. It is also not clear that the convention is "existing law"; according to
Dicey, conventions are, by definition, judicially unenforceable. Dicmy, supra note 1, at 24. The
Jonathan Cape case permits a creative future court to find other common law violations that might
allow the court to intervene into the world of political conventions. On the other hand, one should
not make too much of a single exception found in dicta.
83. MARSHALL, supra note 12, at 210-211 (footnote added).
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Dicey had written "[tihe general rule that the House of Lords must in
matters of legislation ultimately give way to the House of Commons is
one of the best-established maxims of constitutional ethics."" But in the
early twentieth century, the House of Lords, dominated by Conserva-
tives, blocked several pieces of Liberal Party legislation, including a pro-
posed Budget, thereby violating the convention that the Lords would not
obstruct essential legislation.85 The Liberal Prime Minister, Asquith,
asked the King to pack the Lords with enough Liberal peers to form a
majority so that he could pass the contested proposals.8" The King re-
sponded that he would not use the drastic remedy of packing the Lords
unless the Prime Minister first took the issue of the relationship between
the two Houses to the people to decide in a general election. The Prime
Minister deferred to the King and promptly won the next election. 7 The
Lords then capitulated, passing the Parliament Act of 1911 (which was
subsequently amended in 1949).11 That Act established that the Lords
could only permanently block legislation that extended the statutory
limit of five years between general elections.89 A majority of the Lords
could delay all monetary legislation for one month, and could postpone
all other legislation for approximately one year.90 The Diceyean conven-
tion of the House of Lords' deference to the House of Commons had
become the statutory law of deference.
Marshall concluded that this sequence of events generated a deriva-
tive convention that the Prime Minister cannot pack the House to seek
some fundamental constitutional change of the Lords without first seek-
ing a general election or a referendum.9 Whether or not he is correct,
Marshall's claim demonstrates how a convention can arguably be formed
by a single precedent.92 The American Congress may have created a
similar convention when it refused President Roosevelt's request to pack
the Supreme Court in 1937. Politicians, however, can ignore a string of
precedents that have essentially created a convention. For example,
84. DICEY, supra note 1, at 458.
85. WILSON, supra note 10, at 23.
86. Id. at 21-26. Dicey wrote that "packing" was a legitimate response to resistance by the
House of Lords. DIcEy, supra note 1, at 432.
87. WiLsoN, supra note 10, at 23.
88. Parliament Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo.5, ch.13 (Eng.) amended by Parliament Act, 1949, 12, 13
& 14 Geo. 6, ch. 13 (Eng.).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. MARSHALL, supra note 12, at 22.
92. Marshall himself stated that "whilst a number of precedents may not establish a rule, a
single precedent with a good reason can establish a rule." MARSHALL, supra note 12, at 11.
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Prime Minister Thatcher terminated an emerging convention against cre-
ating new hereditary peers (members of the House of Lords who can pass
their title and seat on to their progeny), when she made two such ap-
pointments in the 1980s. 93 Parliament could resolve that issue by con-
verting the discarded convention into law; it could pass a statute
proscribing new hereditary peerages. If a Prime Minister then attempted
to appoint hereditary peers, the British Courts could intervene, finding
such actions ultra vires. The Government would have broken "the Rule
of Law."
C. The British Courts and Constitutional Conventions
The British judiciary quickly incorporated Dicey's major themes
into their doctrine, if only because Dicey clarified their existing constitu-
tional jurisprudence. Although the courts have, with one possible excep-
tion, found conventions unenforceable in any way, they have considered
how conventions explain their constitution and how conventions provide
alternative remedies. For example, in Liversidge v. Anderson,94 the court
held that it would not review the wartime incarceration of alleged "se-
curity risks" based upon the Home Secretary's conclusory affidavit that
the imprisoned person was a threat to national security. The court noted
that the Home Secretary was bound by the convention of individual re-
sponsibility; he could be questioned in Parliament about how he imple-
mented his broad power. In Adegbenro v. Akintola,95 the Privy Council
considered the conventional relationship between the Nigerian Prime
Minister and a legislature that had expressed lack of confidence in that
Prime Minister because the statute creating the Nigerian Constitution
incorporated British conventions.96 Conventions also can influence stat-
utory interpretation; the court held in British Coal Corporation v. The
King97 that Parliament must have intended the Judicial Committee to be
treated as a judicial body "because of the firmly established convention as
to the way in which its advice was accepted by the Crown." 98 Such inter-
pretations make sense; judicial impotence does not mean legal irrele-
vance. Indeed, one of the major points of this article is that the Supreme
93. BRAZIER, supra note 13, at 200-01.
94. [1942] App. Cas. 206 (P.C. 1941).
95. [1963] A.C. 614 App. Cas. (P.C. 1963) (appeal taken from Nig.) See MARSHALL, supra note
12, at 14.
96. MARSHALL, supra note 12, at 14.
97. [1935] App. Cas. 500 (P.C. 1935) (appeal taken from Que.).
98. MARSHALL, supra note 12, at 14.
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Court should not make constitutional law without considering the entire
constitution, the legal and the conventional.
III. THE TWO MAJOR FORMS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTIONS: "NONCONVERTIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTIONS" AND "CONVERTIBLE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS"
Dicey's law-convention dichotomy, which so clearly describes the
English Constitution, cannot blithely be superimposed upon the signifi-
cantly different American constitutional system. Dicey's distinction ac-
curately captures the combination of law and political rules that exists in
a country that does not have an entrenched written constitution. The
British Constitution remains a perpetual, ever-changing mixture of the
two forms of power. The English system also permits facile transitions
between law and convention. Parliament, legally omnipotent under the
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, can transform any convention
into law or eliminate any law to permit a convention to develop.99
The American legal order does not offer such a simple duality be-
cause it has two levels of law: supreme constitutional law and lower or-
der federal statutes, state statutes, and common law. The American
constitutional process is also far more complex. Marbury v. Madison 1o
established that Congress is not sovereign but is bound by the written
constitution. Furthermore, the text of the United States Constitution al-
locates most essential governmental powers. Recall that the British con-
cept of constitutional conventions refers to unwritten allocations of
constitutional powers and to unwritten regulation of those powers. Be-
cause the written, entrenched American Constitution initially distributes
most 01 important governmental powers to the three branches and/or the
states, American constitutional conventions primarily determine how
such powers should subsequently be applied. Even these constitutional
powers that have arisen outside the text- such as executive orders and
agreements, congressional investigations, and judicial contempt-must
be "implied" from existing powers since the federal government is a gov-
99. The notable exception is the unique judicial doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Under
that doctrine, parliaments cannot bind their successors. Thus parliaments cannot change the judicial
doctrine since that would bind successors.
100. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
101. Some important American constitutional powers are implied. Examples include judicial
review, executive privilege, presidential power to remove officials, executive orders, executive agree-
ments, congressional investigations, and congressional contempt powers. Louis FISHER, CONSrrU-
TIONAL DIALOGUES 45 (1988).
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ernment of limited powers. The Supreme Court can and should initially
decide if those "implied powers" are legitimate extrapolations from the
textually created powers."0 2 The Supreme Court should not, however,
enforce the conventions that regulate the implementation of those pow-
ers, whether they be textual or implied.
One can exaggerate the differences between the two systems. Much
of the British Constitution is determined by the written guidelines set
forth in the Bill of Rights of 1688. Many English conventions comple-
ment that statute's written disposition of and limitation of fundamental
governmental powers and relationships. In addition, the American Con-
stitution, broadly defined, contains additional "unwritten" rules and
powers. Examples include the structures of political parties10 3 and the
powers of the Federal Reserve Board."°
Because neither the President nor Congress are sovereign, we need
to distinguish between those constitutional powers, initially established
and/or regulated by convention, that Congress can "convert" into stat-
ute and those it cannot. While the supreme British Parliament can re-
fashion any convention into law, Congress, bound by the written
constitution, can only transfigure some conventions into statutory law
and cannot legally change other conventions at all.10 5 For example, Con-
102. That review is deferential. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
103. The Supreme Court has been properly reluctant to exercise full judicial review over party
structures. The Court battled racist primaries, Nixon v. Herndon, 283 U.S. 536 (1927); Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953), but refused to intervene in a bitter internal Democratic party dispute over credentials,
O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972) (per curiam). Because political parties exist outside the text of
the written Constitution but are, nevertheless, part of America's political constitution, they need to
be treated differently than the "textual constitutional conventions" which are the focal point of this
article.
104. Consider the Federal Reserve Board's constitutional power to regulate the currency. None
of the following practices described by Professor Kettl in his study of the Fed are determined by
statute, much less by constitutional text: (1) the Chairman's dominance, DONALD F. KETrL, LEAD-
ERSHIP AT THE FED 13 (1986); (2) the Fed's nonpartisanship, id. at 110; (3) The Fed's commitment
to secrecy, id. at 171; (4) the Fed's primary relationship with the President, id. at 89, 132; and (5) the
hostility to any plans to "pack" the Fed, id. at 131. On a slightly more trivial level, the Fed
Chairman and the Treasury Secretary have met for lunch once a week since 1936. Id. at 57. Ketti
concluded that the Fed's power "depends on the support it can build, not on its legal status." Id. at
193. The Fed's independence and power are more a function of politics than of law. The Fed also
has to satisfy Congress, which has made statutory changes to the Fed's structure and has periodi-
cally threatened more radical alterations. Id. at 154-59. Although judicial review of such practices
may be constitutionally permissible, it would be impractical; how can a court order an agency to
make its chairman dominant? That question is no longer hypothetical; Chairman Greenspan appar-
ently was unable to convince the Board to reduce interest rates in early 1991. Louis Uchitelle,
Greenspan's Authority on Rates Is Said to Have Been Diminished, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1991, at Al.
105. The President can also convert some conventions into law via executive orders. The
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gress probably cannot pass a law limiting the President's discretion in
exercising the pardon or in choosing ambassadors, but Congress arguably
can create the War Powers Act to control, at least in part, the use of
violence abroad. 106
The Supreme Court must review congressional attempts to convert
existing constitutional conventions into statutory law. The Court can
hold that Congress acted unconstitutionally because it converted a non-
convertible convention into statutory law. For instance, the Court acted
properly when it held that Congress could not override aspects of presi-
dential pardons of Civil War rebels in United States v. Klein."0 7 The
Court also retains power to void an unconstitutional provision in an
otherwise "convertible convention." For example, the Supreme Court
could strike down the legislative veto' 018 in the War Powers Act, even
though the rest of the Act may be a permissible conversion of pre-ex-
isting conventional power into statutorily regulated power. Whenever
the Court decides that Congress has the constitutional power to convert
part or all of a convention into statutory law, the Court must then en-
force the statute. The dispute would no longer revolve around a judi-
cially unenforceable constitutional convention, but would have become a
question of reviewable statutory law."°9
These observations generate two "paradoxes." First, the Court has
the authority to void a statute regulating certain powers that are or
should be regulated by convention (pardons, for instance), but cannot
review particular applications of that power. The Court has the limited
judicial capacity to protect a "nonconvertible convention," which it must
define to some degree, but it has no additional power to apply or entirely
define that convention." 0 Second, the Court cannot consider any consti-
tutional disputes controlled by convention, but must intervene once Con-
Supreme Court cannot convert any conventions into law because, by definition, conventions are
judicially unenforceable rules of constitutional behavior. The supermajority, on the other hand,
represented by the amendment process, can change any convention into constitutional law.
106. Until the 1990 budget agreement, Congress allocated billions of discretionary dollars to the
Pentagon, which then consulted with Congress. Decision-making was thus primarily partially by
convention. The 1990 budget agreement converted much of that convention into law; Congress now
will more closely direct Pentagon spending. Congress Imposes New Restrictions on Secret Funds,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1990, at Al.
107. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147-48 (1872).
108. The Court would rely on I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
109. The all-or-nothing doctrine of nonjusticiability may be incapable of such refinements.
110. This limited judicial function demonstrates that the concept of conventions uneasily coex-
ists with the concept of nonjusticiability, which requires the court to withdraw before considering
the merits at all. The doctrines remain similar in that they lead to judicial restraint.
1992]
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gress has properly converted conventions into law (such as the
Executive's duty to be truthful to Congress). Even then, the Court must
recognize that Congress will rarely convert into law an entire textual
power previously regulated by convention. For a repulsive example, im-
agine a congressional statute setting a five-year prison sentence for black
officials who lied to congressional committees but only a three-year sen-
tence for prevaricating white officials. The Court should strike down
that statute as a violation of the Equal Protection component of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. But the Court probably could
not intervene if Congress did not pass such a statute but instead used its
contempt power only against black officials. Congress might have the
constitutional power to abuse its contempt powers in such a way since
the Court could not stop Congress,111 but it would be breaking the con-
stitutional convention against racist application of its conventional pow-
ers. Thus we see that the Court inevitably must be aware of conventions
and must sometimes participate in their formulation, if only to decide
how or how not to remain involved. A textual constitutional power can
eventually consist of a mixture of constitutional law, statutory law, and
constitutional convention. This conclusion reveals another value of stud-
ying the concept of conventions; much American constitutional law and
power is determined by statute, not just by the Supreme Court and its
decisions. One has to study judicial constitutional decisions, constitu-
tional statutes, and constitutional conventions to understand how Ameri-
can constitutional powers are actually exercised and controlled.
IV. AN INVENTORY OF AMERICAN TEXTUAL CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTIONS
The best "proof" of American conventions is simply to describe
them. This section shall summarily list many American constitutional
problems that might be better understood by applying the concept of
American textual constitutional conventions. I do not mean to imply
that all of the following issues, some of which are profoundly difficult,
must be exclusively regulated by convention. Nor is the following list
meant to be complete; conventions are evolutionary creatures, inherently
IlL. It is also possible that the Court would intervene, relying upon Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886), which proscribed racist application of a facially neutral, valid statute, and Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), which allowed a sex-discrimination suit to be brought against a Con-
gressman. Nevertheless, the Court might decide in our sordid hypothetical that the use of contempt
power was protected by "legislative immunity."
670 [Vol. 40
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fluid, partially unknowable. The next section will analyze a few selected
conventions in some depth.
The concept of constitutional conventions can improve our under-
standing of the following congressional powers and responsibilities: (1) to
declare war; (2) to supervise and investigate governmental agencies;
1 12
(3) to make rules for expelling and/or punishing members of Congress;
(4) to conduct investigatory hearings, including the application of the
contempt power;113 (5) to determine standards to be used to evaluate
nominees to the Supreme Court; (6) to establish criteria for approving
other presidential nominees; (7) to establish procedures to evaluate presi-
dential nominees; (8) to establish criteria for determining what consti-
tutes an impeachable offense; (9) to create procedures for impeachment
proceedings; (10) to implement treaties; (11) to supervise the Executive;
(12) to monitor internal legislative procedures; 1 4 (13) to oversee rela-
tionships between the House and Senate; (14) to allocate internal power
112. Congress initially did not want to listen to Executive officials. "The heads of departments
are chief clerks. Instead of being the ministry, the organs of the executive power, and imparting a
kind of momentum to the operation of the laws, they are precluded even from communicating with
the House by reports. In other countries they may speak as well as act. We allow them to do
neither." 5 HAMILTON'S WoRKs, 201, quoted in FORD, supra note 20, at 88. Ford's history demon-
strates over and over that strict fidelity to the Framers' original conceptions of the Constitution and
to their initial efforts to implement that Constitution would create a form of government that virtu-
ally all of us would find quaint, at best.
113. For a thoughtful discussion of the appropriate amount of judicial review of congressional
investigations, see Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword- The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40, 64-71
(1961). Bickel concluded: "The sum of it is that the power to investigate operates of necessity under
a suspension of many otherwise applicable rules." Id. at 69. The suspension of judicial rules in-
creases the need for clearly formulated political rules and for conventions. For example, Congress
should self-consciously adopt a convention that sets greater limits on its contempt power when used
against private citizens than against Executive officials. Those limits could be both procedural and
substantive. For a grim view of congressional investigations, see RICHARD CRILEY, THE FBI v.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1990).
114. Professor Foreman has argued that the growth of congressional committees and sub-com-
mittees created an unanticipated change in the Constitution, comparable to the growth of political
parties. CHRISTOPHER H. FoREMAN, SIGNALS FROM THE HILL 24 (1988). Foreman's book de-
scribed several conventions: (1) the dominant power of the committee or sub-committee chairman,
id. at 94, 108; (2) the deference each appropriations subcommittee gives to its peers, id. at 92; and (3)
the tendency for appropriations committees to convene secretly when they finally allocate resources,
id.
Michael Miller has argued that the courts should frequently review legislative procedures.
Michael Miller, The Justiciability of Legislative Rules and the 'Political' Political Question Doctrine,
78 CAL. L. REv. 1341 (1990). Miller's proposal would embroil the courts in much litigation. For
instance, Senators Domenici and Gavel ignored a rule requiring publicity during Senate hearings
over a controversial bill assessing waterway user fees. T.R. REID, CONGRESSIONAL ODYSSEY 36
(1980). The courts should not void bills simply because they failed to comply with all conventional
procedures during their often complex evolution.
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among its members, whether based upon party affiliation or seniority;
(15) to share foreign affairs obligations with the President; (16) to regu-
late "leaks" (17) to maintain an understanding of the Republican Gov-
ernment clause; (18) to allocate the discretion given the Executive to
spend revenues;"' (19) to determine the amount of publicity given to
proceedings; 1 6 (20) to suspend habeas corpus;" 7 (21) to oversee the
amendment process;" 8 (22) to delegate legislative authority to the Exec-
utive Branch; 1 9 and even (23) to suspend the rest of the Constitution. 120
115. Congress has given the Executive total discretion in how to spend billions of dollars to
"protect national security." See TIM WEINER, BLANK CHECK: THE PENTAGON'S BLACK BUDGET
(1990).
116. "There is nothing in the Constitution requiring Congress to hold public sittings." FORD,
supra note 20, at 63.
117. "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases
of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
Professor Schlesinger offered the following set of "standards" to determine the use of the emer-
gency prerogative, a power that is by definition non-legal. These standards demonstrate how specific
conventions can be made for even the most dramatic, non-legal issues:
1. There must be a clear, present and broadly perceived danger to the life of the nation and to
the ideals for which the nation stands.
2. The President must define and explain to Congress and the people the nature and urgency of
the threat.
3. The understanding of the emergency and the judgment that the life of the nation is truly at
stake, must be broadly shared by Congress and the people.
4. Time must be of the essence, existing statutory authorizations must be inadequate, and wait-
ing for normal legislative action must constitute an unacceptable risk.
5. The danger must be one that can be met in no other way than by presidential initiative
beyond the laws and the Constitution
6. Secrecy must be strictly confined to the tactical requirements of the emergency. Every ques-
tion of broad policy must be opened to national debate.
7. The President must report what he has done to Congress, which, along with the Supreme
Court and ultimately the people, will serve as the judge of his action.
8. None of the presidential actions can be directed against the domestic political process and
rights.
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
118. John R. Vile, American Views of the Constitutional Amending Process: An Intellectual His-
tory of Article V, 35 AM. J. LEG. Hisr. 44 (1991).
119. Congress has the tendency to delegate its toughest decisions, whether they be the wars in
Indochina or the GATT Trade Talks. See John Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part ."
The (Troubled) Constitutionality of the War They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L. Rnv. 877, 984-97
(1990) [hereinafter Ely, Part 1]. Ely asserted that if he could write on a "blank slate," he would have
found the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution to be an unconstitutional delegation of power. Id. at 896. For
a disturbing discussion of the use of the GATT powers, see Walter Russell Mead, Bushism, Found,
HAR ER'S, Sept. 1992, at 37.
120. Professor Lobel concluded that placing the enormous power to "suspend" the Constitution
to save the country outside the Constitution was a "liberal" response. Jules Lobel, Emergency Power
and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L. J. 1385 (1989). Lobel may be correct. The alternatives
are either the complete proscription of such power or the legitimation of such power through the
Constitution. The Court is torn between choosing collapse or tyranny. Although Congress and the
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Constitutional conventions also help describe the Presidency: (1) the
standards used by the Electoral College; (2) the role of the Cabinet;"' (3)
the powers of such groups as the Office of Management and Budget and
the National Security Agency; (4) the degree of candor, if any, with Con-
gress and the public; (5) the scope of the executive privilege; (6) the im-
plementation of treaties; (7) the sharing of foreign affairs obligations with
Congress, including the use of executive orders and proclamations; (8)
the use of armed forces in combat; (9) the implementation of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment, which determines how the country shall be ruled
when the President is incapacitated; (10) the application of the pardon
power;' 22 (11) the exercise of prosecutorial discretion; 2 3 (12) the con-
duct of national security agencies (the FBI, CIA, NSC, and whatever
else);124 (13) the regulation of "leaks"; (14) the internal structure of the
Executive; (15) the meaning of the Republican Guarantee Clause; (16)
President share enormous "emergency" powers, they should not be able to easily circumvent funda-
mental constitutional rights and obligations by invoking "necessity." Thus, we should have a unique
mix of law and constitutional morality. Only morality and accountability ultimately constrain the
President from suspending the Constitution. The courts retain limited jurisdiction to review such
suspensions. They should be able to award damages after the fact, but not issue injunctions during
the emergency. Finally, Congress has the power, regulated only by convention, to indemnify the
President for any awards made against him. For a thorough description of this traditional doctrine
and how it was applied in the nineteenth century, see Lobel, supra, at 1387-97. Justice Jackson
pursued a similar line of reasoning when he concluded that the Court should not legitimate the
Japanese intern camps during World War II by deciding the case on the merits; the Court should
have stayed out because the issue was not on "law." See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
242-48 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
121. Many of the Framers thought that the Senators and the President would work together in
administering the government. FoRD, supra note 20, at 79-80.
122. Professor Kobil has proposed that the clemency powers of the Chief Executive be limited
by "an independent commission with the requisite expertise which is directed to focus on justice-
enhancing reasons for remitting punishment." Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained:
Wresting the Pardon Power from the King, 69 TEx. L. REv. 569, 639 (1991). However, the executive
"should still retain and exercise that portion of the clemency power that is suited to his skills, as
recognized by the Framers of the Constitution: the granting of clemency for reasons related to the
public welfare." Id. Kobil conceded that the Federal Constitution could preclude his suggestion,
but also stated that the scope of judicial review is limited to pardons that may violate some other
part of the Constitution. Id. at 620. Thus his immediate focus is on changing the powers of Con-
gress and state legislatures which "could create a system of legislative clemency to augment existing
executive clemency procedures." Id. at 615. Perhaps Kobil's distinction, which is hard to apply,
could be reformulated into a convention that could regulate presidential pardons.
123. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (Court refused to enjoin state officials to
enforce child support law). Professor McCormack concluded that the Court should simply hold
that the government has no duty to prosecute a case. McCormack, supra note 30, at 607 (discussing
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986)).
124. See CARNES LORD, THE PRESIDENCY AND THE MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY
(1988).
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the exercise of the veto; (17) the appointment of ambassadors; 125 and (18)
the permissibility of a line-item veto.
126
Constitutional conventions may also partially determine the follow-
ing aspects of the Judicial powers: (1) the scope of jurisdiction of lower
federal courts; (2) the scope of appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court; (3) the number of Justices sitting on the Supreme Court; (4) the
scope of review of Amendment ratifications; (5) the scope of review of
internal congressional procedures and findings; (6) the extent to which
state courts must provide a forum for federal constitutional claims; (7)
the relationship between judges and political leaders; (8) the degree to
which Congress can remove cases from Article III Courts to administra-
tive agencies and to Article I Courts; (9) the extent of extrajudicial activi-
ties;127 (10) case selection by the Supreme Court; (11) supervision of
special prosecutors; (12) the role of Solicitor General; and (13) the obli-
gation of governmental officials to obey judicial orders.
28
125. Id. at 160-62.
126. For a defense of the line-item veto, see J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of
the Item Veto: A Reply to Tribe and Kurland, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 437 (1990). Professors Tribe and
Kurland wrote a letter to Senator Kennedy, which he inserted into the Congressional Record, briefly
stating why they believed a line-item veto was unconstitutional. 135 CONG. REc. S14,387 (daily ed.
Oct. 31, 1989).
Aside from noting that the text of the Constitution authorizes the President to veto bills, but not
to veto parts of bills, this article will not review the numerous arguments concerning the constitu-
tionality of a line-item veto. It will only briefly discuss the contribution the idea of conventions can
make to the debate. We have seen that formulating coherent, viable conventions as an alternative to
judicial standards strengthens the argument that a given issue should not be resolved by the judici-
ary. Conversely, the lack of a viable convention supports meaningful judicial review. What conven-
tion could possibly limit the President's discretion in exercising a line-item veto? Congress' main
weapon, the purse, would be significantly given to the Executive, the power of the purse includes the
power to spend as well as the power not to spend. Congress can choose to give the President discre-
tion over spending whenever it wishes; for years, it has allocated billions of discretionary dollars to
the Pentagon. But Congress must be able to limit that discretion. Congressional negotiations with
the administration and with the administration's party would otherwise become somewhat illusory.
Legislation invariably requires numerous compromises which often involve other pieces of legisla-
tion. If a line-item veto existed, all deals would be contingent. The administration and its party
could pretend to be giving something away, knowing they would later renege and veto the part of the
bargain they did not like. Coalitions would be more difficult to form if legislators knew that their
"add-ons" might be eliminated by the President.
127. See BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS-FRANKFURTER CONNECTION (1982).
128. This is the most paradoxical convention, because the Court obviously found the initial
claim to be justiciable when it issued an order against the government official. Although noncompli-
ance with a judicial order seems to present the purest legal issue, Michael Tigar described how
presidential noncompliance might occur:
Granted that the power-wielder may disregard the Court's admonition in such a case as
the Steel Seizure Case, but violation of an express judicial command may either provide
an occasion for the political process to function by causing public censure of the official,
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The following aspects of federalism are (or should be) also influ-
enced by constitutional conventions: (1) the extent to which state courts
must entertain federal constitutional claims; (2) the "political safeguards
of federalism"; 12 9 (3) the role of party politics in local appointments; (4)
the scope of the "police power"; (5) the power of Congress to regulate
state court jurisdiction; and (6) gerrymandering.
V. ANALYSIS OF SELECTED AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTIONS
There is not enough time or space in this article to develop specific
conventions, replete with alternatives and arguments, for all the exam-
ples listed above. Perhaps not all of the prior issues should have a con-
ventional component. This section shall focus on a few of the
aforementioned examples to verify the article's propositions that Ameri-
can constitutional conventions exist and ought to exist. The arguments
about particular, recommended conventions or mixtures of law and con-
vention will be somewhat cursory, given the complexity of the issues, but
this article is primarily interested in proving the value of the concept of
conventions as a constitutional tool, not in defending or criticizing par-
ticular conventions. I am less interested in having the reader agree with
me about any particular convention. I primarily want the reader to acept
the basic concept of conventions. The vast task of cataloguing and evalu-
ating American constitutional conventions awaits another day.
or demonstrate that the political process is ineffective to redeem the constitutional prom-
ise of justice and must therefore be changed in fundamental ways.
Tigar, supra note 32, at 1149. Presidential and congressional compliance with Supreme Court opin-
ions might be the most important convention of all, similar to the British convention that the Queen
must agree with the recommendations of her Prime Minister. That fundamental convention has
never been broken, the heart of the British constitutional structure.
129. The Supreme Court came close to proposing "unwritten rules" in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). The Court held that since the states were
sufficiently protected by the "political safeguards of federalism," they had no need for judicial pro-
tection under the Tenth Amendment. The Court emphasized the Constitution's "structural" protec-
tions, such as the electoral college and the rule that each state is to elect two Senators. Id. at 551.
The Court could have also included the political rule that Congress should never use its power under
the Supremacy Clause to dominate the states. Constitutional lawyers could help determine the pre-
cise contours of such a rule. Is "coercion" the equivalent of domination? Are conditional grants a
form of coercion or domination? One would not expect agreement over the precise contours of such
rules, any more than one should anticipate consensus over the content of legal constitutional rights.
Nevertheless, the states might be better protected, gaining an additional political safeguard, if they
could refer to a set of well-defined and reasoned constitutional rules that constrain congressional
overreaching instead of relying upon an inevitably clumsy judicial application of the Tenth Amend-
ment. The Court has recently reentered the field. See New York v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 2408
(1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991).
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A. Disputes Between the Executive and the Senate Over the
Interpretation of Treaties
The recent debate over the meaning of the Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty raised issues that superficially appear amenable to judicial
resolution. In 1987, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the
Reagan Administration bitterly debated the proper interpretation of the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972.130 The Reagan Administration
claimed that the Treaty did not prevent the development of the Star
Wars system, basing its argument upon secret discussions with the Sovi-
ets that had not been disclosed to the Senate when it originally affirmed
the ABM Treaty. The Soviets had explicitly stated during the negotia-
tions that they did not want the treaty to cover new technologies.13 1 The
Senate Committee rejoined that the Administration was bound by the
express terms of the ABM Treaty, which stated that the two countries
were "not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which
are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land based." '132 Senator
Biden noted that the Reagan Administration's position contradicted ex-
ecutive statements made at the time of ratification in 1972.133 Both sides
accused each other of acting improperly, even unconstitutionally.
1 34
How should the Supreme Court have handled the issue if somebody
130. Professor Koplow argued that unilateral executive reinterpretations are unconstitutional
and violations of international law. David A. Koplow, Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executive
Reinterpretation of Arms Control Treaties, 137 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1353 (1989). But Koplow also
conceded that disputes between Congress and the President over the meaning of treaties probably
raise nonjusticiable political questions. Id. at 1427-28. Thus his eight proposed standards that deter-
mine when a treaty has become entrenched into law, and his four final recommendations should be
seen as proposed conventions, not recommended legal criteria. See also Michael J. Glennon, Inter-
preting "Interpretation": The President, the Senate, and When Treaty Interpretation Becomes Treaty
Making, 20 U.C. DAVIs L. Rnv. 913 (1987).
The entire treaty process is rife with convention. For a touching account of President washing.
ton's futile attempt to make the Senate into a "privy council," which would rubberstamp his treaties,
see FoRD, supra note 20, at 77-78. Ford's description provides another example of how the struc-
tural Constitution has radically deviated from the Framers' intentions. Convention influences the
amount and form of senatorial advice given prior to entering into a treaty, the power of the Senate to
amend a treaty, and the President's power to abrogate treaties. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S.
996 (1979).
131. Eugene V. Rostow, The Reinterpretation Debate and Constitutional Law, 137 U. PA. L.
REv. 1451, 1459 (1989).
132. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R.,
art. V, para.l, 23 U.S.T. 3435, 3441.
133. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. & John B. Ritch III, The Treaty Power: Upholding a Constitutional
Partnership, 137 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1529, 1532 (1989).
134. See Koplow, supra note 130, at 1356-57, 1425-27. Rostow accused Koplow of creating an
unconstitutional senatorial veto. Rostow, supra note 131, at 1455.
[Vol. 40
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had sued? The Supreme Court might be tempted to intervene since the
issue on one level concerns only the capacity of extrinsic evidence to
modify a written document, a classic legal problem. The Court could
competently create judicially manageable standards. But the Court
should refuse to resolve the lawsuit. At least when the debate over a
treaty's meaning arises between Congress and the President, the issue
should be regulated by constitutional convention, not by constitutional
law."3 5 The Court may be technically "competent" to analyze the issue
and create a remedy, but its intervention would, nevertheless, be inappro-
priate. Under the theory of conventions, the elected branches acted "le-
gally" since they should not and would not be sanctioned by any Court
and since they acted under color of law. But they (and ultimately the
people they represent) must next decide if either branch nevertheless also
acted "unconstitutionally" by violating constitutional norms that cannot
or should not be judicially enforced. Some of the arguments may be le-
galist in form and rhetoric, but the determination of precise conventions
and possible sanctions should remain political.
In fact, that controversy was resolved politically. The Reagan Ad-
ministration retreated from unilaterally developing the Star Wars pro-
gram when the Senate Committee stated that it must now have access to
all secret statements concerning the then pending 1987 Nuclear Disarma-
ment treaty, claiming that future administrations might incorporate
those statements into the treaty. At the same time, the Senate did not
force its interpretation of the ABM Treaty on the Executive by passing
new restrictive legislation. 36 The Senate prevailed by linking the two
135. The Supreme Court is not precluded from considering all issues involving treaties. The
Court must insure that treaties, which have the force of law, are consistent with the rest of the
Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights. See David A. Koplow, Arms Control Inspection: Consti-
tutional Restrictions on Treaty Verification in the United States, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 229, 326 (1988).
A tougher case arises when the courts must decide if they can protect private parties who have been
directly injured by Executive treaty re-interpretations. See Rainbow Navigation, Inc. v. Department
of Navy, 686 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1988) (Navy could not preclude company from shipping to
Iceland after Executive Branch officials told the Senate that the company would be protected under
the relevant treaty). These examples demonstrate that the Court can and must review some Execu-
tive actions under a given constitutional power (implementing treaties), but cannot review other
actions under that same section because those actions should be regulated by convention. In other
words, the Court should hold that the Executive cannot use secret evidence to modify the terms of a
treaty when that modification aggrieves particular individuals or undermines fundamental individual
rights, but the Court should not resolve interbranch conflicts. It also demonstrates how the concept
of conventions is more refined than the blunderbuss "political question" doctrine, which requires
that the Court not reach the merits at all. See U.S. Dept. of Commerce v. Montana, 112 S.Ct. 1415
(1992).
136. See Michael R. Gordon, Nunn says Record on the ABM Pact is Being Distorted, N.Y.
TiMES, Mar. 12, 1987, at Al.
1992]
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treaties together, seeking information that the Administration did not
want to release on the pending Treaty, and threatening the ratification of
the pending Treaty. The Committee's request demonstrated that the two
branches would not be able to work together effectively over time if pre-
viously undisclosed evidence could alter the terms of existing treaties.
Distrust would permeate the ratification process, leading to deadlock.
By requesting the existing documents, the Senate also showed it had suffi-
cient power to force the executive to compromise.
In this writer's opinion, efficiency, self-interest, interbranch co-oper-
ation, fairness, openness, international reliability, and accountability are
advanced by the emerging evidentiary convention against using undis-
closed discussions to change the express terms of a treaty.1 37 The Consti-
tution will operate more effectively and more democratically if we
137. The precise conventions remain unresolved. Abraham Sofaer, Legal Advisor to the State
Department, conceded that the President was bound by express statements to the Senate, Abraham
D. Sofaer, Treaty Interpretation A Comment, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1437, 1440 (1989), but concluded
that the President must interpret any treaty in "good faith," id. at 1447. Because the Senate retains
its power to interpret treaties, id. at 1450, disputes are likely. "A considerable element of judgment
will always have to be exercised, and when such issues evoke intense feelings they will be resolved
through the political process, rather than by application of neat legal criteria." Id. at 1447. Execu-
tive supporters may claim that the Senate has no power to interpret treaties, see Lawrence J. Block et
al., The Senate'sR e-in-the-Sky Treaty Interpretation: Power and the Quest for Legislative Supremacy,
137 U. PA. L. REv. 1481, 1489-90 (1989), but the Senate will certainly ignore them. The Senate may
even adopt Koplow's broad proposition that "[t]he Senate's view of treaty, whether explicit or im-
plicit, is an integral part of the treaty, and the President cannot proceed to ratification on any other
terms." Koplow, supra note 130, at 1405. But if the Senate takes that position, the President can
also ignore it.
Such general propositions do not answer the "evidentiary" question of the admissibility of secret
discussions. Sofaer agreed that the goal is to determine the Senate's "specific understanding and
intent." Sofaer, supra, at 1443. That task becomes virtually impossible when the Senate failed to
consider a particular issue because it was not told about it. Nor would future Senators ever be
certain about what they are accepting, if they know there may be hidden understandings or disagree-
ments which could affect the treaty's meaning.
Thus the proposed evidentiary convention proscribing the use of such evidence is desirable, but it
should never be turned into a legal standard. Sometimes Presidents need great discretion in inter-
preting treaties. In 1793 President Washington remained neutral when France declared war against
England, even though the United States had signed a Treaty of Perpetual Alliance with France.
Rostow, supra note 131, at 1457. Even the text, clearly presented and understood, should whither
before such grim realities. Additionally, constitutional interpretation should not be limited to origi.
nal intent. Professor Trimble rejected any static legal approach to treaty interpretation. He ap-
plauded the resolution: "The process by which the dispute was resolved- a presidential proposal
rejected by Congress-is constitutionally correct procedure for law-making, and the substantive res-
olute- testing of exotic systems in space is not permitted by the ABM Treaty-was clearly correct."
Phillip R. Trimble, The Constitutional Common Law of Treaty Interpretation: A Reply to the Formal.
ists, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1461, 1463 (1989). But as the title of his article indicates, Trimble charac-
terized the process as constitutional "common law-making." Id. at 1463. This article proposes that
the process can be more accurately described as constitutional "convention-making."
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become aware of the precise conventional, constitutional rule that was
created. 3 ' On the other hand, the political system could develop a far
less desirable convention. Perhaps a more deferential Senate will allow
future Presidents to change the express terms of treaties whenever there
is previously undisclosed evidence, or perhaps the Executive branch will
eventually have complete discretion in its interpretation of treaties. Wor-
ried citizens should not run to the courts but should instead turn to the
ballot box and to other forms of political pressure to correct such a dis-
tortion of the Constitution. American citizens will be more likely to seek
a political solution if they are made aware that the two elected branches
violated an important constitutional rule which the courts are incapable
of protecting: The Executive cannot use secret evidence to modify the
express terms of a treaty when it argues with the Senate over how to
interpret a treaty. Perhaps the politicians will also be deterred from act-
ing "unconstitutionally" if they know there is some consensus over such
constitutional rules; they will not be able to predict the voters' reactions
to any breaches. 13 9 Admittedly, the political conflict might remain par-
tially unresolved, and the system might face a "deadlock" if neither of
the elected branches backed down.Y" But sometimes political stalemate
138. Adopting my proposed evidentiary convention does not answer the central question about
who has the last word in interpreting treaties. Senator Biden claimed that "during the life of the
treaty the Constitution permits... only that interpretation [as presented by the executive branch
and understood by the Senate], unless the treaty is formally amended with the advice and consent of
the Senate." The ABM Treaty and the Constitution, Joint Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Comm. and the Senate Judiciary Comm, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 116 (1987). The Reagan
Administration countered with the Sofaer Doctrine, which stated that interpretations only became
"entrenched" if they were "authoritatively shared with, and clearly intended, generally understood
and relied upon by, the Senate at the time of its advice and consent to ratification." SENATE FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS COMM., THE INF TREATY, S. ExEc. REP. No. 15, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 443
(1988).
Like Trimble, I am reluctant to commit myself to any final resolution, much less any legal solu-
tion. Precise constitutional conventions need to be developed. Trimble recommended the following:
"No meaning of a treaty, contract or law is fixed forever, but contrary to Senator Helms, the Presi-
dent cannot unilaterally reinterpret a treaty. Formal Senate action is not necessary, but Senate ac-
quiescence is." Trimble, supra note 137, at 1467. Trimble's conventions may make the most sense,
but the courts should not intervene whenever either side has not been in compliance with them. As
Senator Lugar pointed out, the Senate retains additional weapons, even if the Administration inter-
prets a treaty in bad faith. 134 CONG. REc. S6771 (daily ed. May 26, 1988). Even the House of
Representatives can use its powers, particularly its appropriations power, to influence treaty inter-
pretations. Louis Fisher, Congressional Participation in the Treaty Process, 137 U.PA. L. REV. 1511,
1519-22 (1989). Ultimately, the electorate has the last word. See Trimble, supra note 137, at 1475-
76.
139. Professor Arnold argued that politicians should include within their decision-making pro-
cess an estimation of voter reaction. R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL AC-
TION 7 (1990).
140. Ever wary of being ruled by "nine Platonic guardians" on the Supreme Court, Judge
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is the proper resolution of a political conflict; the politicians will usually
try to avoid such embarrassments and their accompanying political costs.
Whether one agrees with the recommended convention regulating
the interpretation of treaties or not, note how the prior example demon-
strates the value of developing precise constitutional conventions. We
have become more aware of how the entire Constitution operates. The
politicians have developed "unwritten" constitutional rules that regulate
and distribute enormous amounts of constitutional power initially allo-
cated to them by the text. These rules can be premised upon any combi-
nation of text, history, policy, precedent, and morality. We see more
clearly the many purposes and values that the Constitution seeks to im-
plement and how those purposes vary from section to section. So edu-
cated, we can create a set of constitutional rules that can better constrain
unsavory, even unconstitutional behavior, or can at least warn us that
some of our leaders are violating constitutional norms. Finally, the
Court has an additional reason for not intervening in the prior dispute
even though the issue, at least superficially, has many legal overtones.
Learned Hand argued that because the Constitution did not explicitly authorize judicial review, the
Supreme Court should only find a governmental act unconstitutional when there is "deadlock."
Necessity forced the Supreme Court to decide a limited set of cases: "It was probable ... that
without some arbiter whose decision should be final the whole system would have collapsed .... "
LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHs 29 (1964). Although he did not think the case was "ripe,"
Justice Powell followed a similar line in Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), arguing that the
judiciary can eliminate multiple interpretations of the Constitution when the Congress and the Exec-
utive disagree. 444 U.S. at 1001-02 (Powell, J., concurring).
How does Hand's approach coexist with this article's proposition that the Supreme Court should
not intervene when conventions can better solve the problem? Under this proposition, Judge Hand's
"deadlock" theory is both too broad and too narrow. Sometimes the Court should not intervene
even if the system is stymied. For instance, the Court should not try to resolve the dispute over what
evidence can be used to modify treaties, even though that dispute may last for years, even decades.
Eventually the people and the politicians must sort it out. On the other hand, the Court should often
intervene even where there is no political quagmire. For example, the Court should prevent Con.
gress from placing its own members or its subordinates within the executive, as it did in Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Court intervention was proper
even though no deadlock existed; the President was willing to go along with the existing statutes.
Finally, the notion of deadlock does not address individual rights. Individuals are more likely to be
threatened by concerted governmental action, not by governmental gridlock.
Hand then noted that the political question doctrine reinforces his interpretation by precluding
judicial review of many constitutional issues. Judge Hand did not pull any punches, describing the
political question doctrine as "a stench in the nostrils of strict constructionists" that gave the Court
enormous discretion in providing review. HAND, supra, at 15. According to Hand, the political
question doctrine proves that the Supreme Court is under no duty to decide all constitutional cases
and controversies. Id.
The concept of conventions, however, does not answer Hand's threshold argument that the
Supreme Court lacks textual constitutional authority for judicial review. Conventions would exist
and ought to exist whether the Court has significant judicial review or not.
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The Court would know that alternative rules and sanctions can be for-
mulated to resolve the particular problem. In other words, the Supreme
Court cannot effectively protect and implement the entire Constitution
by itself.
B. Procedures and Standards Regulating Senatorial Advise and
Consent of Presidential Nominees to the Supreme Court and
Cabinet
The Bork, 4 ' Souter, and Thomas nominations to the Supreme
Court raised numerous questions about the extent to which a nominee
must answer senatorial questions and about the standards that the Senate
ought to apply in evaluating a nominee. 42 The entire process is and
ought to be governed by convention. The Constitution does not require
the nominee to appear in the Senate, much less to testify. The text does
not constrain senatorial discretion in any way. This textual silence sup-
ports, but does not prove, the following interrelated conventions: (1) Sen-
ators can constitutionally ask the nominee any questions; (2) the aspirant
can refuse to answer any question for any reason; (3) Senators can vote
against a nominee for any reason, including answers given or not given;
and (4) Senators should evaluate Supreme Court candidates more strin-
gently than they do other executive or judicial nominees. Nevertheless,
convention dictates that Senators should remain somewhat deferential to
all the President's choices. The Senate would be breaching the more fun-
damental convention against single branch self-aggrandizement if they
used their advise and consent power to preclude the Executive from exer-
cising this essential power.
Precedent helps establish the convention that the Senate has great
141. See, e.g., Symposium, The Bork Nomination, 9 CARDozo L. REV. 1 (1987); BORK, supra
note 22; Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1164 (1988); Ste-
phen L. Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1185 (1988). See also Stephen L.
Wasby & Joel B. Grossman, Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr.: New Perspectives On His Nomination
to the Supreme Court, 1990 DuKE L.J 74 (briefly discussing the defeated nominations of Judges
Haynsworth, Carswell, and Parker to the Supreme Court); Joel B. Grossman & Stephen L. Wasby,
The Senate and Supreme Court Nominations: Some Reflections, 1972 DuKE L.J. 557; Edward N.
Beiser, The Haynsworth Affair Reconsidered- The Significance of Conflicting Perceptions of the Judi-
cial Role, 23 VAND. L. Rxv. 263 (1970); Peter G. Fish, Red Jacket Revisited: The Case that Unrav-
eled John J. Parker's Supreme Court Appointment, 5 LAW & HIST. REv. 51 (1987).
142. See Norman Vieira & Leonard E. Gross, The Appointments Clause: Judge Bork and the
Role of Ideology in Judicial Confirmations, 11 J. LEGAL HisT. 311 (1990). Vieira and Gross, wary of
applying ideological standards, based their argument upon precedent and policy: "The prospect of
politicizing the process should be disturbing to everyone." Id, at 336. See also, TIMOTHY PHELPS &
HELEN WINTERNrZ, CAPITOL GAMES 179 (1992).
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latitude in probing constitutional jurisprudence, the nominees' views of
prior cases, views on unresolved issues, character, politics, and prior non-
judicial acts of any candidate. 4 The Senate affirmed Hugo Black's nom-
ination even though he had been a member of the Ku Klux Klan. The
Senate rejected Harold Carswell partially because he once expressed ra-
cist sentiments. 1" Judge Bork's eagerness to participate in the Senate
Committee's gruelling televised analysis of his jurisprudence helped
cause his rejection. When William Rehnquist was nominated to be Chief
Justice, he had to explain arguments he made in favor of private segrega-
tion when he was a younger man.145 The one major exception to this
convention, an exception that also cannot be judicially enforced against
the Senators, is that Senators should not inquire into the guilt or inno-
cence of any particular person entangled in the criminal justice system or
into any case that might be pending before the nominee. Such a question
would violate due process, undercutting the litigant's right to an impar-
tial judge.
Precedent alone, however, cannot validate these or any other con-
ventions. There must also be a sufficient, continuing justification; other-
wise, all conventions would be nothing more than descriptions. As
discussed earlier, the process of justifying conventions utilizes the tech-
niques of constitutional legal reasoning: text, history, precedent, and pol-
icy. The primary raison d'etre for these conventions is that the Supreme
Court is a political as well as a judicial institution; its life-tenured,
unelected officials make decisions that affect some of the most important
parts of our lives. A dismal hypothetical best confirms this point. Imag-
ine that race relations continue to deteriorate in this country, and a large
group of people assert that Brown v. Board of Education,1" the school
desegregation opinion, was wrongly decided. Senators should ask any
143. In his assessment of his bitter defeat to become a member of the Court, Judge Bork stated:
"Nor should the American people put up with a political campaign about nominees that resorts to
untruths or to a confirmation process in which senators demand that the nominee promise specified
results." BoP.K, supra note 22, at 10. Dishonesty transgresses the often violated convention of "fair
play." But should the Senate adopt Bork's recommendation that the confirmation hearing "not
consist of an attempt to argue the outcome of specific issues"? Id. at 301. Bork attempted to prove
his point by quoting from the clumsy questioning by Senator Specter. Id. at 302-05. But alleged
senatorial incompetence does not justify such a bright line. For example, Senators should be able to
ask a nominee what he or she thinks about desegregation opinions like Brown v. Board of Education,
349 U.S. 294 (1955). The recent decades of divided government seem to have developed a substan-
tive convention: the Senate will more closely scrutinize a Supreme Court nominee when the Senate is
not controlled by the President's party.
144. Vieira & Gross, supra note 142, at 329.
145. PHELPS & WnEmRNrrZ, supra note 142, at 162.
146. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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Supreme Court nominees if they would overrule Brown, and should then
vote against any nominee who states they would reverse Brown or who
refuses to answer the question. Certain cases and rights should be con-
sidered inviolable. The debate over abortion proves that there will be ma-
jor disagreement over which rights warrant such legislative protection
from judicial alteration. Of course, existence of a conventional power
does not justify abuse of that discretion. The Senate should not turn
confirmation hearings into elaborate political litmus tests nor put exces-
sive pressure on future Justices to disclose their positions on difficult
legal issues before those issues have been properly presented via the ad-
versarial process. But the precise balance is for the political system; the
voters will ultimately determine if the Senators have abused their discre-
tion. Certainly there is no indication that many voters made subsequent
voting decisions based upon the tumultuous Bork proceedings. Bork
may have been a martyr but only amongst those who already believed. 147
Any nominee can refuse to answer any question. Souter and
Thomas acted both constitutionally and legally by refusing to disclose
their views on the continuing viability of Roe v. Wade. 48 But they had
no right to eat their cake too; the Senate could have refused to nominate
them for that evasion. Yet there is nothing inherently wrong with being
circumspect. Otherwise, the President would be pressured into nominat-
ing the innocuous and the noncommittal, characteristics of the mediocre.
Each Senator must decide if the constitutional issue in question is so im-
portant that the nominee must respond in a certain way. The Thomas
and Souter hearings showed that many citizens and many Senators did
not feel that abortion rights deserved such legislative protection.
The Senate should apply more rigorous standards in evaluating
Supreme Court nominees than other presidential nominees because of the
unique nature of the job. As noted above, once nominated, these
unelected people have extraordinary legal and political power. Cabinet
officials, on the other hand, can only serve for up to four years before an
election threatens their employment. Furthermore, the President should
be allowed great latitude in picking his or her employees; the President is
both responsible for the administration of the government and is ex-
pected to be partisan in that administration. One assumes partisanship
will influence political positions, but one hopes for a broader perspective
among those who are to sit on the Supreme Court. We thus have another
147. Bork actively participated in a losing effort to unseat Senator DeConcini, who had voted
against Bork. PHELPS & wINTERNrTZ, supra note 142, at 214-15.
148. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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semi-paradox; because judicial politics should not be the equivalent of
partisan party politics, politicians can take a closer look at the highest
judicial nominees than at the highest political nominees. 149 Under this
set of conventions, the Senate's rejection of President Bush's nomination
of John Tower to be Secretary of Defense should be considered an excep-
tion to the rule. 150 Finally, the Senate need not so closely scrutinize
judges on the lower federal courts because those judges do not have as
much power as the Justices on the Supreme Court.151 Consequently, the
Senate did not violate any constitutional convention when it consented to
President Reagan's nomination of Judge Bork to the powerful District of
Columbia Court of Appeals but rejected Bork's subsequent nomination
to the Supreme Court.
Creating precise conventions puts much of the legal and political
literature on presidential nominations of judicial and executive officials
into context, reducing the events and subsequent analysis to a series of
rules that can constrain the politicians after the politicians and the elec-
torate are aware of the rules and their constitutional significance. At the
very least, such rules provide the wary amongst us with additional infor-
mation about how constitutional power is really distributed and exer-
cised. Conventions become tripwires that indicate that one branch or a
politician within that branch may be overreaching. But does all of this
even matter since it is unlikely that a defeated nominee would ever file
suit? That query actually strengthens the overall argument in favor of
including conventions in American constitutional analysis. The lack of
litigation over a particular constitutional text or practice does not neces-
sarily diminish the constitutional significance of that area. The lack of
litigation only demonstrates that major constitutional powers are being
149. The Senate may be developing a convention of more closely scrutinizing presidential ap-
pointments to regulatory agencies than to Cabinet positions. Members of "independent" regulatory
agencies need to be less partisan than cabinet appointees, and are in power for more years. The
Senate also critically evaluates assessments presidential appointments to independent regulatory
agencies to change regulatory policy. See CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, JR., SIGNALS FROM THE
HILL 77-87 (1988).
150. Walter Karp argued that the Senate, controlled by Democrats, viciously undermined Presi-
dent Carter by refusing to accept his nomination of Theodore Sorensen to be chief of the Central
Intelligence Agency. WALTER KARP, LIBERTY UNDER SIEGE 30-31 (1988). This breach of conven-
tion, of deference to the President, lends credence to Karp's basic thesis that the Democratic leader-
ship was more concerned about destroying internal opposition, including Carter, than the
Republican Party (particularly Ronald Reagan).
151. Sometimes the Senate will reject a presidential nominee to the Court of Appeals. Neil A.
Lewis, Committee Rejects Bush Nominee to Key Appellate Court in South, N.Y. TIMEs, June 12,
1991, at Al.
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implemented outside the courtroom and need to be regulated by nonlegal
means.
C. The Conduct of Military and Foreign Affairs
Although it is virtually inconceivable that any defeated presidential
nominee would bring his or her senatorial rejection to court, there is little
doubt that military conflicts will continue to trigger litigation. Properly
formulated conventions should play a major role in determining how and
when that military power should be used, even though litigation may also
sometimes be appropriate. Both Congress and the President have over-
lapping textual claims to regulate military force; all the issues cannot and
should not be completely reduced to law, with full judicial review. To
take the most compelling example, Congress and the courts should not
and could not legally constrain how the President should react to a sur-
prise nuclear attack.
The 1991 attack on Iraq, which generated several cases before its
quick, bloody end,"52 serves as an effective example of how conventions
can fit into the Constitution. Paul Rockwell, a free-lance writer, wrote a
newspaper column in 1990, soon after President Bush sent the first two
hundred thousand troops to Saudi Arabia, entitled War by President is
Unconstitutional."5 3 What did Rockwell mean by "unconstitutional"?
Rockwell argued that during the Iraq-Kuwait crisis, President Bush un-
constitutionally circumvented the Constitution's textual requirement
that "Congress shall have the power ... to declare war."1 5 4 By exten-
152. For instance, President Bush was sued over the Iraq conflict in Dellums v. Bush, 752
F.Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990). The plaintiffs requested that the court enjoin the President from at-
tacking Iraq until he secured specific congressional authorization, arguing that the President's ac-
tions would otherwise be "unlawful." Id. at 1144. The District Court denied the plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment, holding that the controversy was not ripe for decision. Id. at 1149-52. But
the Judge also stated that the Executive does not have unreviewable discretion to determine what
military actions are or are not "war." Id. at 1146. See also Wallace v. Bush, No. C-91-0264-VRW,
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1068 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 1991); Pietsch v. Bush, 755 F. Supp. 62 (E.D.N.Y.
1991); Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990).
153. CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 3, 1991, at 9-B. This is not a new argument. In 1919, Senator
Borah made similar complaints about the American armed intervention into the Soviet Union after
the First World War:
Mr. President, we are not at war with Russia; Congress has not declared war against the
Russian government or the Russian people. The people of the United States do not
desire to be at war with Russia.... Whatever is being done in that country in the way of
armed intervention is without constitutional authority."
CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, BLOOD, CLASS, AND NOSTALGIA 196 (1990).
154. CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 3, 1991, at 9-B.
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sively referring to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,l"' Rockwell
contended that "[ihe authors of the Constitution deliberately outlawed
presidential war," and "[ain Act of war is equivalent to an act of law
... ." Rockwell implied that judicial relief should be available. Several
months later, after President Bush doubled the forces in the Middle East
to over four hundred thousand troops, but before he launched his attack,
Speaker of the House Thomas Foley and Senator Majority Leader
George Mitchell stated that the Bush Administration had "no legal au-
thority" to attack without congressional consultation and authoriza-
tion.156 Was Mitchell suggesting he could have obtained an injunction
that would have prevented Bush from fighting? Similar arguments have
been raised about previous conflicts.
15 7
The Supreme Court would almost certainly reject any argument
that Bush's attack against Iraq in 1991 was unconstitutional, just as it did
not entertain similar challenges against the Vietnam War."58 As much as
I loathed the Vietnam War and as much as I disagreed with the use of
force against Iraq at the time of the Gulf War, I believe the Court was
correct not to intervene in Vietnam, if only because the Court could not
have created a meaningful remedy. But simply labelling the congres-
155. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
156. Adam Clymer, 102d Congress Opens, Troubled on Gulf but Without a Consensus, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 4, 1991, at Al.
157. Professor Ely wrote two law review articles arguing that Presidents barely acted constitu-
tionally in fighting in Vietnam, but acted unconstitutionally in secretly fighting in both Cambodia
and Laos. See Ely, Part I, supra note 119; John Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part 1I:
The Unconstitutionality of the War They Didn't Tell Us About, 42 STAN. L. Rnv. 1093 (1990) [here-
inafter Ely, Part 11]. In both articles, Ely asserted that the President acted illegally. Ely, Part I,
supra note 119, at 890, 916; Ely, Part II, supra, at 1116. What did Ely mean? A group of law
professors unsuccessfully sought an injunction to prevent the war, joining a suit brought by members
of Congress. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F.Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
158. The Vietnam War spawned over seventy cases raising constitutional issues. See Robert P.
Sugarman, Judicial Decisions Concerning the Constitutionality of United States Military Activity In
Indo-China" A Bibliography of Court Decisions, 13 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 470 (1974). See, e.g.,
Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (3 judge court dismissed as nonjusticiable claims
that the war was unconstitutional). The Supreme Court never reviewed any of the cases. It affirmed
Atlee summarily, sub nom. Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973). Justices Douglas, Brennan,
and Stewart dissented, wishing to hear the Atlee case. Id. I believe the Court should have heard the
case and dismissed it. But see Warren F. Schwartz & Wayne McCormack, The Justiciability of
Legal Objections to the American Military Effort in Vietnam, 46 Tax. L. Rnv. 1033 (1968). In the
course of criticizing the Court for failing to address the Vietnam issue, Professor Koh described the
Court's constitutional responsibilities in very broad terms: "iThe role of judges is to define the rule
of law by drawing the line between illegitimate exercises of political power and legitimate exercises of
legal authority." KOH, supra note 43, at 184. Koh thereby posed a false dichotomy between illegiti-
macy and legality; for better or for worse, the concept of conventions indicates that some political
actions may be "illegitimate," but are nevertheless legal.
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sional refusal to declare war in Indochina a "political question" or "non-
justiciable" excessively legitimatizes the two branches' behavior. Both
branches partially ignored the Framers' intentions, clearly expressed in
the text, that Congress actively participate in the decision to send troops
into combat.15 9
The country should formulate an initial series of constitutional con-
ventions that partially regulate the two branches' shared power over the
use of military force. Those, such as Rockwell, who are critical of the
informal way this country enters wars, should contend that both the
President and Congress breach a constitutional convention if they con-
tinue any war without a formal declaration of war when Congress has
time to act. Thus the two branches violated the text, spirit, and intent of
the Constitution when they fought the war in Iraq without ever formally
declaring war. They acted "legally" since no court could or should have
stopped them and because they acted under legal authority given them
by the Constitution, but they also acted unconstitutionally by violating
judicially unenforceable aspects of the Constitution. From a conven-
tional perspective, the main problem with such a proposal is that the
country has never acted that way. Indeed, the public seemed satisfied
with the way the Gulf War decision was reached.
One can conceive of other conventions that should never be reduced
to law or subject to judicial review. The President would breach a consti-
tutional convention if he launched a surprise attack without consulting at
least a few members of Congress (unless there was insufficient time).
Professor Ely articulated another potential convention when he argued
that "[s]ecret wars are prima facie unconstitutional, since they haven't
been authorized by Congress, let alone exposed to the scrutiny of the
American public.""lso Such wars may be odious, but it is hard to imagine
159. Professor Ely described Congress' reluctance to authorize or even fully acknowledge in-
volvement in Indochina. Ely, Part I, supra note 119, at 911-22; Ely, Part II, supra note 157, at 1116-
23.
160. Ely, Part II, supra note 157, at 1099. In this article, Ely suggested primarily political
remedies, such as congressional censure of a President who violated his rule against secret rules. Id.
at 1135. But Ely nonetheless remained a lawyer. He equated arguments of constitutionality with
arguments of legality. Id. at 1116. He also remained wary of the political question doctrine, propos-
ing that the Court should "remand" such issues back to Congress whenever it believed that Congress
should do more or was being evasive. See John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted A War Powers
Act That Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1379, 1410 (1988) [hereinafter Ely, War Powers]. Judicial
remands without follow-up sanctions may only confuse the picture. The voters can also evaluate
congressional evasion.
In his companion piece on the wars in Indochina, Ely argued that, aside from precedent, the
Tonkin Gulf Resolution violated the nondelegation doctrine by giving the President too much dis-
cretion over the decision to engage in combat with the North Vietnamese. Ely, Part I, supra note
1992]
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what the Supreme Court should do under the Constitution (at least in the
absence of statutory standards) when such wars take place.
Those who believe that the proper convention is complete presiden-
tial discretion can reply that the many prior examples of undeclared war
and Presidential authorization of force 161 demonstrate the existence of a
broad, accepted convention: the President can fight whenever he wants.
Admittedly, precedent is a major source of and justification for conven-
tions, but it is not a conclusive source. There still has to be a raison
d'ftre. Thus the compromise solution that the politicians created before
the Iraq conflict should become a viable constitutional convention: If
there is sufficient time and if there is little or no immediate threat to the
lives of Americans by invoking the process, the President should not en-
gage in significant armed conflict without first receiving formal approval
from both branches of Congress. That convention does not solve all mili-
tary problems, but it would be a good start.
But the inquiry is far from over. Congress can pass a statute, similar
to the existing War Powers Resolution, requiring a joint resolution before
the President can commit troops if there is time or requiring a resolution
after troops have been committed in certain situations. 162 Congress can
pass statutes similar to the Boland Amendment, which made it illegal for
the Executive to support the Nicaraguan Contras for the purpose of over-
throwing the Sandanista government.1 63  Congress can also cut off fund-
ing, authorizing the Courts to enforce some or all of the statute. In other
words, Congress can convert some existing conventions into law, includ-
ing some of the ways the President uses military force. At that time, the
119, at 894-97. He also asserted that the judiciary could enforce a "bright line test" requiring Con-
gress to clearly authorize military action. Id. at 925. Yet Ely's article forcefully demonstrates that
both political branches are extremely capable of speaking in varying degrees of clarity. In the ab-
sence of statutory authority, the judiciary should not enforce Ely's bright line. The people should.
Ely's eagerness to "legalize" these difficult problems resurfaced in his proposed changes of the
War Powers Act. Ely, War Powers, supra, at 1385-1421. Ely proposed that Congress amend the
War Powers Resolution so that the courts could intervene more effectively by simply starting the
statutory "clock" that requires the President to pull out of a dangerous situation unless Congress
concurs. Id. at 1417. This suggestion is far less troubling than Ely's invocation of the delegation
doctrine. The Court would be enforcing the will of one elected branch.
161. America has used force in other countries 211 times, but Congress has declared war only
five times. Marshall Ingwerson, March Toward War Tests Authority of Congress, CHRISTIAN Sch
MON., Jan. 7, 1991, at 1, 2.
162. Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1429
(1989). Such a proposal arguably contains an unconstitutional legislative veto, thereby violating
I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
163. See Andrew W. Hayes, Note, The Boland Amendments and Foreign Affairs Deference, 88
COLUM. L REv. 1534 (1988).
[Vol. 40
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courts would become involved. 1
D. Congressional Power Over Federal Court Jurisdiction
1. Congressional Power to Limit Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction
Under Article III. Although we should apply the law-convention distinc-
tion to numerous constitutional issues, there is danger in trying to resolve
all such issues completely. We are frequently uncertain of the mix of law
and convention simply because many important questions of constitu-
tional power have never been adjudicated. Sometimes it is better to re-
tain such uncertainty. Politicians can then make both legal and
conventional arguments against disturbing constitutional proposals.
Two arguments are frequently better than one. One of the values of con-
ventions, after all, is that they can prevent unconstitutional actions from
ever occurring, preempting the need for judicial review.
The debate over congressional power to alter lower federal court
jurisdiction and to limit Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction confirms
the virtues of ambiguity. The text of the Constitution gives Congress
vast powers. Article III, Section 1 states: "The judicial Power of the
United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,"
Article III, Section 2 is equally broad: "In all the other Cases before
mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as
to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as
the Congress shall make." Do these clauses permit Congress to manipu-
late jurisdiction so lower federal courts and the Supreme Court are pro-
hibited from hearing some, or even all, constitutional claims? Can
Congress, for instance, pass a statute preventing all federal courts, in-
cluding the Supreme Court, from reviewing a congressional statute out-
lawing the burning of the American flag? Has the constitutional text
thus created a loophole whereby a mere majority of Congress (with Presi-
dential assent) can virtually amend the Constitution by passing unconsti-
tutional bills with special jurisdictional protections that can completely
or partially preclude judicial review? Can Congress even pass a statute
preventing state courts from hearing certain constitutional cases?
It may be needless to say, but no consensus has emerged to answer
these difficult questions. Although the law-convention distinction cannot
provide specific solutions, it can improve the debate. There are many
164. Determining which conventions should or should not be convertible remains for another
day. Professor Glennon has argued that both Congress and the courts should be more active in
foreign affairs. MICHAEL GLENNON, CONSTrTIONAL DIPLOMACY 30-33 (1990).
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possible solutions, but consider four: (1) Congress is only restrained by
convention from manipulating federal court jurisdiction"' (with the ex-
ception of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction);166 (2) only conven-
tion constrains congressional definition of lower federal court
jurisdiction, but constitutional claimants must have some access to the
Supreme Court (if only through the state courts);167 (3) Congress faces
165. Professor Wechsler concluded that "Congress would decide from time to time how far the
federal judicial institution should be used within the limits of the federal judicial power;, or, stated
differently, how far judicial jurisdiction should be left to the state courts." Herbert Wechsler, The
Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1005 (1965). Many commentators agree that
Congress has plenary power over lower federal court jurisdiction. Even Professor Ratner, who has
asserted that the Supreme Court must have significant appellate review to fulfill its "essential func-
tions," conceded significant power to Congress. Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on
Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REv. 929, 955
(1981-82).
Other commentators disagreed. Professor Eisenberg stated that lower federal courts must exist
and must have broad constitutional jurisdiction because "[t]he national judiciary was intended, per-
haps above all else, to be able to hear and do justice in all cases within its jurisdiction." Theodore
Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L. J. 498, 506
(1973-74). Professor Amar has written that, at a minimum, all federal questions must eventually
reach an Article III Court, if only via appellate review. Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of
Article III" Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 229-59 (1985)
[hereinafter Amar, Neo-Federalist View]; Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. CI. L. REV. 443, 466 (1989) [hereinafter Amar, Marbury].
166. Marbury held that Congress could not expand the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Professor Amar has concluded that Congress
can alter some of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Amar, Marbury, supra note 165, at 478-
488.
167. In his seminal article, Professor Hart asserted that constitutional claimants must have ac-
cess to some court. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress To Limit The Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1372 (1953). But later in the discussion,
Hart seemed to hedge that general proposition:
Congress would need the executive arm to seize persons and property, if it were going to
act on an important scale. And the executive arm could be checked by the courts unless
Congress had repealed the general grants of jurisdiction. If both of them did get to-
gether, it wouldn't be long before the voters had something to say, would it?
Id. at 1397. Hart conceded: "Habeas corpus aside, I'd hesitate to say that Congress couldn't effect
an unconstitutional withdrawal ofjurisdiction .... The primary check on Congress is the political
check - the votes of the people." Id. at 1398, 1399 (emphasis added). (Note that the added empha-
sis on "unconstitutional" reveals a potential convention.)
Hart's final fallback - the legal autonomy of the state courts - is somewhat constrained because
state courts have little power over federal officials under existing caselaw. For instance, state courts
cannot use habeas corpus to challenge confinements by federal officials. Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 397 (1871). See also Martin H. Redish & John E. Muench, Adjudications of Federal Causes of
Action in State Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 311, 313-40 (1976). Hart proposed a legal standard, not a
conventional one, to make such nightmares unlikely. Congress cannot simultaneously give a federal
court jurisdiction over any claim and limit that court's ability to entertain all relevant constitutional
issues. Hart, supra, at 1373. Hart's primary authority is United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
128 (1871). See also Laurence Gene Sager, Foreword Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Au-
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conventional restraints in formulating lower federal court and Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction, except the Supreme Court can legally pre-
vent Congress from initially limiting state court jurisdiction to hear con-
stitutional claims and can require state courts to entertain such claims; 6 '
thority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REv. 17, 27, 87 (1981). That
legal standard should be part of any mix of law and convention.
Hart created a large pocket of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction that seems immune from
congressional regulation. "mhe exceptions [clause] must not be such as will destroy the essential
role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan." Hart, supra, at 1365 (emphasis added). Pro-
fessor Ratner extended Professor Hart's argument that the Supreme Court must have appellate juris-
diction if it is to perform its "essential functions" in the Constitution. He maintained that the
Supreme Court must retain appellate jurisdiction over state courts to insure constitutional uniform-
ity, access to state courts, and the supremacy of the national Constitution over state interpretations.
Ratner, supra note 165, at 935-36, 955. See also Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over
Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 157 (1960). Professor Wechsler was
not convinced. Wechsler, supra note 165, at 1005.
Professor Sager, also relying on Hart, concluded that state courts retain power under the
Supremacy Clause to enjoin federal officials if no adequate federal court remedies exist. Sager, supra,
at 83. See also Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control
Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 143, 157-61 (1982). Of
course, we cannot predict how the different state courts would interpret the Supremacy Clause if
they had to face such difficult problems, but the best guess would be "inconsistency." Such possibili-
ties appear unlikely under Professor Sager's formulation, because he interpreted Article 1II, due
process, and the Supremacy Clause as requiring the Supreme Court to decide virtually all constitu-
tional issues, based upon the premise that all constitutional claimants must have "adequate relief"
and must have access to some Article III court. Sager, supra. Sager also concluded that the Court
should oppose congressional efforts to shift specific constitutional issues to state courts because such
moves "create a political climate hostile to certain constitutional rights." Id. at 87. Although he
agreed with Sager's policy perspective, Professor Redish concluded that Congress has plenary power
to remove particular constitutional claims to state court. Redish, supra, at 144.
168. Professor Van Alstyne asserted that Congress has "plenary" power under the exceptions
clause to modify the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. William Van AIstyne, A Critical Guide
to Ex Parte McCardie, 15 Aiuz. L. Rlv. 229, 260 (1973). He marshalled numerous Supreme Court
opinions to support that argument. Id. at 254-63. But he then qualified that plenary power, stating
that the power must conform to the rest of the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights. Id. at 263.
Van Alstyne concluded that "[d]ue process does not require either a hearing or an appeal in the
Supreme Court. It does require, however, at least one fair hearing in a judicial setting which, in light
of the claim that is asserted, conforms to the Supreme Court's stated requisites of procedural due
process." Id. at 268. Thus the Supreme Court apparently must retain some appellate jurisdiction to
insure that neither the state courts nor Congress evades the fundamental obligation to provide "one
fair hearing." Professor Bator disagreed, concluding that Congress could legally eradicate Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction, although such an act would violate the "spirit" of the Constitution.
Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REv.
1030, 1039-41 (1981-82). Bator was proposing a convention.
Professor Redish made a similar argument to Van Alystyne's, concluding that Congress could
completely constrain Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over a fundamental right "so long as
some independent forum existed to protect that right." Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power to
Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Over the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External
Examination, 27 VILL. L. REv. 900, 918 n.73 (1981-82). Redish noted that due process may define
"independence" as requiring either access to Article III lower courts or access to state courts with
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(4) virtually the entire field is subject to meaningful judicial review, and
the Supreme Court has the legal power to strike down any congressional
attempt to impose jurisdictional limitations on the power of lower federal
courts, state courts, and the Supreme Court to hear constitutional
claims.
169
This problem is so dauntingly complex that I am loathe to make a
particular recommendation at this moment, lest the issues and the result-
ing arguments swamp and distort the rest of the article. 170 But the con-
Article III tenure and pay protections. Id. at 915 n.61. For a more extended discussion, see Redish,
supra note 167, at 161-66. But if the Supreme Court cannot review an issue because Congress has
completely foreclosed appellate jurisdiction, including appellate jurisdiction to determine the inde-
pendence of the lower court that heard the claim, who is to determine "independence"? Perhaps
Redish is arguing that the Supreme Court retains minimal, constitutionally protected appellate juris-
diction to insure judicial "independence."
The Supreme Court has continued to pressure the state courts to assume their full constitutional
responsibilities. See Fedler v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988). The Supreme Court edged toward the
conclusion that the state courts must entertain all such cases, but it never had to reach that final
conclusion, just as it never has had to consider a congressional statute limiting lower court jurisdic-
tion over federal constitutional claims. If, on the other hand, the Court were to hold that state
courts have no obligation to consider federal constitutional claims (perhaps only by the unlikely
means of shutting down all state courts), then the Court should do one of two things. The Court
should either create a narrow legal exception to any holding that Congress can limit federal court
jurisdiction to cover that exception, or should hold that Congress cannot preclude constitutional
claims from federal courts.
169. Raoul Berger asserted that Congress can only limit Supreme Court review of factual find-
ings, not conclusions of law. RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 285-96 (1969).
See also Irving Brant, Appellate Jurisdiction: Congressional Abuse of the Exceptions Clause, 53 On. L.
REy. 3 (1973) (discussing the misinterpretation of the phrase "both as to Law and Fact"); Henry J.
Merry, Scope of the Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction: Historical Basis, 47 MINN. L. Rv. 53
(1962) (analyzing the purpose of the Exception Clause in the grant of appellate jurisdiction).
170. It would be absurd to suggest that this issue, which has generated some of the finest and
the most complex law review articles ever written, can be solved in this brief section. I have only
sought to demonstrate that the problem can be more easily grasped and better resolved by including
the concept of constitutional conventions as part of the solution. On a more general level, the quan-
dary'shows why the Court needs to make subtle determinations about the proper mix of law and
convention. That exercise is impossible if constitutional conventions are not fully articulated and
defended when the cases appear before the Court. Because nobody can predict which of these issues
might first appear on the Court's docket, it is vital that the Court have a broad perspective on the
proper mix of law and convention covering the entire doctrinal area whenever it tackles such
problems. Otherwise, an initial decision of either nonjusticiability or justiciability on a seemingly
narrow question, such as the power of state courts over federal officials, could be awkward at best,
catastrophic at worst.
We are, after all, dealing with a simultaneous equation of the most complex and unpredictable
nature. The Court needs to interpret, at the least, Article III, due process, equal protection, habeas
corpus, the Supremacy Clause, the implied doctrine of separation of powers, the power of Congress
to create "legislative courts" under Article I, the Tenth Amendment, and diversity jurisdiction. One
also has to consider the roles and possible responses of Congress, the Supreme Court, the lower
federal courts, the state courts, the state legislatures, and the state constitutions. The issues include
suspension of habeas corpus, federal removal power, federal immunity from state court powers, the
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cept of conventions may provide a "common ground," a starting point in
this inquiry. As diverse as their views are, virtually all constitutional
scholars would agree that Congress would, at the least, violate a constitu-
tional norm by precluding particular constitutional claims from either
lower federal court jurisdiction or from Supreme Court appellate juris-
diction.17' As Professor Bator put it, the Constitution's "spirit" would
be offended if Congress discriminated against a particular category of
constitutional claims. 72 Although Congress may well have the constitu-
tional power to cripple the federal courts in this fashion, Congress would
disrupt the constitutional balance. Once one political faction uses certain
means that threaten judicial independence, other factions will be more
willing to use those devices in the future. The long-term stability of the
system, including the doctrine of separation of powers, is undermined by
such unconventional tactics.
This hesitation to map out the precise mix of law and convention is
another way of expressing the worth of uncertainty. Congress does not
know if it has unlimited legal discretion to alter lower federal court and
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction;' 73 it will hopefully continue its tra-
dition of rejecting any such proposals. 74 Congressional traditionalists
should contend that such constitutionally disruptive acts are "unconsti-
tutional" because they break the particular convention proscribing their
creation; they violate the more fundamental convention that one branch
should not use its powers to cripple another branch; and they may well
definition of "judicial independence," motive, non-discrimination by the states against constitutional
claims, access to state courts, the possible existence of "essential functions," the role of general
jurisdiction statutes, the power to issue coercive orders, and the policy needs for uniformity and
federal supremacy.
171. Professor Rice has proposed that Congress use its jurisdictional powers to express disap-
proval of particular Supreme Court decisions. Charles E. Rice, The Constitutional Basis for the
Proposals in Congress Today, 65 JUDICATURE 190, 196-97 (1981). If the power is indeed regulated
only by convention, I prefer strong adherence to the existing convention. Congress should only use
this weapon if the Court acts outrageously, as it did in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393 (1856).
172. Bator, supra note 168, at 1039-41.
173. Congress clearly has great power. Congress has limited lower federal court jurisdiction
over some claims which can raise constitutional issues. See 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988) (limiting district
court jurisdiction in state tax cases); the Johnson Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988) (limiting district
court interference with orders made by state administrative agencies affecting public utility rates);
and the statute that set a $10,000 requirement for federal questions from 1875 to 1980, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1976), amended by Pub. L. No. 96-486 (1980). The First Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73
(1789), did not extend federal court jurisdiction to include claimants who successfully prevailed on
their federal constitutional claims in state court. See PAUL BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 32-36 (2d ed. 1973).
174. For a list of such bills, see Sager, supra note 167, at 18 nn.3-4.
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be struck down by the Supreme Court as also being illegal. Whatever the
ultimate outcome (one we hope we never learn), we see that Congress has
exercised considerable self-restraint for two centuries by not forcing these
issues. 175 Such congressional self-discipline may not constitute a pure
convention because some of these issues may eventually turn out to be
judicially enforceable, at least in part, but Congress' record reveals an-
other unwritten constitutional rule that ought to be acknowledged, de-
fended, and applauded.
2. Congressional Removal of Cases from Article II Jurisdiction
Courts to Administrative Agencies, State Courts, or Article I Courts. Con-
stitutional conventions, like legal doctrine, vary in their importance, their
specificity, and their technicality. Consequently, the need for traditional
legal analysis fluctuates from convention to convention. Some constitu-
tional issues need to be thrashed out by the body politic; others require
technical legal attention. Subtle, profound issues arise whenever the
Supreme Court determines which cases Congress can constitutionally
transfer from Article III courts, whose judges have protected tenure and
salary, to Article I "legislative" courts or to federal administrative agen-
cies. 176  On first impression the issue may not seem very important.
There are presently only four purely "legislative" courts: the territorial
courts, the military courts, the courts of the District of Columbia, and
the U.S. Tax Court.17 7 That impression is misleading. The issue would
175. Congress has not always followed this convention. For many years, Congress gave state
courts final review over successful constitutional claims. See supra note 173.
176. Professor Redish correctly noted that no coherent distinction exists between Article I
courts and administrative adjudications. Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agen-
cies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DuKF L. J. 197, 201. Professor Fallon concurred.
Richard H. Fallon, Of Legislative Courts Administrative Agencies and Article III, 101 HARV, L.
REv. 915, 928 (1988).
177. Redish, supra note 176, at 199 n.18. Congress has also established legislative courts to hear
Court of Claims issues, private land claims, and customs and patent appeals. Fallon, supra note 175,
at 922.
Professor Geier explored how the Court might analyze the claim that Article I tax courts are
unconstitutional. Deborah A. Geier, The Tax Court, Article III and the Proposal Advanced by the
Federal Courts Study Committee: A Study in Applied Constitutional Theory, 76 CORNELL L. REV.
985 (1991). She noted that tax controversies are not "public rights," that amorphous collection of
issues that all Justices believe can be resolved by administrative agencies. Taxes, after all, are not
"benefits"; they are one of the government's major coercive tools. Drawing upon the cases and the
academic writings, Geier discussed the factors that enter into the determination over the Tax Court's
constitutionality: (1) does the issue involve criminal law? (2) is there a possibility of bringing the
claim in state court? (3) is there appellate review to an Article III court? and/or (4) does the claim-
ant have a waivable option to pursue the case in either an Article III court or an independent state
court? Perhaps some of these factors should be made into permanent constitutional legal doctrine,
but others should only become conventional constraints on Congress. Id.
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become very disruptive if the Supreme Court were to hold that Congress
must place all federal adjudications in either Article III courts or in state
courts to achieve sufficient adjudicatory independence; federal adminis-
trative agencies would no longer resolve millions of claims.17
After deciding in Northern Pipeline Const Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co.,179 that bankruptcy judges must be Article III judges, the
Supreme Court retreated to a balancing test in Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Comm. v. Schor,180 upholding a federal administrative agency's juris-
diction to entertain state common law counterclaims. The Court's two
attempts to create appropriate rules or standards- distinguishing "pri-
vate rights" from "public rights" in Northern Pipeline and "balancing" in
Schor-have been unsatisfactory."'1 Northern Pipeline's private-public
distinction requires Article III judicial autonomy for a narrow set of
rights (i.e., preexisting state common law rights), which do not need judi-
cial independence as much as constitutional rights.18 2 The Court's for-
malism appears to be protecting the wrong set of issues. Only subsequent
decisions can explain Schor's amorphous balancing test, which allows
Congress to remove cases from Article III courts unless Congress'
scheme "impermissibly intrude[s] on the province of the judiciary." ' 3
Schor's balancing test suffers from the diseases that afflict all balancing
tests: indeterminacy, unpredictability, and malleability. Professor Fallon
has argued that meaningftl appellate review by an Article III court must
be provided, 84 while Professor Redish has proposed that there must be
judicial review by some "independent court," either state or federal.1 85
These academic solutions may entangle the "independent" courts in too
many administrative matters.
A brief consideration of a nightmarish hypothetical can demonstrate
how the law/convention dichotomy can help determine Schor's "prov-
ince of the judiciary" (and shed more light on the prior section's discus-
sion of congressional power to alter federal court jurisdiction). Imagine a
congressional statute that transferred a category of criminal laws, which
178. Fallon, supra note 176, at 928.
179. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
180. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
181. Redish, supra note 176, at 208-24.
182. Fallon, supra note 176, at 927.
183. 478 U.S. at 851-52.
184. Fallon, supra note 176, at 950. See also Amar, Neo-Federalist View, supra note 164.
185. Redish, supra note 176, at 227. Redish has asserted that the Supreme Court may require
state judges to be tenured and to have salary protection to be constitutionally "independent." See
Redish, supra note 166.
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authorized incarceration, to legislative courts supervised by the Presi-
dent, stating that those dependent courts had exclusive and final jurisdic-
tion over all claims, including all constitutional challenges. The
following discussion will be somewhat conclusory, but it is primarily of-
fered to demonstrate how conventions can coexist with law in a very
complex area.
The Supreme Court ought to make several determinations about the
proper mix of law and convention. Let us assume that the Court agrees
with such scholars as Herbert Wechsler that Congress has vast powers
over federal court jurisdiction.1 86 Convention primarily limits congres-
sional use of Article III powers to alter lower federal court jurisdiction;
Congress can remove any Article III case from the lower federal
courts.18 7 Congress also has vast discretion, limited primarily by conven-
tion, in limiting Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. I believe Con-
gress could not legally preclude all Supreme Court jurisdiction over all
constitutional claims. In other words, the area is not completely regu-
lated by convention. That assertion is premised upon a hierarchy of
rights and interests. Although you may disagree with the precise ranking
and with some of the distinctions, 18 the following list"1 9 can help us de-
termine when Congress acts illegally, unconventionally, or appropriately:
(1) the right to life is the greatest interest; the dead have little use for
freedom of speech; (2) threats to individual physical liberty come next, as
reflected in the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus; (3) criminal fines and
criminal stigmatization need to be carefully monitored; (4) the individ-
ual needs protection from the government's other "coercive" powers,
such as depriving individuals of property via taxation and civil penal-
ties;19 (5) the remaining constitutional rights that are not directly related
to "coercion" also require great protection; (6) the Court will need to
scrutinize certain "constitutional facts" that often effectively determine
the content of constitutional rights; (7) claimants also raise important
non-constitutional questions of federal statutory law, which "arise
under" the Constitution; (8) legal inferences and questions of fact fre-
186. Wechsler, supra note 165, at 1004-1008.
187. But see Amar, Neo-Federalist View, supra note 165 at 272. For a critical response, see
William R. Casto, An Orthodox View of the Two-Tier Analysis of Congressional Control Over Federal
Jurisdiction, 7 CONSr. COMMENTARY 89 (1990).
188. I am not going to defend this ranking, except by pleading to the reader's intuition.
189. This list is largely derived from Professor Fallon's categories. See Fallon, supra note 176.
190. Professor Fallon wrote: "An equally entrenched and important line of cases depends on the
premise that there must, at the very least, be judicial review of and effective remedies for coercive
violations of constitutional rights." Fallon, supra note 176 at 955.
[Vol. 40
HeinOnline  -- 40 Buff. L. Rev.  696 1992
1992] CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS
quently determine legal outcomes, but remain largely immune from ap-
pellate review; and (9) such "public rights" as governmental benefits can
be important, even essential,191 but warrant the least amount of legal
protection.
If one accepts that hierarchy, or some close variant, then one might
agree with the following legal rules, rules that do not violate the previ-
ously articulated conventions, yet provide the minimum of mandatory
constitutional law. The Supreme Court has a "core" of permanent, judi-
cially protected appellate jurisdiction that enables it to decide that Con-
gress does not have the legal power to remove criminal cases from
Article III courts to either administrative agencies or legislative courts,
unless Congress also permits those defendants to remove their cases to
state courts or provides appellate review by at least one Article III
court.192 Both Article III and procedural due process, which protects
persons from the deprivation of life, liberty and property, provide indi-
viduals threatened by the government's criminal coercive power with the
right to an "independent" adjudicator, to someone who is not directly
under federal executive or legislative authority. 193 Requiring independ-
ent judicial review insures that the criminal defendant will eventually get
significant constitutional protection since all Article III courts and all
state courts are obligated by oaths to enforce the entire Constitution once
191. See, eg., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
192. Professor Brown endorsed a similar legal standard: "There may be claims, such as consti-
tutional issues, which require a judicial forum at some point" George D. Brown, Article III as a
Fundamental Value- The Demise of Northern Pipeline and Its Implications for Congressional
Power, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 66 (1988). This solution of requiring at least one "independent" court to
have jurisdiction over "crucial" claims such as the right to be free from improper coercion is not
completely consistent with legal precedent or existing practice. But as Professor Fallon has pointed
out, it is probably impossible to create doctrine that can coexist with all the precedent since the cases
are themselves inconsistent. Fallon, supra note .176, at 947. There are several troubling cases. For
instance, the Supreme Court upheld the congressional power to create criminal legislative courts in
Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973). The short answer is that Palmore was wrongly
decided. See Redish, supra note 176, at 224. The Supreme Court still retains appellate review over
the District Courts. The Military Courts present an even greater problem because they can apply
coercive sanctions, including the death penalty, without any direct Article III supervision. Military
defendants, however, retain access to Article III courts via habeas corpus. Thus it may not be
constitutionally necessary to require the Court of Military Appeals to be an Article III court as long
as there is some access to the Supreme Court. See Van Alystyne, supra note 168, at 269 (arguing
that McCardle can be narrowly read to permit congressional withdrawal of jurisdiction when tradi-
tional habeas corpus jurisdiction remains undisturbed). A more pitiful compromise is to conclude
that military courts and military justice are sui generis, that their structures do not provide guidance
one way or the other to the remaining parts of the Constitution. Finally, there is no right of appeal
from the territorial court in American Samoa. Fallon, supra note 176, at 971-72. Profound constitu-
tional debates should not be resolved by accommodating such trivial absurdities.
193. Due Process and Article III reinforce each other. Fallon, supra note 176, at 955 n.223.
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they have jurisdiction, a second legal requirement that the Supreme
Court must retain appellate jurisdiction to enforce. 194 In other words,
the Supreme Court must have continuing appellate review to guarantee
this modicum of due process, no matter what the congressional statute
says about lower court federal jurisdiction or Supreme Court appellate
review. Article III's "exceptions" clause cannot swallow these particular
legal rules, which constitute the "essential judicial functions." I would
then extend this legal doctrine to all constitutional claims.
This resolution is admittedly unsatisfying: Congress can technically
comply with the requirement by authorizing only Supreme Court review,
knowing that the Court cannot adequately supervise thousands of
cases. 195 Nevertheless, foisting excessive amounts of judicial review on
the Supreme Court may only violate constitutional convention, not con-
stitutional law. The Court would be bogged down in litigation, but Con-
gress would not have violated the text because one independent court
would retain the last word on constitutional issues, the most the Supreme
Court may legally be able to mandate. But we can and should complain
if Congress functionally crippled constitutional rights by providing inad-
equate judicial review of constitutional claims by independent judicial
bodies.
Professor Akhil Amar would probably bristle at these propositions.
He has carefully parsed the constitutional text to reach the conclusion
that Congress must provide for Article III supervision of all federal ques-
tions, constitutional and statutory. 196 I am reluctant to endorse Amar's
position, if only because Congress has previously placed constitutional
claims within the state court system for final resolution. His proposed
doctrine, however, can easily be reformulated into valid conventions.
Congress would breach a constitutional convention (1) whenever it
places constitutional claims in state court for final resolution, or (2)
whenever it places any other federal questions in state court with no right
to appeal to any Article III court. Such bald transformations of pro-
posed legal doctrine into conventional doctrine certainly do not refute
Amar, but remember that my primary goal in this article is to demon-
strate the usefulness of conventions as a constitutional concept.
194. Thus the appellate court might hold that the administrative agencies cannot try criminal
cases because the agencies do not provide juries and/or do not have the power to imprison anyone.
195. For instance, Professor Fallon asserted that "habeas corpus, which was intended as an
ultimate constitutional safeguard, is not a constitutionally adequate substitute for the right to ap-
peal." Fallon, supra note 176, at 971. As a matter of convention, he may be correct. As a matter of
law, he is on much weaker grounds.
196. Amar, Neo-Federalist View, supra note 165.
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This section's hypothetical also demonstrates how the law/conven-
tion distinction works better than the more absolutist nonjusticiability/
justiciability distinction. If the Court were to find that Congress' power
to regulate federal jurisdiction were nonjusticiable, it would probably
never intervene in any situation, even when a criminal defendant was cut
off from meaningful judicial review. On the other hand, if the Court
determines that such federal jurisdiction issues are justiciable, it may ex-
ceed its appropriate authority, unless it has a clear conception of conven-
tions to provide guidance through this complex field.
E. Congressional Sanctions
Although Congress cannot directly enforce its statutes, 197 it has sev-
eral sanctions that it can employ, sanctions that are almost completely
regulated by convention: impeachment, censure, expulsion, and con-
tempt. Lawyers need to be aware of these conventions to determine the
true balance of power between the branches.
1. Impeachment. Impeachment is the most important interbranch
sanction, allowing Congress to remove any executive or judicial official
from office. 198 The Supreme Court should not be able to review the sub-
stantive grounds for impeachment even though the text of the Impeach-
ment Clause is limited, making it appear to be an easy clause for the
judiciary to interpret: "The President and all civil Officers of the United
States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction
of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."' 199
Congress historically has interpreted that clause broadly, impeach-
ing Judge Pickering for drunkenness and senility.2" Congress consid-
ered impeaching Justice Chase for partisan reasons. 201 President
Andrew Johnson was impeached by the House of Representatives, only
to survive his trial in the Senate by one vote, for trying to fire Secretary of
War Stanton, who arguably was protected by the Tenure of Office Act of
1867.202 Yet the verdict of history has been that Johnson should not
197. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
198. See Michael L. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives,
68 TEx. L. Rav. 1 (1989).
199. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. But see RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS 103-121 (1973).
200. BERGER, supra note 199, at 57 n.15.
201. See, eg., STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING (1973).
202. Many years later, the Supreme Court found the Act unconstitutional. See Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). See also MICHAEL L. BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF
ANDREW JOHNSON (1973).
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have faced impeachment." 3 Overall, Congress slowly created a conven-
tion against using impeachment for exclusively political reasons. The
Nixon impeachment process, however, had obvious political overtones.
The House of Representatives found "clear and convincing evidence" for
three impeachment articles against President Nixon: (1) covering up the
Watergate burglary, (2) misusing his executive power and the power of
such agencies as the Internal Revenue Service; and (3) failing to comply
with subpoenas from the House Judiciary Committee. None of these al-
leged transgressions are self-evidently "High Crimes" or "Misdemean-
ors," yet all three offenses, particularly the refusal to comply with the
House subpoena, are flagrant breaches of convention. If Nixon could
have used executive privilege to stymie an impeachment investigation
and then prevailed on the argument that a frustrated investigation is not
itself an impeachable offense, Congress would no longer be able to effec-
tively apply its impeachment power. Conventions thus expand the con-
stitutional text beyond any narrow, legalistic reading. Some legal
academics agree. Professor Tribe has described impeachable offenses as
those which "involve serious abuse of official power,"' 4 while Professor
Ely had "little doubt" that "a serious and willful violation of the separa-
tion of powers should count as a 'high crime or misdemeanor.... ,205
The Supreme Court should not evaluate either the proof or the pro-
cedures that Congress adopts during its impeachment proceedings. For
example, federal district court Judge Hastings unsuccessfully argued that
Congress should not impeach him for bribery because a jury had already
found him not guilty in a criminal proceeding; he was thereby protected
by the constitutional ban against double jeopardy.20 6 The Supreme
Court recently decided to hear Judge Walter Nixon's claim that the im-
peachment proceedings against him were void because the full Senate did
not vote. The Court should not get embroiled in this ostensibly legal
debate. It need not consider the probable congressional retort that juries
203. BERGER, supra note 199, at 252-296.
204. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 291 (2d ed. 1988).
205. Ely, Part II, supra note 157, at 1133. Raoul Berger concurs. BERGER, supra note 199, at
53-102.
206. William J. Eaton, Senate Convicts Judge, Strips Him of Offce, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1989,
at Al. Both Judge Hastings and Judge Nixon filed lawsuits contesting the impeachment procedures.
Hastings v. United States Senate, Impeachment Trial Comm., 716 F. Supp. 38 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 887
F.2d 332 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Nixon v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd, 938 F.2d
239 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert granted, 112 S.Ct. 1158 (1992). The courts found their claims to be
nonjusticiable. Hastings, 716 F.Supp. at 43; Nixon, 744 F.Supp. at 14. For a contrary view, see
Michael B. Miller, The Justiciability of Legislative Rules and the "Political" Political Question Doc-
trine, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1341, 1374 (1990).
[Vol. 40
HeinOnline  -- 40 Buff. L. Rev.  700 1992
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS
apply a higher standard of proof in criminal proceedings than Congress
does in impeachment proceedings. Only Congress can determine what
burden of proof it should apply, and the members of Congress are under
no legal obligation to tell the rest of us the standard they used.2"7 The
impeachment sanction is different than the criminal sanction, and Con-
gress is effectively constrained only by convention.
Judge Hastings also criticized Congress because most of his im-
peachment trial was to be conducted by twelve senators, not by the full
Senate.2"8 Once again Hastings raised a conventional issue. Conventions
should be developed to determine the grounds for impeachment, the
standards of proof, and the procedures. Nor should we forget that Con-
gress, like the other two branches, is bound by the fundamental conven-
tions against excessive concentration of power and tyrannical treatment
of individuals. More precise procedural and substantive conventional
standards for impeachments would give all of us more warnings that
Congress might be exceeding its legitimate authority. At some point, the
citizenry as well as the Court must demand that the elected branches
comply with constitutional norms. There is little outrage over the
Judges' impeachments.
It will be easier for the Court to rule against claimants like Walter
Nixon if the Court is aware of the vast extent and precise nature of con-
stitutional conventions, and if it is able to put Nixon's claim in constitu-
tional context. The Court should not consider judicial abstinence to be
either unusual or inappropriate. Both the general theory of conventions
and the existence of actual conventions that regulate impeachments un-
dercut Nixon's claim for a judicial reversal of his impeachment. His only
appeal should be to the court of public opinion.
2. Congressional Self-Behavior. Although the Supreme Court held
in Powell v. McConnack 2  that it can review congressional decisions not
to admit an elected member into Congress, the Court has never consid-
ered a case where Congress used its textual power to expel a member
who had previously been admitted. The expulsion power should not be
subject to judicial review (with one narrow exception, discussed below),
even though a majority of more than two-thirds could abuse it to elimi-
207. "The standard of proof is decided by each senator rather than the customary courtroom
requirement of guilt 'beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Eaton, supra note 206, at Al. Only five other
federal judges had been impeached before Hastings. Id.
208. Ruth Marcus, Senate Removes Hastings; US. Judge Convicted of Extortion Plan, Despite
Jury Acquittal, WASH. POsr, Oct. 21, 1989, at Al.
209. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
19921
HeinOnline  -- 40 Buff. L. Rev.  701 1992
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
nate all opposition. As in England, the majority's relationship with the
opposition is and should be governed primarily by convention. Certainly
the text gives broad power to the legislative branches: "Each House may
determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disor-
derly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Mem-
ber."21 0 The Court should only be able to reverse any expulsion that was
not supported by a two-thirds vote. Judicial enforcement of that textual
requirement assures that a smaller majority cannot seize this extraordi-
nary power; that any expulsion reflects widespread national support; and
that the expulsion will usually reflect some bipartisan support because
the majority party will normally not have enough votes, particularly in
an era of weak party discipline. The rest of the text - the other proce-
dures and grounds for expulsion - should be determined by convention.
The judiciary should not second-guess lesser internal congressional
sanctions. Speaker of the House Jim Wright should not be able to turn
to the courts for being forced to give up his powerful position, even
though the process was more political than legal.2"' Representative Luk-
ens, convicted of a sexual crime, should not prevail in court after he was
forced either to resign to preerve his pension or to face the likelihood of
expulsion.2"2 Senators Glenn and McCain may have had a legitimate
complaint of unfair treatment when the Senate Judiciary Committee re-
fused to accept the special prosecutor's finding that there was no prob-
able cause that they had acted improperly on behalf of Charles H.
Keating, Jr.'s failed Lincoln Savings and Loan Association. 213 Colum-
nist and ex-Congressman Otis Pike concluded, "That isn't high ethics,
that's low politics."21 Pike is actually pointing out a breach of the con-
stitutional convention of "fair play." The solution is not to legalize "fair
play," but to make it a more powerful constraint on congressional action.
Pike should have concluded that the Committee acted unconstitutionally
by violating the document's political norms. The jaded public might be-
come less tolerant of such shenanigans if it saw how such behavior un-
dermines the Constitution itself. The committee's final resolution -
recommending full senatorial censure of the ill and retiring Senator
Cranston while wristslapping the four senators who were remaining in
210. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
211. See JOHN M. BARRY, THE AMBITION AND THE POWER 687-750 (1989).
212. Lukens Submits Resignation From House, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 25, 1990, at A18.
213. Helen Dewar, Ethics Panel Delays Action on 'Keating Five' Until After Election, WASH.
POsT, Sept. 24, 1990, at Al.
214. Otis Pike, Ethics Bog in the Senate, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 29, 1990, at 7-B.
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office215 - may have revealed that ancient, darker standard: protect your
own lest they turn upon you.2 16
3. Criminalization of Executive Behavior. A classic American re-
sponse to problems is to pass a law which makes Americans feel more
secure but which often fails to remedy the problem. If the irritating be-
havior is unpopular enough, pass a criminal law. Because Congress has
control of this extraordinarily powerful impulse, it can radically alter re-
lations with the other branches, particularly when powers overlap. This
"trump" gives Congress the theoretical power to dominate both foreign
affairs and the distribution of funds, two powers it shares with the Presi-
dent. The most important recent example is the Boland Amendment,
which prohibited any member of the Executive branch from providing
unauthorized funds to the Contras in Nicaragua, and the statute which
made it a crime to trade in arms with Iran.2"7 These statutes, along with
subsequent perjuries to Congress by executive officials who violated the
statutes, provided the legal foundation for the Iran-Contra Affair.
The congressional ability to criminalize executive action may an-
swer the perpetual debate over who ultimately controls foreign policy,
the President or Congress. For example, Congress could pass a law mak-
ing it a crime for any executive official or military officer to enter El
Salvador or Nicaragua unless those countries have directly attacked the
United States. The courts should enforce that law. This is another ex-
ample of the subtle nature of American constitutional conventions. The
courts cannot review much of the sharing of foreign affairs powers in the
absence of congressional statute, but may be able to do so after Congress
has converted its conventional power into law.
This article proposes that criminalization of legislative-executive re-
lations should be a last resort. The sharing of foreign affairs ought to be
primarily controlled by convention, not by criminal law. The initial, es-
sential conventions are executive honesty with Congress and congres-
sional willingness to maintain secrecy. When the Executive fails to be
open with Congress, Congress can employ its contempt powers, another
power primarily defined by convention. If the Executive disregards a
215. Helen Dewar, Panel Finds 'Credible Evidence' Cranston Violated Ethics Rule" No Further
Action Sought Against 4 Other Senators in Keating Case, WASH. PosT, Feb. 28, 1991, at A12.
Although a case was pending against Senator D'Amato, only 10 senators have been censured by the
Senate, and only 15 have been expelled. Id.
216. In a subsequent article, I shall consider the question of whether or not a venal pattern of
behavior can become a "convention."
217. See Hayes, supra note 163. See also KOH, supra note 43, at 52.
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statutory constraint, Congress can also cut off funding, publicize the law-
lessness, and argue that the Executive is acting unconstitutionally. Of
course, if executive officials have violated ordinary criminal laws, such as
they did in Watergate, those laws apply.
Such platitudes do not solve the recent conflict between Congress
and the Presidency. Perhaps Congress was justified in passing the Bo-
land Amendment, given the consistent breach of the convention of hon-
est disclosure by officials like CIA Director Casey,21 but such statutes
should be quickly repealed and should be rarely recreated.219 Perhaps
the rhetoric of conventions can help move the country back from its pre-
occupation with legal confrontations and solutions. Given the perpetual
changes in foreign affairs, the mix of congressional and presidential pow-
ers cannot and should not be overly constrained by law. For example,
Congress may gain more foreign affairs power now that the Cold War
and the threat of instant nuclear war appear to be receding memories.
The political constitution should be allowed to adapt to this fundamental
change in the foreign policy climate without excessive interference from
the legal Constitution. Both Congress and the courts should refrain from
generating too much law, whether it be statutory or constitutional.
Congress has also given itself the related criminal law power to reg-
ulate the Executive by requesting that the Attorney General appoint spe-
cial prosecutors whenever the Attorney General finds "probable cause"
of criminal behavior. In a prior article that also compared the British
and American Constitutions,220 I argued that the Supreme Court should
have found the special prosecutor statute unconstitutional in Morrison v.
Olson.22 This is not the place to repeat such arguments.222 Notice in-
stead how the concept of constitutional conventions can partially rescue
that dubious decision. One way to reduce the likelihood of congressional
abuse of its new prosecutorial power would be to create a convention
limiting congressional invocation unless there was minimum bipartisan
support or unless two-thirds of Congress supported such a move.
Throwing someone in jail, after all, is far more threatening than impeach-
218. BOB WOODWARD, VEIL (1987).
219. Clark Clifford disagreed: "I urged that teeth be put into the law in a way that everyone
could understand: criminal penalties for 'knowing and willful' violation of the law." CLARK CLIF-
FORD & RICHARD HOLBROOKE, COUNSEL To THE PRESIDENT 171 (1991).
220. Wilson, supra note 28.
221. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
222. In addition to Justice Scalia's dissent in Morrison, 487 U.S. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting),
see Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REv. 105 (1988), and Wilson,
supra note 28, at 165-75.
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ing them, which jeopardizes their pension and reputation. Congress has
become a participant in the murky area of prosecutorial discretion.
Scholars and political leaders should create explicit nonjusticiable stan-
dards and procedures to limit that discretion so that the electorate will be
warned that Congress might be overreaching. Admittedly the courts
could not enforce such conventions, but at least the populace would have
some way to evaluate the exercise of this novel power.
VI. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE CONCEPT OF CONVENTIONS TO THE
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE OF NONJUSTICIABILITY
The doctrine of nonjusticiability interacts in two ways with conven-
tions. First, the Supreme Court can improve its existing justiciability
analysis by including the concept of conventions. Second, the Court
should retain the notion of conventions to determine its scope of judicial
review, even if it eliminated or did not apply the controversial doctrine of
nonjusticiability.
This section suffers from the ambivalence that invariably afflicts a
new approach to old legal doctrine. On the one hand, the section wishes
to show that the concept of conventions easily coexists with the political
question doctrine so the Supreme Court will start using the concept. On
the other hand, it partially undermines the political question doctrine by
introducing a significantly different perspective.
A. The Concept of Conventions Improves Existing Nonjusticiability
Analysis
The Supreme Court might resolve this article's previous illustrations
of conventions by holding that they all raised "political questions" that
fit under the six Baker v. Carr223 criteria:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political ques-
tion is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discovera-
ble and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of decid-
ing without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolu-
tion without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of govern-
ment; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifari-
ous pronouncements by various departments on one question.
224
223. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
224. Id. at 217.
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Justice Brennan, never renowned for his judicial restraint, expressed
all six tests in grudging terms. Because the Court has a duty initially to
interpret the entire Constitution (if only to determine when to withdraw),
it will rarely conclude that any part of the constitutional text exclusively
commits an issue to another branch. Often the issue can best be resolved
by a mix of law and convention, not completely by either convention or
by law. Judges can almost always devise "judicial standards" to satisfy
the second test, given the broad discretion inherent in equity. How often
will it be "impossible" for the Court to act without making a policy deci-
sion that "clearly" involves nonjudicial discretion under the third stan-
dard? How is the Court to determine, by itself, "lack of respect" for
another branch under the fourth test, since the other branch can usually
best determine if it is being treated with lack of respect? How often will a
thoughtful Court find, under the fifth requirement, an "unusual need"
for "unquestioning adherence" to a "political decision" "already made"?
Nor is the final guideline any broader. Because the Supreme Court nor-
mally225 has the last word after finding justiciability, there is little poten-
tial embarrassment of "multifarious pronouncements." As Professor Ely
noted, the modem Court assumes that all elected officials will comply
with its orders.226
Subsequent decisions have confirmed the doctrine's narrowness;
never have so many tests generated so few results.227 The political ques-
tion doctrine's seemingly minor contribution to constitutional law has
encouraged some scholars to argue for its elimination. 228 The Supreme
Court has never explained why it chose and limited itself to these six
particular formulations, six doctrines in search of a theme. Overall, the
six standards are "court focused," reflecting the Court's worries about
itself, about its relationship with the other branches. Under these tests,
225. If the Court defers to another branch, that branch effectively has the last word.
226. Ely, War Powers, supra note 160, at 1410.
227. The major cases concerning the doctrine are Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849),
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962), Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), and Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996
(1979). Professor McCormack then narrowed that group: "Baker and Powell rejected application of
the doctrine; in Colegrove and Carter, the political question doctrine rationale commanded only a
plurality of the Court. The original political question doctrine cases, Luther v. Borden and Coleman
v. Miller, thus stand as the only clear applications of the doctrine." McCormack, supra note 30, at
615. Professor Scharpf, on the other hand, included far more cases under his analysis. Fritz W.
Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966).
228. Critics of the political question doctrine include Professors Henkin, Redish, McCormack,
and Tigar. See Henkin, supra note 33; Redish, supra note 35; McCormack, supra note 30; Tigar,
supra note 32.
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the Court is tempted to rush into fields once it is satisfied it can "compe-
tently" create standards, determine facts, and create remedies, even
though it should nevertheless abstain from intervening because the issue
is more fit for conventional resolution. Nevertheless, the Court is correct
in concluding that it should not have the last word on all constitutional
disputes. If the political question did not exist, something like it would
have to be invented.
The concept of textual constitutional conventions provides a link
between the six Baker hurdles, which exist somewhat in isolation from
each other. The judiciary ought not resolve many constitutional disputes
simply because such disputes should be resolved by the formation and
enforcement of conventions. Thus the concept of conventions, at the
least, enables the Court to spot nonjusticiable issues more accurately and
to keep out of other areas even if it does find the issue to be technically
"justiciable." More importantly, it strengthens the underlying notion of
judicial restraint. Just as a plaintiff is more likely to obtain an injunction
if he or she can offer the court a viable remedy, a defendant is more likely
to prevail if he or she can suggest an attractive alternative, which in these
cases would be to propose conventional resolutions.
Conventional analysis should not be subsumed into the Baker tests;
the Court should withdraw from conventional disputes whether or not
the issues meet any of the Baker standards. The six Baker tests, by them-
selves, fail to capture the need for judicial abstinence as powerfully as the
concept of conventions in combination with those Baker criteria.229
Conventions generate a broader policy analysis than the six broad and
amorphous tests that Justice Brennan formulated in Baker v. Carr. Con-
ventional analysis forces us to analyze each section of the Constitution to
determine the need for conventions and to propose each convention's
particular form. This article has attempted to show, through specific ex-
amples, how the Court and the body politic can make better decisions
once they decide that some constitutional problems should be resolved
politically. We have also seen that the Court's refusal to rule in favor of
the plaintiff should not always terminate the constitutional debate.
The concept of constitutional conventions influences the inquiry
into the proper scope of judicial review by bolstering the argument that
sometimes the Supreme Court cannot adequately protect parts of the
Constitution, even when unconstitutional behavior exists. 230 The con-
229. Political question and standing decisions are not rare, isolated precedents, but are legiti-
mate judicial acknowledgments of conventional aspects of the American Constitution.
230. Professor Mulhern used both positive and normative arguments to justify the political
1992]
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cept allows us to see more clearly which constitutional issues should be
left to the political arena, and how those issues should be resolved after
the Court has ruled against the plaintiff. If judges and lawyers are more
aware of the political Constitution's norms, they can make better deci-
sions about the scope of the legal constitution. In other words, the Baker
tests fail to describe adequately the Constitution because they focus on
the Court's limitations, not on the powers and responsibilities of the
elected branches.
B. The Concept of Conventions is Severable from the Doctrine of
Nonjusticiability
The political question doctrine is plagued by almost metaphysical
dilemmas. For instance, how can a court decide not to decide a constitu-
tional case without first deciding how to interpret the Constitution to
determine when not to decide? In other words, how is the Court to de-
cide which part of a textual passage it will consider and which it will
question doctrine, Mulhern, supra note 24, just as this article has alternated between positive and
normative justifications for constitutional conventions. By combining the political question issues
with high levels of judicial deference to congressional regulation of economic and social legislation
under the "rationality" standard, id. at 129-34, and congressional regulation of the states under the
Commerce Clause, id. at 150-52, Mulhern created a vast field of non-judicial constitutional interpre-
tation. "An interpretation that fits our tradition must acknowledge that courts share responsibility
for interpreting the Constitution with the political branches of government." Id. at 101.
Although he refused to embrace Professor Choper's argument that the Court should not resolve
any structural issues and should only protect individual rights, id. at 169, Mulhern adopted a simi-
lar, but slightly less rigid stance. According to Mulhern, the courts have a special "sphere within
which [they] consider themselves responsible for constitutional interpretation. Protecting oppressed
individuals from abuses of government power is the core of that sphere." Id. at 164. At the same
time, the Court should generally abstain from resolving separation of powers and federalism issues.
Id. at 165. Mulhern concluded that most interventions, such as Chadha and Bowsher, were clumsy.
Id. at 172-74. When they did not assert themselves, as in Garcia, the system flourished: "The contin-
ued vitality of the states as governmental entities provides the most compelling evidence that the
political branches of the government do not routinely trample constitutional values." Id. at 159.
Although this article and Mulhern's article obviously reinforce each other, the principle of con-
ventions leads to different conclusions. Mulhern's distinction between structure and process raises
problems. Although this article has focused on structure, primarily because conventions best explain
constitutional structures, it has not drawn a bright line between structure and process. First, we
have seen several examples of how individual rights and structural problems are often commingled.
In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), after all, criminal defendants asserted a right to the
tapes. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), the special prosecutor case, affected the lives of
individual executive officials as well as the doctrine of separation of powers. Furthermore, the Court
should sometimes intervene in structural cases. For an example, one need go no further than Mar-
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (which also had an individual rights aspect). By focusing on
which parts of the structural constitution the political branches can best enforce, conventions better
explain why there should be a high degree of judicial restraint in such "political cases" than Mul-
hem's distinction between structure and rights, or his blending nonjusticiabiity with deference.
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not?2 31 Isn't the Court deciding a case or interpreting the Constitution
whenever it applies a six prong test?
The doctrine of nonjusticiability also can suffer from overbreadth.
It operates on the assumption that the entire issue is not fit for judicial
resolution, immunizing entire sections of the Constitution from any judi-
cial review and generating potentially awkward or even absurd results.232
For example, let us reconsider the question of the power of Congress to
expel its members. This article argued that the Congress can expel any
Congressman or Congresswoman for any reason; that aspect of the con-
stitutional text should be regulated by convention. It is also likely that
the Supreme Court would find the issue nonjusticiable. Consequently,
the House of Representatives could legally expel ex-Ku Klux Klan leader
and Nazi sympathizer David Duke for his past actions and his past be-
liefs if Duke were to win a seat to the House. Such a politically moti-
vated expulsion would violate an existing constitutional norm/
convention but would not constitute grounds for judicial involvement.
Congress would have acted unconstitutionally by expelling someone for
partisan, political reasons. So far, the doctrine of conventions and the
political question doctrine would probably overlap. However, imagine
that the House of Representatives also proposed to chop off Duke's arm
as part of its expulsion penalty. Such a sanction would exceed the "outer
perimeter" of congressional expulsion authority, and would violate the
Eighth Amendment (at the very least). The Supreme Court should pre-
vent such unconstitutional and illegal behavior. Application of the non-
justiciability doctrine would be muddy, at best, since that doctrine
arguably precludes the Court from considering any claims arising under
nonjusticiable text. The concept of conventions helps to determine more
precisely when the Court should stay out of a constitutional conflict and
when it should intervene.
One might try to preserve the justiciability doctrine by arguing that
it is a metaphor for an extraordinarily high level of judicial restraint that
can be set aside in extreme circumstances.233 But that response rein-
forces the academic criticism that the nonjusticiability doctrine only ob-
fuscates constitutional doctrine, failing to add anything to the more
231. See New York v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2433 (1992).
232. The Supreme Court may be retreating from such an all-or-nothing approach. Id.
233. A doctrine of extreme deference can easily coexist with the concept of conventions. The
Court would defer on virtually all issues that involved conventions, but would retain the power to
intervene if legal violations occurred at the "outer perimeters" of power.
19921
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straightforward conclusion that the government acted within its legal
powers. I do not, however, want to get too embroiled in this debate.
Ultimately, it may not matter too much what legal doctrine the
Court chooses when it decides that a particular issue should be resolved
by convention rather than by law. The primary point is that the Court
should almost always stay away from certain constitutional problems.
The concept of conventions locates those issues without committing the
Court to complete judicial abdication. It is a valid and useful concept,
whether or not one accepts the more contentious doctrine of nonjusticia-
bility. How might the concept of conventions coexist with the political
question doctrine? If the Court were to incorporate conventions into its
thinking, it might well conclude that some conventions arise under the
issues covered by the political question doctrine, but other conventions
occur in areas that are "justiciable." '234 Thus, influenced by the concept
of conventions, it might dismiss Judge Nixon's claim as a "political ques-
tion," or the Court might hold that he should lose, even though the issue
is justiciable, because the issue of impeachment ought to be almost exclu-
sively regulated by convention and thus be subject to a highly deferential
scope of review.
C. Applying the Concept of Conventions to Recent Supreme Court
Opinions Involving the Political Question Doctrine
This part shall apply the concept of conventions to three recent
Supreme Court cases that raised "political question" issues.
1. United States v. Munoz-Flores. 2" Twice in 1990, the United
States Supreme Court awkwardly grappled with the longstanding prob-
lem of determining which constitutional disputes are nonreviewable
"political questions." 236 In United States v. Munoz-Flores, the Court
unanimously held that a criminal defendant could challenge the Victims
234. For instance, the Court held that parents of black children had no "standing" to challenge
the Reagan Administration's refusal to enforce equal protection in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737
(1984). There can be no doubt that equal protection claims are justiciable. I would argue that the
Reagan Administration breached a constitutional convention by not faithfully executing the laws.
We have already seen that the Court will sometimes become involved in conventional issues,
although it never can consider political questions. The Court must determine which conventional
powers can be implied, and which conventional powers can be "converted." Finally, it can obtain
judicial review over some issues after Congress has "converted" them by statute. What was previ-
ously conventional has become legal. It is far more difficult to imagine how Congress can convert
the nonjusticiable into the justiciable.
235. 495 U.S. 385 (1990).
236. Chief Justice Marshall set up the basic distinction in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
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HeinOnline  -- 40 Buff. L. Rev.  710 1992
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS
of Crime Act, a federal statute that imposes special assessments on con-
victed defendants to fund programs that compensate and assist crime vic-
tims, on the ground that the Act violated the Origination Clause, which
requires that all bills raising revenues be initiated in the House of Repre-
sentatives.23 Justice Marshall's majority opinion found that the claim
was not a nonjusticiable "political question" under any of the six alterna-
tive criteria established in Baker v. Carr.238 He then concluded that the
challenger should lose on the merits because the "primary purpose" of
the Act was not to raise revenues, but to generate funds to compensate
victims of crime.2 39 Three Justices did not agree with Marshall's stan-
dard for determining what facts would be necessary to satisfy the Origi-
nation Clause requirement. In separate concurrences, Justice Stevens
concluded that any violation of the Origination Clause would be cured by
proper presentation to the President,24° while Justice Scalia stated that a
bill satisfies the requirement once it has been designated "H.J. Res.," an
abbreviation for "House Joint Resolution," that affirms that the bill com-
menced in the House.24
The British system not only provides us with the basic law-conven-
tion distinction, but also indicates how Munoz should have been de-
cided.242 The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty does not preclude
the British courts from reviewing everything that emerges from West-
minster, the seat of Parliament. In Stockdale v. Hansard,243 the House of
Lords held that a House of Commons resolution, stating that parliamen-
Cranch) 137 (1803). "Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws,
submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court." Id at 170.
237. "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the
Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 7.
238. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
239. 495 U.S. at 399.
240. Id. at 403.
241. Id. at 409.
242. I am not suggesting that most specific English conventions should be transplanted to
America. The English mixture of law and convention is radically different than the American solu-
tion. One cannot crudely lift one part of a complex, interrelated system and superimpose it on a
radically different system. Changing any single part of a constitution subtly alters other parts. But
comparative law is not primarily an inquiry into technical legal similarities and differences. One
studies other legal systems for their own sakes and to learn more about one's own culture. Professor
Haskins believed that comparative law enabled us to perceive underlying similarities in legal systems
which may express uniformities in human behavior. The English example reveals the widespread
existence of similar American constitutional conventions and the need to adapt the English concept
of conventions to America's different structure. Although specific English solutions can be illumi-
nating, Americans need not adopt any particular English conventions. They only need to incorpo-
rate the underlying concept of conventions.
243. [1839] 9 A. & E. I.
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tary reports were protected by the parliamentary privilege from defama-
tion actions, was not law because it was not passed by the "King in
Parliament": the House of Commons, the House of Lords, and the
Crown. Thus the English courts have a constitutional "rule of recogni-
tion" 2' that determines when Parliament has passed a "law" that the
Courts can enforce. Under this narrow scope of review, the English
Courts will be satisfied if they are presented with a Queen's Printer's
copy of a statute. For revenue bills, the Speaker of the House must cer-
tify that a bill complied with existing laws as it passed through the Par-
liament. Thus, to take an extreme situation, the judges could not reverse
the Speaker's dishonest representation that the House of Lords had
agreed to a Bill when they had not. The British courts must trust that
the Speaker of the House has abided by the conventions of honesty and
impartiality.
Because America has a written Constitution, the Supreme Court
need not invent a judicially enforceable "rule of recognition." The Con-
stitution sets forth the basic procedures for federal law formation. Con-
sequently, the Court was on firm ground in LN.S. v. Chadha,2 as when it
held that both the House and Senate need to participate in any law-mak-
ing and that Congress cannot make laws without presenting them to the
President, who can exercise veto power.' 4 We want formal rules to de-
termine what is "law." Thus, the Munoz Court correctly determined
that all revenue bills must originate in the House of Representatives; the
Court must legally protect that basic "rule of recognition." But the
Court erred by formulating a probing "primary purpose" test to deter-
mine when bills originate in the House of Representatives. The test is too
vague, too broad, and even too narrow (given its apparent aspirations).
For instance, it doesn't address two recent flagrant violations of the
"spirit" of the clause. In 1968 and in 1982, the Senate superimposed
major tax bills on minor existing House legislation.247 The House only
considered the bills in conference and in its final vote.24 The "primary
244. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97 (1961).
245. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
246. Chadha was not beautifully reasoned. Academics have been critical of Burger's formalism.
See eg., Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions - A
Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 497 (1987).
247. 1_ DouGLAs ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL AcTION 164-65, 185 (1990).
Such evasions are nothing new: "The tariff act of 1883 really originated in the Senate, where it was
added to a small internal revenue reduction bill which came over from the House, and the new bill
with some changes was accepted by the House." FORD, supra note 20, at 244.
248. For an interesting episode demonstrating the House's capacity to enforce the Origination
Clause, see T.R. REID, CONGRESSIONAL ODYSSEY 69-71 (1980).
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purpose" of the final bill was taxation, but the taxation part of the bill did
not originate in the House. How should the Court analyze those two
laws or other legislative circumventions? Either it will apply its vague
"primary purpose" test to invalidate such legislation, thereby becoming
entangled in subtle legislative tactics, or else it will dilute the test so that
applications will appear to be random. Because such legislative maneu-
vers are inevitable and because the legislature will constantly create new
means to outflank the Court, the Court should have adopted Justice
Scalia's solution; complete deference to the House Speaker's certification
that the bill originated in the House. The Speaker is bound by the con-
vention of honesty, and the Court should rarely examine the internal dy-
namics of Congress. This "formalistic" approach resembles the British
solution.
Although Justice Scalia's resolution echoes the English approach,
neither society should simplistically lift constitutional outcomes from one
country and force them into the other country's constitution, whether
those solutions be legal or political. Too many differing, unknown collat-
eral effects exist, caused by the significantly different cultures and consti-
tutions. Still, Munoz demonstrates why the Court should consider
conventions when formulating constitutional law. The House of Repre-
sentatives ought to develop its own set of constitutional conventions to
protect its powers under the Origination Clause and should not look to
the Supreme Court for meaningful assistance. Once the Speaker has cer-
tified that the bill began in the House, the House has "waived" any rights
and powers. The Court should affirm the legislation. Such judicial with-
drawal does not mean that constitutional law will disappear; the
Supreme Court needs to protect the basic "rule of recognition." Some-
times the Court will need to act aggressively, as it did in Chadha, but at
other times it should respond with more restraint, leaving effective en-
forcement of a particular clause to the appropriate elected branch.
Note how application of conventions leads to a better result than
using the "political question doctrine." If the origination issue were
completely nonjusticiable, the Court should not intervene even if the
Speaker of the House failed to certify the challenged bill as having
emerged from the House. The "rule of recognition" would partially
break down. Yet the Court should not aggressively intervene even if the
issue is technically "justiciable." The Court should leave to Congress the
final constitutional resolution of most origination issues, because conven-
tions provide the best means for protecting the House of Representative's
prerogatives.
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2. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois.2 49 In Rutan v. Republi-
can Party of Illinois, decided the same year as Munoz, the Supreme Court
ruled that various Illinois and Republican party officials violated the
First Amendment rights of low-level state officials by refusing to hire,
promote, recall, or transfer them because of their party affiliation and/or
support. In his dissent, joined by three others, Justice Scalia concluded:
"The appropriate 'mix' of party-based employment is a political question
if there ever was one, and we should give it back to the voters of the
various political units to decide, through civil-service legislation crafted
to suit the time and place, which mix is best."250 The majority opinion
did not respond, but Justice Stevens tersely replied in a footnote to his
concurrence: "Despite Justice SCALIA's imprecise use of the term...
the legal issue presented in this litigation is plainly not a 'political ques-
tion.' ,2" Such summary analysis adds uneasiness to the inevitable com-
plexity surrounding the proper scope of judicial review over such
constitutional disputes.
Even if current political question doctrine is clumsy, did the Rutan
Supreme Court err in holding that low-level state officials have a First
Amendment right not to be discriminated against in terms of transfers
and promotions because of party affiliation and/or support? Should the
Court have stayed out, stating that the mix of patronage and civil service
in state and federal government should be left in flux or resolved by con-
vention/statutory law? Notice that the concept of conventions cannot
answer these questions. It operates at such a high level of abstraction
that it only can help frame the questions and answers. Certain factors
favor political rather than legal solutions in Rutan: federalism, the values
of party politics, 25 2 party structure, experimentation, a of developing via-
blejudicial standards. But Rutan presents a different situation than most
of the other disputes that we have considered because the challenged
practice also adversely affects the fundamental, individual constitutional
right of free exercise of political speech. Conventional resolutions are
most appropriate when the Court is reviewing intergovernmental rela-
tions; conventions are less legitimate responses when the Court is consid-
ering majoritarian threats to fundamental, individual rights. Quite
honestly, I am uncertain of the proper result. The alternative of conven-
249. 110 S.Ct. 2729 (1990).
250. Id. at 2758 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 2740 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring).
252. For a powerful defense of party politics, see FORD, supra note 20, at 294-333. Ford consid-
ered patronage to be the core strength of parties. Id. at 171.
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tions is one reason for that hesitation, blocking my instinctive urge to
protect those who wish to remain apolitical. The better solution may be
to condemn the elected party leaders for breaching an emerging constitu-
tional convention against excessive partisanship influencing state employ-
ment. Notice also how Rutan undermines the distinction between
individual rights cases and structural cases. Not only does structure pro-
tect individual rights and individual rights strengthen structure, but also
the two sometimes directly overlap.
3. Davis v. Bandemer. s3 As disturbing as the prior cases were,
either in rhetoric or result, they remain far less troublesome than the
Court's effort to correct gerrymandering abuses in Davis v. Bandemer.
The Court held that federal courts could review state gerrymandering
whenever the gerrymandering "is arranged in a manner that will consist-
ently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political
process as a whole."2"4 Davis does not have as firm a footing as Rutan,
which protected a fundamental individual right. In Davis, the Court held
that members of minority parties within a state could challenge state
reapportionments that "consistently degraded" their vote through gerry-
mandering. First, no individual has been deprived of his or her vote, or
of an equal weight for his or her vote. Second, the leading minority party
is more the beneficiary of the opinion than any individual."' Third, judi-
cial standards of unconstitutional behavior and judicial remedies will be
very difficult to formulate. The problem should be left to convention:
State citizens should criticize their leaders for acting "unconstitutionally
but legally" when they engage in excessive gerrymandering. The Court
should have abstained, perhaps with a comment that the country ought
to develop a convention against excessive gerrymandering.
Recent political developments in England confirm this conclusion.
During the 1980s, the Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party
won very few seats during parliamentary elections even though they won
a large percentage of the vote.2" 6 These centrists tended to come in sec-
ond to Labour in Labour areas and second to Conservatives in Conserva-
tive constituencies. The "first past the post" system, awarding the seat to
the candidate who wins the most votes in a given district, favors a two
253. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
254. Id. at 132.
255. The problem may also be overrated. See, e.g., GARY C. JACOBSON, THE ELECTORAL OR-
GINS OF DMDED GOVERNmENT 94 (1990). ("Despite its nefarious reputation, gerrymandering has
had surprisingly little systematic impact on congressional elections in the postwar period.").
256. These parties have since merged into the Social and Liberal Democrat Party.
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party system. The Liberals and Social Democrats have argued for "pro-
portional representation," which would give them a percentage of MPs
based upon their nationwide showing. One can easily argue that the
"first past the post" system in America discriminates so effectively
against third parties that they barely exist. Many voters, including this
one, might vote for a third party if proportional representation existed.
Defendants of the status quo will reply that the two party system forces
political factions to make accommodations before they go to the electo-
rate. If extremists could have their own seats, they would not join the
two parties. Imagine a Religious Fundamentalist Party.
This is not the place to resolve that debate, but only to point out
that all electoral structures are inherently biased against certain parties
and interests, and that the Court should withdraw from that arena once
it has guaranteed that individuals have roughly equal votes under Reyn-
olds v. Sims.2"7 Reynolds, after all, can be distinguished because it pro-
tects an individual right, is relatively "neutral," and is easy to enforce.
The Supreme Court could have certainly held in Davis that the gerry-
mandering problem raised a nonjusticiable political question under at
least one of the six Baker criteria. But developing precise conventions
may make such a holding more likely by demonstrating how the political
constitution can develop rules and norms to correct the problem without
judicial intervention. The concept of conventions more completely ex-
plains and defends the very narrow scope of judicial review over many
constitutional actions than does the more conclusory doctrine of
nonjusticiability.25 8
VII. CULTURAL, POLITICAL, ACADEMIC AND LEGALISTIC
CRITIQUES OF THE CONCEPT OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTIONS
A. Cultural and Political Criticisms
Should America adopt a mode of constitutional thought from Eng-
land, a country that has been in a relative state of decline for a cen-
tury?259 The most obvious response is that the British Constitution,
257. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
258. At the least, the Court should consider including conventions as a device to help it deter-
mine how to apply the existing Baker criteria: the Court should not intervene if the particular issue
can best be resolved by the formulation of appropriate conventions. Obviously, the first step in
applying this conclusory test is for the Court to become aware of this major alternative methodology
for regulating constitutional behavior and protecting constitutional values.
259. Certain English constitutional conventions arguably contributed to its social, economic,
[Vol. 40
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much less its constitutional conventions, was not a major cause of Eng-
land's deterioration in power. But even if one assumes that the British
Constitution has been a factor in Britain's deterioration, that assumption
does not invalidate the fact that the American Constitution, like all other
constitutions that regulate complex societies, is riddled with unwritten
conventions. The previous section's lengthy inventory best justifies the
concept of American constitutional conventions. American constitu-
tional conventions exist in large number, therefore they ought to be rec-
ognized. Constitutional conventions are so numerous and important that
lawyers and politicians would make better decisions if they were aware of
the conventions' existence.
Such positivism, of course, does not unequivocally generate the nor-
mative conclusion that all conventions are desirable, either in number or
in specific content. Perhaps we could reduce all existing American con-
ventions into reviewable law. But even if the Supreme Court could re-
view some or all of these issues, it would be bedeviled by enormous
competency problems. For instance, what judicial standard could it ap-
ply when the Senate refuses to confirm the nomination of someone to the
Supreme Court? The real constitutional question concerns the appropri-
ate combination of law and convention, not the existence of conventions.
Just as England may need more constitutional law and fewer consti-
tutional conventions in order to flourish, America may need more con-
ventions and less law. The concept of conventions allows both England
and America to adapt without making formal, rigid changes in structure.
The concept also allows the entire citizenry to participate more fully in
and political problems. The rigidly adversarial party system in the United Kingdom conceivably
generates too much instability because the winning party has unlimited power. Nobody can make
long-term plans because a victorious Socialist Labour Party will implement significantly different
policies than the Conservatives. Philip Norton has concluded that the members of Parliament
should not be as bound by the convention of party discipline; if they had more autonomy, both they
and the opposition would have more power, forcing the government to compromise. PHILLIP NOR-
TON, THE CONsTrumoN IN FLux (1982). The complaint that the Prime Minister has too much
conventional power may be equally compelling. But such attacks on the British Constitution are
really aimed at specific conventions, not at the concept of conventions. Part of the solution may be
to metamorphose certain British conventions into law, but one may also need to change the content
of other conventions. For example, the Prime Minister might be better controlled by a convention
requiring concurrence by two-thirds of the Cabinet before he or she can fire another member of the
Cabinet than by a statute mandating the same standard.
We should be wary of ascribing too much responsibility for national decline to the specific consti-
tutional structures in most liberal-democratic regimes. The real difficulties are more often found in
the country's culture and its leadership, not in the particular constitutional structure. For example,
more American problems are caused by parents who never read thiir children a book or who spank
their children too often than by the voters' right to elect a legislator for an unlimited number of
terms.
1992]
HeinOnline  -- 40 Buff. L. Rev.  717 1992
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the development of their constitution. Conventions are often better than
legal doctrine at fulfilling such constitutional values as accountability,
fair play, efficiency, separation of powers, and flexibility.
A related cultural criticism is that the English idea of constitutional
conventions won't survive the trip across the Atlantic Ocean. Most
scholars, including myself, rely upon "culture" and "tradition" to ex-
plain the anomaly that British and American citizens have similar per-
sonal rights and obligations even though they live under radically
different constitutional systems.2" For instance, most American liberals
would resist the English solution of eliminating constitutional judicial
review over all legislation, claiming that England is not as big, diverse, or
as dangerous as the United States. The relatively homogeneous English
are immersed in history, culture, and tradition, while Americans are still
creating a historical tradition, largely premised on law. American law-
yers can easily invent horror stories, many of which would probably
come true: Imagine what would happen in (pick your least favorite part
of the country) if there were no First Amendment.
This article's initial defense does not change; the American Consti-
tution is already infused with constitutional conventions. But more af-
firmative replies also exist. Perhaps the best way to create a more
communitarian, ethical society is to rely more upon conventions and less
upon law. Law has been a dominant cultural force in America.2 61 The
existing cultural conflict and squalor may indicate that it is time to move
on. Liberals spent the decades since World War II using the law to im-
plement their agenda; perhaps they now need to spend more time and
260. Wilson, supra note 28, at 158-60.
261. One will have to be very careful in drawing the precise lines between conventions and law.
For instance Professor Henkin correctly stated that Congress can pass laws altering existing treaties
because treaties and statutes are of equal weight. Louis Henkin, Lexical Priority or "Political Ques-
tion" A Response, 101 HARv. L. REv. 524, 531 (1987). Henkin rejected Professor Westen's claim
that the issue should be considered nonjusticiable. See Peter Westen, The Place of Foreign Treaties
in the Courts of the United States" A Reply to Louis Henkin, 101 HARv. L. REv. 511 (1987).
The English system provides guidance. Under English law, a treaty does not become domestic
law until it is confirmed by Parliament whenever (1) the treaty's terms require such confirmation, (2)
the treaty affects the rights of British citizens, see The Parliament Beige, 4 P.D. 129, 154 (1879), or
(3) the treaty changes English laws or expenditures, Att.-Gen. for Canada v. Att.-Gen. for Ontario,
1973 App. Cas. 326. Furthermore, any prior law or treaty converted into law can be altered by
subsequent law under the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, which prohibits any Parliament
from binding its successors. See MuNRo, STUDIES, supra note 43, at 86-87. This combination of
structure and doctrine indicates that treaties should not be considered "higher" than statutory law,
and that the legislative branches should be able to amend them. This system also undercuts Wes.
ten's claim that legitimating congressional alterations of treaties somehow indicates America is "law-
less and disrespectful ... toward international law." Westen, supra, at 512. At the least, America is
not the only country to allow such modifications.
[Vol. 40
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energy developing a political ethic that would be attractive to their fellow
citizens. 262 Admittedly, our culture may have gone beyond the stage
where it can respond to any shared ethical perspective, but if so, the cul-
ture is probably doomed. We must continue to create a morality pre-
mised upon compassion and common sense. A chance remains that the
country can regather itself to generate a political morality that is firm but
not self-righteous, tolerant but not indifferent.
One can make more particularized complaints about the British ex-
perience. In the United Kingdom, the Prime Minister is the chief benefi-
ciary of constitutional conventions. The already dominant Presidency
may become excessively powerful if America were to incorporate the
principle of conventions. Christopher Hitchins observed:
"Much like Britain's 'unwritten constitution'... the [special relation-
ship between England and America] provided an uncheckable, untestable
charter for the freedom of action of an unelected class. There were always
those in the United States - Henry Kissinger not the least of them - who
looked with vicarious envy on this power untrammeled by legislative or
legal restraint .... 263
Certainly the Thatcher Administration's record of significantly er-
oding civil liberties makes most American liberals feel uneasy. The most
infamous example was her government's ultimately futile attempts to en-
join the republication of Spycatcher in England.2 Her administration
also systematically centralized power at the expense of local govern-
ments; her desire to weaken Labour local authorities led to the disastrous
poll tax.265 Perhaps the best remedy is to constrain the British govern-
ment with a written constitution, not to create or to enlarge an unwritten
constitution in America.
Precise definitions of conventions, however, can frequently provide a
better check on executive abuse of power than passing new laws or
262. "The great liberal victories... were won largely in the courts, not in Congress, in the state
legislatures, or at the polls. Instead of seeking to create a popular consensus behind these reforms,
liberals pursued their objections by indirect methods, fearing that popular attitudes remained un-
reconstructed." CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN 37 (1991). Lasch does not
mention that many liberal organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union have always
been woefully underfunded, making litigation the most attractive alternative, at least over the inter-
mediate run. One often needs to advertise to change consciousness in this country, and that cannot
be done without money.
263. HITCHINS, supra note 153, at 318.
264. See K.D. EWING & C.A. GEARTY, FREEDOM UNDER THATCHER: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
MODERN BRITAIN 152-69 (1990); CHAPMAN PINCHER, THE SPYCATCHER AFFAIR (1987).
265. Bagehot, supra note 11.
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amending the Constitution.266 For instance, the Gulf War provides a
precedent for a new convention requiring the President to consult with
Congress and to obtain a joint resolution permitting the use of force (un-
less there are compelling reasons not to do so). That convention, uncer-
tain as it is, will constrain the President more than any law that must be
dangerously rigid, filled with loopholes, or vulnerable to being ignored.
Such important conventions would probably change as the country's ad-
versaries change, but convention's flexibility is a virtue in itself. Ulti-
mately the public decides, initially through the polls and more finally
through the ballot box, whether or not the President or Congress under-
mined the Constitution when they decide how and when to go to war.
At least the public has an additional way of evaluating presidential and
congressional behavior. One cannot and should not expect the Court to
solve by itself most of the problems caused by shared executive-congres-
sional power over military force.
The concept of conventions, which reinforces the powers of the
elected branches, can also be condemned for being too cheerful.26 After
Congress had so much trouble creating a budget in 1990, and after Con-
gress has been so lazy and corrupt in its handling of the Savings and
Loan disaster, how can it be trusted to develop, much less enforce, con-
stitutional conventions? Such understandable cynicism should not ob-
scure long-term triumphs. Congress already has created major
constitutional conventions. Congress has not narrowed federal court ju-
risdiction over constitutional claims268 and has resisted any efforts to cre-
ate more than nine openings on the Supreme Court. Even a Senate that
has frequently been controlled by the party in opposition to the President
has not strangled presidential nominations to the Supreme Court. Both
266. Because they both constrain political power and determine political morality, conventions
can be as effective as statutes in warning a country of impending abuse of power or even tyranny.
For example, ex-Prime Minister Thatcher temporarily lost significant political power in 1987 be-
cause of her administration's handling of the Westland Affair, an internal battle in the Cabinet over
whether the Westland Helicopter Company should be sold to Americans or Europeans. HuGo
YouNG, ONE OF Us 435-57 (1989). Thatcher was not just criticized on the merits of the Westland
episode; she and her supporters were also attacked for acting unconstitutionally by leaking a Memo-
randum by the Solicitor General, for evasion before Parliament, and for not letting the Westland
issue be fully debated in the Cabinet. Id. at 453.
267. This article's increased reliance on morality instead of on law does not necessarily signify
hope. The shift to ethical solutions also reflects anxiety about the society and about the Court.
Frankly, I am unable to determine how much this growing commitment to judicial restraint is a
function of a deeper understanding of constitutional jurisprudence and a growing appreciation for
judicial restraint, and how much is a result of the current conservative make-up of the Supreme
Court.
268. See Sager, supra note 167, at 18 nn.3-5, 19 n.6.
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Congress and the Executive may become even more responsible if the
citizenry were to hold them accountable to a precisely defined constitu-
tional morality.
Acknowledging the widespread existence of conventions improves
judicial separation-of-powers analysis. The Supreme Court has fre-
quently grounded its separation-of-powers decisions upon the Framers'
fear of tyranny. Citing The Federalist No. 22, the Chadha Court claimed
that its decision battled tyranny: "We should create in reality that very
tyranny which the adversaries of the Constitution either are, or affect to
be, solicitous to avert." '269 But conventional analysis reveals that law
alone cannot protect us from tyranny, a conclusion that weakens the fre-
quently used legal argument that a case must be decided in a certain way
to prevent tyranny. For instance, Congress need not fiddle with legisla-
tive vetoes if it seeks to dominate the other branches. A tyrannical ma-
jority of more than two-thirds in Congress could radically destabilize the
Constitution through a ruthless combination of expulsions, impeach-
ments, jurisdiction limitations, court packings270 and criminalizations,
little of which the Court could stop under the proposed theory of conven-
tions or any probable definition of the political question doctrine. The
President, who would have been the Speaker of the House before a
couple of impeachments, and the Congress can join together to pack the
Court whenever they want.271 Only the state legislatures, which must
participate in the amendment process, could legally stand in the way of
tyranny, since a true tyrant or evil faction would need to amend the Con-
stitution to eliminate elections.
That conclusion, interestingly enough, brings us back to Dicey, who
wrote that the true "legislative sovereign" in the United States is the
269. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 135 (Alexander Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed., 1888), quoted in
I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 949 (1983).
270. Congress could pack the Court by impeaching the President and the Vice President,
thereby giving itself the power to select a President. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
271. Congress sets statutory limits on the number of Supreme Court Justices and even on the
number of Representatives in the House. 28 U.S.C. § 1 (1988); 2 U.S.C. §§ 2a-2c (1988). Such laws
as these reveal a form of constitutional convention that I have not studied in this article. Some
constitutional issues - such as the number of Justices or Representatives - must be resolved by
statute. The resulting statutory solutions are not pure conventions because they are justiciable; the
Court should prevent Congress and the President from adding new Justices in the absence of statu-
tory authorization. But there is an unwritten, nonjusticiable constitutional rule, a "post-statutory
convention," that prevents Congress from altering such statutes. The Court could not stop Congress
from passing and implementing a law increasing the number of Justices. Thus, this important con-
stitutional power is regulated by justiciable statutory law, yet that statutory numerical unit is regu-
lated by a judicially unenforceable constitutional convention.
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supermajority needed to pass constitutional amendments.272 That group
constitutes both the greatest threat and the greatest protector of our
rights and liberties; it is a political force unconstrained by law, bound
only by a broader set of cultural values. At some point, the public re-
tains the legal power to eradicate the existing legal structure. But by
then constitutional conventions would have served one of their most im-
portant functions; Congress' flagrant violations of existing constitutional
conventions would have warned the public that the Constitution was be-
ing undermined. The voters and state legislators would then have to de-
cide whether or not to concur with such a tragedy. 73
This unlikely supermajoritarian nightmare does not require the
Supreme Court to withdraw from all separation-of-powers issues. Tyr-
anny can develop incrementally through changes in the legal system as
well as in the political system. Legislative or executive dominance at the
margin may or may not be a prelude to legislative or executive tyranny,
but the Court will be less sensitive to subtle shifts in power if it only
considers the formal, legal Constitution. Furthermore, the Constitution
serves more functions than just preventing tyranny. By drawing more
attention to America's vast "unwritten constitution," the doctrine of
conventions enables the Court to make more accurate assessments of the
actual balance of power between the different parts of government. It
enables the Court and the body politic to determine the best set of polit-
ical and legal rules to implement any given constitutional text.
The Court needs to scrutinize many nontextual changes, such as leg-
islative vetoes and such innovations as special prosecutors. It should not
create any arbitrary distinction between individual rights and structure
because structure can protect individual freedom as much as rights. The
special prosecutor case, after all, involved both separation of powers and
individual due process issues. The Justices should not formulate their
doctrine in a vacuum; they should be aware of widespread breaches of
the conventional constitution and should battle a branch that is edging
toward oppression or even tyranny. Although the Court could not tech-
nically enforce breaches of convention (since the issue would no longer
be conventional), it could become less deferential to an aggressive
branch. Breaches of constitutional convention serve as harbingers of tyr-
anny to the Court as well as to the public. Indeed, the Court may have
recently been unconsciously reacting in such a way when it upheld the
272. DIcEY, supra note 1, at 148-49.
273. See U.S. CONST. art. V (authorizing constitutional amendments).
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Special Prosecutor statute in Morrison v. l0son.27 4 If the Presidency had
not been stained by its recent dismal record of criminality and constitu-
tional arrogance, the Court might have found the statute
unconstitutional.
Conventional analysis influences other constitutional debates. Be-
cause Congress and the President retain large amounts of unreviewable
discretion, as expressed by the doctrine of conventions, Professor Raoul
Berger's fears of an "Imperial Judiciary" are exaggerated.2 7' The
Supreme Court has far less power than many lawyers believe. Conven-
tions prevent Congress and the President from packing the Court, nar-
rowing lower court jurisdiction, or disobeying the Court. Conventions
also demonstrate that the Constitution may not be "vanishing," as Pro-
fessor Chemerinsky feared,276 but may only be moving from the Court to
the elected branches. Such a shift in constitutional power may not be as
nightmarish as congressional critics fear. As the prior discussion of Arti-
cle III jurisdiction indicates, Congress has frequently acted
responsibly.277
The concept of conventions also undermines the claim that the Con-
stitution is merely a battleground between interest groups, contested by
"homo politicus," a political creature of pure self-interest. The theory of
conventions suggests that the Constitution is not completely amoral.
Like most moralities, constitutional morality partially consists of imme-
diate self-interest. However, conventions of honesty, toleration of oppo-
274. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
275. See Raoul Berger, Paul Brest's Brieffor an Imperial Judiciary, 40 MD. L. REv. 1 (1981);
RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1977).
276. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term - Foreword: The Vanishing Constitu-
tion, 103 HAsv. L. REv. 43 (1989) (asserting that the Rehnquist Court has allowed a "majoritarian
paradigm" to dominate constitutional law).
277. There is no consensus over the quality of congressional constitutional interpretation. For
example, Louis Fisher has asserted "that Congress can perform an essential, broad, and ongoing role
in shaping the meaning of the Constitution." Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members
of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REv. 707, 708 (1985). Whereas, Judge Mikva has a far darker view, stating
that Congress is not designed for constitutional interpretation, and therefore deference should be
accorded to the judiciary. Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Consti-
tution?, 61 N.C. L. Rnv. 587 (1983). See also Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term -
Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1979). Paul Brest has been more ambiv-
alent, asserting that Congress has demonstrated untrustworthy practices in constitutional interpreta-
tion. But Brest does not foreclose the possibility of the development of legislative procedures that
would allow for competent interpretation. Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and
Its Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REv. 57 (1986). See also Paul Brest, The Thirty-
First Cleveland-Marshall Fund Lecture - Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLaV. ST. L. REv. 175 (1986)
(urging increased participation of citizens and legislatures in constitutional decision-making).
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sition, and self-restraint indicate a richer moral universe.27 Conventions
should be crafted at such a level of generality that they do not discrimi-
nate against non-tyrannical political factions. If conventions achieve that
degree of non-partisanship, they have elements of "neutrality"279 and of
278. Perhaps some of these values can be found in "republicanism." See Frank 1. Michelman,
The Supreme Court, 1985 Term -Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1986);
James Gray Pope, Republican Moments The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Constitu-
tional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 287 (1990). But "republicanism," like all other "isms," makes me
sufficiently nervous. As Michelman noted, republicanism has its odious side. Michelman, supra, at
19-24. For instance, Larry Tise has described the proslavery movement as "proslavery republican-
ism." LARRY E. TIsE, PROSLAVERY 347-62 (1987).
279. Conventions can be somewhat neutral and somewhat principled. Professor Wechsler re-
jected Judge Learned Hand's argument that the Supreme Court has significant discretion in review-
ing constitutional claims. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARv. L. REv. 1, 3-7 (1959). Wechsler asserted that the Court has a nondiscretionary judicial
"duty to decide the litigated case and to decide it in accordance with the law .... " Id. at 6.
Wechsler also argued that the Court should intervene when a remedy can be formulated for an
interest that needs protection. Id. But he dramatically qualified those propositions, stating that the
Court should not resolve issues when the "Constitution has committed to another agency of govern-
ment the autonomous determination of the issue raised .... " Id. at 8. His examples of "political
questions" included the seating and expulsion of members of Congress, the Republican Guarantee
Clause, the interpretation of the Impeachment Clause, gerrymandering, and military issues. Id. at
8-9. Quoting Justice Frankfurter, Wechsler conceded that a "very thin line" existed between those
cases which are so "political" that the Court cannot intervene and those cases which the Court must
decide even though the cases contain "political" values. Id. at 7 (quoting Felix Frankfurter, John
Marshall and the Judicial Function, Address Before the Harvard Law School Conference on "Govern-
ment Under Law", 69 HARV. L. REV. 217, 227-28 (1955)).
A fully developed catalogue of conventions, containing adequate descriptions and normative as-
sessments, can help make the thin line a little thicker, and a little brighter, focusing on political
remedies as well as on judicial remedies. The concept of conventions might or might not be consis-
tent with Wechsler's approach. While conceding the difficulty of the problem, Wechsler also nar-
rowed the scope of the inquiry: "Difficult as it may be to make [the judgment about political
questions] wisely, whatever factors may be rightly weighed in situations where the answer is not
clear, what is involved is in itself an act of constitutional interpretation, to be made and judged by
standards that should govern the interpretive process generally." Id. at 9. Although the comment
superficially seems to embrace the usefulness of conventions, Wechsler argued elsewhere in the same
article that the Court is to base its decisions upon "the language of the Constitution, of history and
precedent." Id. at 17. Since the formulation of constitutional conventions includes considerations of
policy and morality, Wechsler might consider conventions inappropriate. See Id. Furthermore, con-
ventions may also exist outside the scope of the political question doctrine.
Wechsler's article is more renowned for his argument that the Court must apply neutral princi-
ples to those cases it must adjudicate. "[Tihe main constituent of the judicial process is precisely
that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in reaching
judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is to be achieved."
Id. at 15. Just as the notion of conventions helps explain the precise contours of judicial restraint
over some politically charged disputes, so constitutional legal analysis assist us in determining the
forms of the conventions. Wechsler's "neutral principles" can help formulate appropriate conven-
tions. Conventions should transcend immediate partisan interests. They should be created and de-
fended to allow different ideological factions function within the constitutional framework, thereby
avoiding the temptation of excessive "result orientation." Consider two examples. The citizenry
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"principle."2 ' As a result, the concept is ultimately more valuable to
politicians and citizens than to judges. The citizenry can allege that poli-
ticians are acting "unconstitutionally but legally" when interpreting trea-
ties, evaluating Supreme Court nominees, expelling members from
Congress, requesting Special Prosecutors, and so forth. Ambitious politi-
cians like Richard Nixon and House Speaker Jim Wright might have
been less aggressive if they had been more aware of the values conven-
tions serve and of the power with which conventions can be enforced.
The most troubling allegation that can be made against conventions
is that they will permit tyranny to flourish. Opponents can quote Wil-
liam Pitt's aphorism: "Where laws end, tyranny begins."2 ' Shrewd, evil
should complain whenever any party breaks the conventions that regulate how the congressional
majority treats the opposition. The voters should be wary of a Senate that rejects too many presiden-
tial nominations.
280. Professor Bickel both accepted and modified Professor Wechsler's concept of "neutral
principles." Bickel agreed that the Supreme Court was the forum of principle in our society, but he
concluded that the Court should not push those principles to their logical extremes. Alexander M.
Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term. Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40, 41, 50
(1961). The Court needs to compromise prudently with the political world of expediency. Id. at 50.
Consequently, the Court is not under a duty to intervene every time a case is fit and every time a
remedy is conceivable. Id. at 44. Bickel thus defended the techniques of withholding ultimate con-
stitutional adjudication, including the political question doctrine. He also accepted compromises in
substantive law, such as the Court's caution in pressing school desegregation by establishing the "all
deliberate speed" standard. Id. at 40, 50. Professor Scharpf criticized Bickel for commingling the
political question doctrine with such other passive devices as standing, ripeness, and denial of certio-
rari. Scharpf, supra note 227, at 535-38. To put Scharpf's argument in Bickel's own terms, the
political question doctrine does not simply "withhold ultimate constitutional adjudication"; the
Court makes a final decision that it does not have the last word. Bickel, supra, at 40. Nothing has
been delayed or withheld.
Bickel concluded that the political question doctrine reflects this tension between expediency and
principle: "There is something different about it, in kind, not in degree, from the general 'interpretive
process'; something greatly more flexible, something of prudence, not construction and not princi-
ple." Bickel, supra, at 46. This article's listing and discussion of constitutional conventions demon-
strates that Bickel was correct in arguing that the line between convention and law will be so hard to
draw that it will appear unprincipled. Certainly no single principle can explain all the conventions
since each clause of the text serves so many different principles and values. But conventional analy-
sis undermines Bickel's distinction between judicial principle and political expediency, which he
claimed was at the heart of judicial review. Bickel noted that the Court will be reluctant to intervene
when an issue has "to yield more often and more substantially to expediency than to principle." Id.
at 75. Conventions indicate that principle can influence political action as well as law.
Conventional analysis also alters Bickel's formulation that the Court's finding of nonjusticiability
implies that the politicians acted "not unconstitutionally." The Court may find that the politicians
acted "legally," since it can do nothing. But such a holding should not end the debate; the rest of us
still have to decide if the politicians nevertheless acted "unconstitutionally." Consequently, a judi-
cial determination of nonjusticiability and/or of a breach of convention does not generate as much
legitimacy as other judicial findings of constitutionality, and should be retained for that very reason.
281. As quoted in Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.. 2537, 2542 (1991).
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politicians can prevent the Supreme Court from fulfilling its basic duty to
prevent tyranny, thereby undercutting the primary purpose of the Con-
stitution.28 2 This argument cannot be lightly dismissed; there is always
ground for anxiety, even fear. I certainly can't predict if this conceptual
stone should have remained unturned, but I am relying on some residual
American optimism, hoping that the country can still create a viable,
humane political morality. Pessimism is also served; it is better to be
aware of how tyranny can arise within the Constitution than to pretend
that legal doctrine alone can provide sufficient protection. Finally, the
concept of conventions gives the country three opportunities to stop un-
constitutional action. First, a properly formed "convention" can prevent
an action from ever taking place. Second, the Supreme Court may not
consider a particular issue to be "conventional" and may strike it down.
Third, the citizenry can continue to clamor for enforcement of the con-
vention, even if the Court chooses not to intervene.
Just as the risks are high, so are the rewards. The concept of con-
ventions demonstrates that much of the American Constitution is fluid
and flexible. A time may come when the country decides to change sig-
nificantly, to weed out much of the existing corruption, oppression, and
decay. Constitutional conventions provide a roadmap of how significant
change can be accomplished without destroying the Constitution's basic
structure, purposes, and norms.
B. Legalistic Reservations
Aside from cultural and political concerns about the impact of con-
ventions on existing and future distributions of power and on constitu-
tional doctrine, one can also criticize the idea of constitutional
conventions for more technical, legalistic reasons. Does the doctrine of
282. In the course of evaluating United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974), holding that
the plaintiffs raised a nonjusticiable claim when they sought a public accounting of CIA spending,
Professor McCormack anticipated this article's methodology and stated some of its risks: "Although
it is possible for a member of Congress to argue that a particular secret use of funds is unconstitu-
tional, nobody is likely to take the argument very seriously if the Court has already declared the
provision to be nonenforceable." McCormack, supra note 30, at 599. But such an argument can be
raised against any new form of constitutional rhetoric; we don't know how well it will work unless it
is tried. Conventions provide a vehicle for making such arguments seriously and effectively. On a
more prosaic level, conventions may be the only practical technique available to prevent certain
constitutional abuses, because the Court probably will continue to refuse to adjudicate many such
issues, relying on a variety of doctrines. In other words, even if the Court adopted Henkin's doctrine
of "equitable discretion" and jettisoned the political question doctrine, we would still need to de.
velop constitutional conventions to give the Court more guidance in how to exercise its discretion
and to check elected politicians who will frequently be legally immunized by that discretion.
[Vol. 40
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conventions add anything new to the constitutional debate? I could
hardly be the first person to notice something so important and wide-
spread. We have seen that Dicey mentioned American constitutional
conventions in 1885.283 Woodrow Wilson discussed conventions in his
study of Congress.284 Legal debate rarely depends upon complete nov-
elty; feminist jurisprudence did not discover compassion and empathy.2"5
Lawyers mainly argue over the proper weight to give to different doc-
trines, feelings, and concepts. Law review articles often alert the legal
community to values and arguments of which it may have not been
aware, may have forgotten, or may have minimized. Constitutional con-
ventions (or some other phrase) are not as important a part of the Ameri-
can constitutional consciousness as they should be.
Justice Frankfurter repeatedly referred to "custom" in his deci-
sions,286 and Justice Scalia has frequently invoked "tradition," '287 but
these legal doctrines are in a different universe than conventions. Courts
enforce customs and traditions. Also, as we have seen, a convention can
be created out of one episode or even out of the recommendations of a
constitutional theorist; one does not simply contemplate the past. Tradi-
tion also does not offer as much guidance in applying the political ques-
tion doctrine as the doctrine of conventions. Custom and tradition
emphasize precedent, while the doctrine of conventions considers many
forms of argument, by seeking its raison d'etre in precedent, text, policy,
morality, character, and history. The words "custom" and "tradition"
are more positivistic than the word "convention," which contains an eth-
ical component. Finally, there is not yet a fully articulated tradition in
this country that a violation of a constitutional norm can take place, yet
the Supreme Court can do nothing about it. There is no tradition of
283. DICEY, supra note 1.
284. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1908).
See also CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(1890); 1 JAMES BRYCE, AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH, 391-407 (3d ed. 1895); HERBERT W.
HORWILL, THE USAGES OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1925). Dicey's editor, Professor
E.C.S. Wade, noted: "It may be asserted without much exaggeration that the conventional element
in the constitution of the United States is as large as in the English Constitution." DICEY, supra note
I, at 28 n.1.
285. Carol Gilligan has argued that gender heavily influences morality. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN
A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). See also Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 1574 (1987); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988).
286. KOH, supra note 43, at 70. See also Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving
Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REv. 109 (1984).
287. See David J. Luban, Legal Traditionalism, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1035, 1038 (1991).
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developing a precise set of judicially unenforceable powers, rules, and
sanctions to make the Constitution more effective.
The idea of conventions should not be reduced to a question of "pol-
icy." That word suffers from its own set of ambiguities. The theme of
conventions more directly links constitutional political rules with the
constitutional text and with constitutional morality than with "policy
analysis." "Convention" is a more expansive, less technocratic concept
than "policy." It implies morality and continuity, not just cost-benefit
analysis or crude consequentialism. Finally, by providing a larger per-
spective on the Constitution, conventions free us from a largely judicial
conception of the Constitution, which is largely concerned with and con-
strained by "judicial competence."
288
288. Professor Scharpf concluded that much of the debate between Hand, Wecshler and Bickel
over the political question doctrine was misleading: "In my understanding of the political question,
the doctrine cannot be regarded as a test for the validity of the competing theories of judicial re-
view.... "Scharpf, supra note 227, at 597. Instead of trying to ground his theory of nonjusticiabil-
ity in such abstract concerns as the existence of a judicial duty to hear all constitutional claims,
Scharpf concluded that most of the cases could be explained in terms of judicial competence: (1)
difficulties of judicial access to information, (2) deference over international disputes, and (3) reluc-
tance to interfere with another branch's specific responsibilities when the issue raises concerns "be-
yond the Court's reach." Id. at 587. Without committing himself to any theory ofjudicial review,
Scharpf concluded that the amendment process should be nonjusticiable; at some point the Court
must allow the people to change the Constitution and to reverse its decisions. Id. at 589. Scharpf's
careful presentation of caselaw showed that the usual reasons given for the political question doc-
trine do not really explain how the Court has actually applied the doctrine. The Court has fre-
quently tried to resolve contentious issues, id. at 549-55, and issues that present difficulties in
formulating legal standards, id. at 555-66. Indeed, Scharpf concluded that the scope of the political
question doctrine is primarily limited to international affairs. Id. at 596.
Conventional analysis differs from functional analysis by focusing on the powers and responsibili-
ties of the rest of the government, instead of on the judiciary's capacities and limitations. Because
conventions regulate both important and relatively trivial constitutional questions under different
parts of the text, they create a pressure for a more ad hoc, less principled interpretation of the
political constitution, and thus of any doctrine of judicial restraint. The Court might have the tech-
nical skill to solve certain constitutional problems, such as the admissibility of secret treaty negotia-
tions into treaty interpretation or the grounds for an impeachable offense, but it should not intervene
in such situations. The best solution is conventional. The complex universe of conventions also
undermines any grand theory of judicial review; the Court needs to assess each textual provision on
its own terms, determining the peculiar mix of values that the text fulfills. Professor Wechsler would
probably be troubled by the ad hoc nature of constitutional conventions: "ad hoc evaluation is, as it
has always been, the deepest problem of our constitutionalism, not only with respect to the judg-
ments of the courts but also in the wider realm in which conflicting constitutional positions have
played a part in our politics." Wechsler, supra note 279, at 12. It could be that large parts of our
Constitution are and ought to be ad hoc battlegrounds of warring principles and beliefs, particularly
those parts that should be governed by conventions. There may be a unifying theory for all the
conventions, but it will be harder to locate than a unified theory of constitutional adjudication.
Finally, by taking us beyond the existing cases to hypotheticals that admittedly will probably never
be litigated, conventional analysis shows that significant judicial restraint under the political ques-
tion doctrine (or some equivalent) is not a narrow one, but is a crucial aspect of our constitutional
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The doctrine of conventions is arguably too complex. Dicey's dis-
tinction is relatively easy to apply in England since the British constitu-
tion consists of a few significant statutes, common law, and convention.
Parliament can easily turn any conventions or any common law doctrine
into a statute. The American system, premised upon a written text and
significantly separated powers, is more cumbersome. Congress, unlike
Parliament, cannot convert all conventions into law. The Supreme Court
cannot effectively review conventions, but it can sometimes reverse con-
gressional overreaching into Executive conventional power; it can also
consider Executive actions regulated by congressional conversions of
conventional power into statutes. While almost all the British conven-
tions can be reduced to the underlying goal of political accountability, a
logical derivative of the British Constitution's majoritarian premise,
American conventions serve a variety of purposes because they help im-
plement the diverse goals reflected by relevant parts of the text. Thus,
they will reflect the multiple, conflicting purposes of the American Con-
stitution: democracy, separation of powers, protection of minority rights,
anti-majoritarianism, effectiveness, the general welfare, and the preven-
tion of tyranny. The short answer, which is not completely reassuring, is
that development of constitutional conventions will be no more compli-
cated than development of constitutional law. We need to define the
proper mix of law and convention for each clause, and to debate what
types of argument are appropriate to determine that mixture. This arti-
cle only begins that inquiry.
Do constitutional conventions create unnecessary obfuscation?
That query almost assumes that the Baker criteria provide sufficient clar-
ity and self-justification. Conventions offer a fuller, clearer description of
the Constitution than the existing political question doctrine. One way
or the other, the Court has to decide when it should not intervene, and
conventions help the Court establish the proper scope of review. Con-
ventions force us to confront the mixture of law and politics that make
up the Constitution, while the Baker tests tend to separate that basic
problem into six discrete legalistic categories. The Baker standards look
at the Court's responsibilities; conventions help us determine the other
branches' obligations. The phrase "constitutional convention" does not
mandate a specific resolution of any particular constitutional dispute,289
structure. We can miss much of the Constitution if we only focus on the caselaw and on the issues
that are likely to be litigated in the future.
289. Any rhetorical concept that operates at a high level of generality will fail to generate spe-
cific results. Nevertheless, the Court's decision over which forms of argument it will consider radi-
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the concept provides us with an additional mode of discourse, emphasiz-
ing political remedies.
A related complaint is that conventions suffer from malleable circu-
larity.2"o But any general legal concept that is incapable of mandating
particular results is always vulnerable to malleability and potential circu-
larity. For instance, why would I be willing to tolerate the risk of con-
gressional overreaching in impeachment, but would oppose the line-item
veto because I am wary of presidential abuse? Why am I satisfied with
the conventions that regulate impeachments but find no satisfactory con-
ventions that can effectively control the line-item veto?291 After all, Con-
gress retains more weapons to battle a President using the line-item veto
than does a President who is threatened by a partisan impeachment pro-
ceeding. State governors have used line-item vetoes without triggering
disaster. I have to concede that my formulation of specific conventions
reflects my underlying biases, apprehensions, and reactions to recent
political realities, such as extraordinary presidential power combined
with periodic outrageous presidential abuses of that power (not to men-
tion congressional muddling). This article has not been a purely neutral
application of abstract principles of government. Nor should it have
been. If one accepts the proposition that political assumptions permeate
the law, one shouldn't be surprised to learn that political beliefs will even
more thoroughly determine the specific conventional rules which regu-
late political behavior. Much of the constitution will change, as it
should, as all of us learn from experience.
Just as the last question in a legal case is the remedy, so the final
problem concerning conventions is determining the appropriate sanction.
Conventional sanctions vary dramatically in their impact, their fre-
cally influences outcomes. Spurred by Justice Scalia, the Court has recently revived the "tradition"
argument. In 1989 and 1990, the Justices used the word "tradition" in thirty cases concerning the
United States Constitution. For specific examples, see Powers v. Ohio, 111 S.Ct. 1364 (1991),
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2748 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and
Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
290. This article's exploration of conventions can be attacked for being too passive; hardly a
single Supreme Court decision would be disturbed if the Court adopted all of the article's recommen-
dations. The concept may nevertheless have significant legal value because we do not know what
issues the Court will face in the future. It can also influence political behavior outside the
courtroom.
291. One can explain the distinction between line item vetoes and impeachment by invoking
constitutional text: the Constitution entrusts Congress with the impeachment power and with the
power of finance. But all constitutional lawyers know that the text is just the beginning, even if some
wish otherwise. The legal academy should share some of its experience about evaluating constitu-
tional rhetoric with the politicians, historians, and political scientists who have been most involved
with the political constitution.
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quency, and their application. Such politically charged weapons as im-
peachment, censure, forced resignation, and prosecutorial discretion will
not always be used appropriately, much less "neutrally." Voter reaction
to breaches of convention will always be hard to predict, in terms of
either intensity or duration. The voters will probably forgive or forget
most violations of conventions which occur early in a politician's term.
Although these criticisms have power, they create the false impression
that the legal system can handle these particular problems. The reality is
that the judiciary never has considered and never will consider many
constitutional decisions and disputes. Under existing rhetoric, politicians
remain largely immune from constitutional criticism so long as they do
not violate any laws. Conventions offer an additional constitutional con-
straint on political actions, although they will often be weak.
C. Potential Academic Criticisms of the Doctrine of Conventions
Even if one separates the doctrine of conventions from nonjusticia-
bility, many lawyers will remain uncomfortable with the doctrine's impli-
cations. This section shall apply some of the scholarly arguments made
against the political question doctrine to the concept of conventions.
Professor Redish attacked the political question doctrine for foster-
ing lawlessness.292 Redish's argument posits that lawlessness is always
undesirable, perhaps because he believed that such behavior is then com-
pletely unregulated. Redish's dualism forces the Court to choose be-
tween law and anarchy. But there is and ought to be an ethical
component to any decent society; some issues ought to be resolved non-
legally. The principle of conventions demonstrates how such an ethical
constitutional system functions. The scholars, politicians, and public
can self-consciously develop explicit standards to limit political
discretion.
Redish also feared that the political question doctrine reinforces in-
appropriate judicial deference at the expense of individual rights. He
noted that the Korematsu293 decision, which upheld the internment of
Japanese-Americans during World War II, approached the status of a
political question decision because the plaintiffs had "effectively no re-
view."2 94 By focusing on structure instead of individual rights, this arti-
cle has avoided some of the specific problems that Redish raised. The
doctrine of conventions does not require the judiciary to accept govern-
292. Redish, supra note 35.
293. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
294. Redish, stipra note 35, at 1037.
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mental deprivations of individual liberty. On the other hand, this article
has not attempted to draw a bright line between structure and rights
because government structure directly and indirectly affects individual
rights.
There is no doubt that some abuses will occur and that courts will
be unable to rectify the situation. For instance, President Reagan
pardoned, without studying the trial record, FBI officials W. Mark Felt
and Edward Miller, who were convicted in 1978 for ordering the burgla-
ries of the Weather Underground.29 At most, President Reagan argua-
bly violated a convention by pardoning these men. This example may be
too easy; few scholars would give either Congress or the courts power to
review pardons. But the example demonstrates that many constitutional
abuses, such as gerrymandering or the conduct of secret armed conflict,
remain or ought to remain immune from judicial review (particularly in
the absence of permissible congressional statutory regulation). The
greater the number of conventions, the greater the opportunity for abuse
of whatever discretion the conventions authorize. There are costs associ-
ated with the conventional perspective, but there are greater costs in ig-
noring or jettisoning the notion of conventions.
Although Redish did not discuss the pardon issue, he conceded that
the Court must vary its degree of deference to other branches depending
upon the issue raised.2 96 But he nevertheless concluded that "the Court
must draw the final constitutional calculus." '297 Why must the Court al-
ways have the last word on all constitutional disputes? Part of the an-
swer lies in the first sentence of Redish's article: "The so-called 'political
question' doctrine postulates that there exist certain issues of constitu-
tional law that are more effectively resolved by the political branches of
government and are therefore inappropriate for judicial resolution.
2 9 8
The concept of conventions reinforces that postulate, which Redish re-
jected, by showing how the political branches can and ought to resolve
certain constitutional problems more effectively than the judiciary.
Professor Henkin concluded that the political question doctrine is
"an unnecessary, deceptive packaging of several established doctrines
... ,299 When he was a law professor, Michael Tigar stated that there is
295. KENNETH O'REILLY, HOOVER AND THE UN-AMERICANS 291 (1983).
296. Redish, supra note 35, at 1048.
297. Id. at 1060.
298. Id. at 1031 (emphasis added).
299. Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L. J. 597 (1976).
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"no such thing" as the political question doctrine.3" Professor McCor-
mack labelled nonjusticiability a "myth": "This Article contends there is
no such thing as justiciability, except for the narrow requirement that
courts handle only judicial proceedings. ' 30 1 All three authors then
hedged their initial attacks. Even though Henkin believed judicial review
was always appropriate, even in impeachment cases, 302 he proposed that
the Court should sometimes exercise its equitable discretion to refuse to
settle some of the more difficult issues.3°3 Tigar suggested that the Court
should decide all cases using the doctrine of deference and evidentiary
devices to reflect the degree of autonomy the other branches should
have.3 4 As we shall see, McCormack vacillated over the question of
finality.305
Because these scholars provided the Court with alternative doctrinal
devices to support the government, one might conclude that the debate is
only over doctrinal semantics or doctrinal aesthetics. Who cares what
doctrine the Court uses so long as it makes the proper decisions on the
merits? But if the Court were to take the scholars' advice, it could exces-
sively legitimate many issues. Judicial manipulation of deference, bur-
dens of proof, and equitable discretion can stack the decks against a
300. Tigar, supra note 32, at 1135.
301. McCormack, supra note 30, at 595. McCormack agreed with Henkin that the doctrine
only obfuscates issues. Id. at 633.
302. Henkin did not simply reformulate the caselaw into exercises of judicial deference, which
he called "ordinary respect." Henkin, supra note 33, at 601. He tried to weed out all hypothetical
examples. Thus, Henkin maintained that the courts should consider such issues as the constitution-
ality of the Vietnam War, id. at 623-24, the process of impeachment, id. at 604 n.24, 605 n.26, the
implementation of constitutional amendments, id. at 613-14, and even the "Republican Guarantee"
clause, id. at 607-08. Henkin concluded his review of the cases by stating: "The leading cases of the
past were or could have been decided, I believe, without foreswearing judicial review or indulging
other extraordinary self-effacement by the courts, whether from principle or prudence." Id. at 617.
303. Id. at 624.
304. Tigar, supra note 32, at 1171. Tigar commenced his attack on the political question doc-
trine with "the general principle that a federal forum must be generally available for the decision of
any federal claim," id. at 1151-52, particularly when a case involves personal liberty, id. at 1179. He
then dismissed the political question standards set forth by Professor Wechsler and Professor Bickel
as being too general and Justice Brennan's Baker v. Carr tests because they are necessary but not
sufficient grounds for making a determination of nonjusticiability. Id. at 1153-55. Tigar also criti-
cized those formulations because they did not reflect earlier precedent. Id. at 1155-63. Tigar refor-
mulated the cases as examples of judicial deference, not judicial surrender, to the other branches
when those branches are acting within their "spheres of competence." Id. at 1173. Tigar's complaint
that there is no easily identifiable unifying thread, theory, or distinction to the political question
doctrine does not invalidate the related doctrine of conventions. We are trying to determine the
"rules of the game" in the political world to help us understand how that world coexists with its
judicial cousin.
305. See infra text accompanying notes 307-09.
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plaintiff as effectively, but even more obscurely, than holding that the
Court cannot decide the claim because it is nonjusticiable or conven-
tional. The plaintiff can still take his or her allegation of unconstitution-
ality to the body politic. By rejecting the idea that "some constitutional
requirements are entrusted exclusively and finally to the political
branches of the government for 'self-monitoring,' "I' Henkin forces the
Court to decide virtually all constitutional disputes. The Court will still
frequently rule in favor of the government, perhaps relying upon Hen-
kin's "equitable discretion." However, such holdings give too much le-
gitimacy to many constitutional conflicts. The Court should have the
option of notifying the constitutional community that it did not have the
last word on a given constitutional dispute and that the political part of
that community needs to develop additional constitutional standards to
effectively safeguard certain constitutional values. It is better to ac-
knowledge the inevitability and even desirability of a significant degree of
"self-monitoring" than to assert that "sef-monitoring" does not or
should not exist.
Much of the debate comes back to deciding which constitutional
actor ought to have the last word. McCormack, at least in the earlier
part of his article, favored judicial finality: "Once having assumed the
Marbury burden of following the law, for the Supreme Court to leave
both interpretation and enforcement to the political branches is to at-
tempt to read the provision out of the governing law and make it a mere
exhortation." ' 7 That premise led McCormack to criticize the Rehnquist
Court for shifting constitutional claims to Congress: "If the Rehnquist
Court wishes to make the political branches more involved in interpret-
ing and enforcing the Constitution, then it should disclaim the role of
ultimate arbiter which the Court has held for almost 200 years."30 8 Yet
at the end of his article, McCormack equivocated, "[w]hen the Court
holds that it is up to another branch to decide the meaning of a constitu-
tional term, it has exercised judicial review .... The Court has not re-
fused to decide "the issue"; it has decided the issue by holding that
another branch has final authority.
' ' s31
The concept of conventions demonstrates more clearly than the ex-
isting political question doctrine or than these critics that many constitu-
tional disputes cannot be adequately resolved by the judiciary. The
306. Henkin, supra note 33, at 599.
307. McCormack, supra note 30, at 599.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 634.
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Court will not make and, in fact, should not always formulate the final
constitutional decision, the final exercise of discretion, the final set of
constitutional rules, or the appropriate sanction. Nonjusticiability may
be a "myth," but we need to invent something like it to express a very
high level of judicial restraint, simply because we cannot function with-
out it. Conventions support ambiguous judicial endings. Sometimes the
constitutional debate should not end when the Court has ruled against a
plaintiff, but rather, should just be starting. By trying to eliminate any
notion of nonjusticiability or of a high degree of restraint, scholars force
the Court to choose between two options: the Court must either pro-
scribe the challenged activity as illegal and unconstitutional or hold that
the defendants completely and legitimately acted within their constitu-
tional authority. There is not a third opportunity of leaving a cloud over
the government's actions. That cloud can best be created by articulating
a theory of conventions, notifying the rest of the country that important
parts of many constitutional debates remain for it to resolve.
In short, a theory of conventions requires the American legal com-
munity to let go of much of its beloved Constitution (or at least of its
constitutional caselaw). Many great constitutional struggles do not and
should not take place inside the judiciary's empire. The resulting consti-
tutional universe is less certain, less predictable, less rule-bound, less con-
trollable, less theoretical, and in some ways, more dangerous than the
constitutional world that most law students and law professors study.
But if these somewhat disturbing conclusions are true, as this article has
sought to establish, then we should acknowledge those truths. We
should more self-consciously develop rules to control by non-legal means
the power that the politicians inevitably have. The concept of conven-
tions simultaneously increases anxiety and offers a partial palliative for
that dread.
Finally the body politic has to make a difficult distinction when de-
termining violations of conventions and sanctions for such violations.
When has a politician acted "unconstitutionally" by "breaching" a con-
vention, and when has a politician merely modified a convention or cre-
ated a new convention? These questions reflect a basic tension between
the core values conventions serve. Conventions signify constraints on
political action, yet they also permit constitutional change. There can
never be a simple answer to this dilemma. And this constitutional dis-
pute, like so many others, must ultimately be decided in the court of
public opinion. The public will decide if the politician has validly as-
serted the defense that he or she is merely creating a new convention or
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that the politician is guilty of undermining the Constitution. Technical
issues, such as the scope of Article III, will probably be monitored by
more informed members of the public. More fundamental issues, such as
President Nixon's not providing information to the House Committee
investigating his impeachment, will be determined by the citizenry. 10
Thus public opinion alters the actual structure of the Constitution; the
public, informed and relatively uninformed, interact with the politicians
to create and enforce particular constitutional conventions. The public,
of course, also affects political behavior more immediately through elec-
tions, polls, monetary support, and other avenues.
VIII. CONCLUSION
America is wobbling, torn by a callous court,311 a bitter and self-
indulgent electorate, special interest group dominance, class and racial
conflict, a superficial but seemingly impregnable Congress, and an iso-
lated, frequently arrogant Presidency. It is tempting to find solutions
through more laws, more Supreme Court decisions, or new constitutional
amendments. Critics may dismiss this article's alternative of developing
constitutional conventions as quaint at best, or as an inappropriate form
of argument in America, at worst. They may argue that the British are a
people of convention and tradition, but this country remains a polyglot, a
frontier society. In a land of "wheeler dealers," the idea of "political
morality" is a dangerously naive oxymoron. Only the sharp edge of the
law, preferably permanent constitutional or criminal law, can keep politi-
cians in line.
Such a grim rejoinder may be a bit of a caricature, but it can be
partially met on its own grounds. Too much law can empower politi-
cians as much as too little law; we need a proper mix of law and conven-
tion, not one or the other. The problem of the proper blend can be
restated to reflect other basic questions. What is the appropriate combi-
nation of law and virtue? 12 What is the most felicitous mixture of law
and politics? What is the role of culture in constitutional law? The con-
cept of conventions cannot precisely answer such profound queries, but
310. Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon. President of the United States, House Calendar #426,
House of Rep., 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., art. III, reprinted in FROM: THE PRESIDENT 619 (B. Oudes, ed.
1989).
311. See James Wilson, Reconstructing Section Five of The Fourteenth Amendment to Assist In.
poverished Children, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 391 (1990).
312. Christopher Lasch has evaluated several definitions of "virtue." CHRISTOPHER LASCH,
THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN 59, 175, 233, 250, 274, 373 (1991). See also ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984).
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simply enables us to frame the issues by combining two alternative ap-
proaches for constraining power, law and morality. It reminds us that
law is not enough. Particular laws and structures can be less important
than either the people who work within those systems 313 or the overall
culture. The concept of conventions also reveals the constitutional mo-
rality that most of us have in common.314
The Constitution must be continually enforced by the political
branches and the people, as well as by the courts. If we are caught in a
Manichean world of having to choose between law and anarchy/despot-
ism, we have reduced the possibility of developing a humane society. We
would no longer be relying upon the virtues of either our politicians or
our citizenry to strengthen our Constitution. Too much law can be as
dangerous as too little law. Such truisms do not simply reflect themes of
political empowerment and responsibility. Because politicians can theo-
retically change conventions at any time, conventions provide much of
the needed flexibility within the American Constitution. For better or
for worse, the Constitution periodically transforms itself in response to
shifts in public opinion. 15 In short, all constitutional societies should
create the best blend of law and convention to control and define their
constitutional branches, instead of relying exclusively on either
technique.
Little harm can come from having American constitutional lawyers
and judges think more often and more analytically about the rules and
standards that arise under the political side of the Constitution, coexist-
ing with the legal, judicially enforceable part of the Constitution. The
legalistic impulse often has the noble goal of systematically attempting to
organize a set of rules and standards to control aggression. But that im-
pulse can become compulsive and self-centered, entering into arenas
where it does not belong. Not all behavior, not even all governmental
behavior, can or should be controlled by the courts. The concept of con-
ventions offers an alternative approach that should appeal to lawyers: the
orderly development of a series of rules, based upon text, history, prece-
dent, policy, and morality, that can better define the Constitution and
better protect all of us from tyranny than exclusive reliance upon the
313. Bagehot observed: "But generally the laws of a nation suit its life; special adaptations of
them are but subordinate; the administration and conduct of that life is the matter which presses
most." BAGEHOT, supra note 57, at 153.
314. Constitutional adjudication inevitably generates winners and losers. Formation of proper
constitutional conventions can solidify the body politic.
315. See A.V. DICEY, LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND (1905). For the court's most
recent perspective, see Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
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Supreme Court. In other words, the notion of conventions suggests the
following resolution of the law-politics dichotomy: all legal questions are
political, but some political questions should not be legal.
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